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11. An otjective estimate of Berkeley and of Bowne shows kindred
elements of strength and of weakness, Berkeley "being the
more original and creative of the two, though the system
of Bowne is more comprehensive and coherent than that of
Berkeley. Berkeley contributed the idealistic conception
of knowledge and of reality; Bowne contributed the con-
ception of personality as a methodological principle.
Berkeley was the father of personal idealism; Bowne was
"the first personal! st" . - 162
IE. Summary of Conclusions*
Attracted to Berkeley by community of interest and intel-
lectual sympathy, Bowne early became acquainted with Berkeley,
whose idealism met Bowne' s favor. Influenced by Berkeley
and the Berkeleian principles, Bowne developed a system
which admitted the constructive elements of the Berkeleian
philosophy and tended to correct the defects. Although
Bowne 's system seems to have been independently developed,
yet the Berkeleian principles have furnished the central
framework, while the chief modifying influence has been
that of Kant. Bowne himself elevated personality to the
central place in philosophical method, so that he may right-
ly be called "the first Personal! st" . Thus Bowne' a system
is in truth "Kantianized Berkeleian! sm" . The Personalism
of Bowne is the modern development of Berkeleian Idealism, 162
I
THB RELATIONS BaTWBSH BBRK3LBY AKD BOWKB.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Reasons for undertaking the research
The present study seeks to determine the relationship
"between the philosophy of Bishop George Berkeley and that of
Professor Borden P. Bowne, These two men, while moving in the
sane current of Idealism, were separated "by nearly two centuries
of time, and numerous doctrines of large philosophical importance
entered the stream of thought during the interval. Accordingly,
if we can trace the influence of Berkeley in the teachings of Bowne
,
and observe just how the Berkeleian elements have teen modified,
it should help us not only to appreciate the thought movements of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but to judge also with
some fairness concerning the general trend and goal of the main
philosophic current.
It is important to discover the relationships among thinkers
generally, for in so doing, we learn not only the facts of history
but also the meaning of the facts. It is undoubtedly true that
"Only the final and absolute humanity, only the ultimate and perfect
civilization, would possess, were siich a civilization possible on
earth, the final and absolute philosophy"-^; but it may also be true
that "There is a dialectic in our thought whereby we are driven from
one position to another, until complete consistency has been reached''^^
so that "The world movement is but the dialectical unfolding of
thought itself."^ If this principle be accepted, even in a limited
l_Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 12
2-Bowne, theory of Thought and Knowledge, 305 5-Ibidera, 304

sense, the delineation of relationships among thinkers should help
to disclose the Truth itself.
The two men whose doctrines form the subject of the present
study raay be looked upon as spokesmen in their respective centuries
for that major current of thought known as Personal Idealism. Berkeley,
indeed, has been called the father of modern Personalism; and while
estimates of Berkeley's importance vary widely, his system at least
looms so large in the history of philosophy that no fair historian
can ignore it, and few thinkers in modern time have been able to es-
cape his influence. Viscount Haldane is probably right in affirming
that "There is no modern thinker who does not owe something to such
subjective idealists as Berkeley and Hume."^ Borden P. Bowne stands
too near us in time to permit of any accurate appraisal. He also has
been variously estimated, and there have been eminent voices to do him
honor. Though less original than Berkeley, yet as a writer, he has
given clear expression to the idealistic teaching, and he may justly
be regarded as a representative exponent of Personal Idealism in its
later form. Inasmuch as Bowne frankly claims kinship with Berkeley
in philosophical doctrine, it is well for the careful student to ex-
amine the claim. It will be our endeavor in the following pages to
determine (1) what were the respective contributions of Berkeley and
of Bowne to philosophy, and (2) to what extent Bowne himself was cor-
rect in affirming a relationship between his doctrine and that of
Bishop Berkeley.
Our study should also help to clarify the question of the ob-
jective worth of the Berkeleian philosophy. If one has faith in the
ultimate survival of Truth - and without some such faith, all study
must appear futile - one may look for the more valid portions of an
early doctrine to reappear in a later age; if we find certain elements
1-Haldane, Reign of Relativity, p.
9
{)
of Berkeley's syaten surviving in the speculations of isowne , this fact
would seem to indicate the validity of the elements in question. Such
a test is not in any sense final, for certain errors have been known to
persist for centuries with marvellous tenacity; yet the survival of philo
sophic doctrine is an important kind of evidence, and inevitably chal-
lenges attention. A just critical estimate of the philosophical accom-
plishments of Bishop Berkeley should be reached more easily after we
have heard the Berkeleian propositions rephrased by Borden ?. Bowne
,
since Bowne* s viev; of Berkeley represents not only a perspective of
nearly two centuries of time, but also an intellectual vantage point
more particularly created by the oo rnprehensive work of such thinkers as
Kant and Hegel. v/hatever of Berkeley survives in modern thought after
such a passage would seem to possess credentials of a very special
character
.
Again, our research will be valuable, if it enables us to look
with clearer understanding upon the life and work of Borden P. Bowne.
Considering the books which have come from Bowne* s pen, the high recog-
nition accorded him by eminent and thoughtful men, and the invitations
which he received to important philosophical appointments, it would
seem that too little is known of Bowne among students of modern thought,
J, Cook Wilson of Oxford spoke of Bowne as "the most important of modern
American philosophers."'^ Hermann Lotze of (jottingen acknowledged person-
al obligation to him; and Rudolf 3ucken of Jena regarded him as "distinct
ly America* 3 first philosopher."^ We need not be concerned at this time
either to confirm or deny these opinions, bvit it should be recognized
that when such opinions exist, the student of philosophy ought to know
more about the man in question than can be learned from the almost com-
plete silence of modern historians of philosophy. It shall be our en-
deavor in this treatise both to throw more light upon the work of Bowne,
1 & 2- Quoted by a. C. Knudson in The Personalist, Vol.I.,f2, (1920) p. 13

4and to measure the fairness of the hi£h praise just recorded.
There is one other consideration which would seem to justify the
present study, jfrom a purely historical point of view, it is well for ua
to know of Bowne's relationship to Berkeley. The history of Personal
Idealism has never been written. The permanent place which this type of
philosophy may hold in human thought has not yet been determined. But
its signif icance for religion and morality is already sufficiently e^eat
to call for an understanding of the genesis and growth of the movement.
As lovers of wisdom and truth, we are bound to ask concerning each of the
major currents of thought. Whence it arose, and Whither it tends? The
idealistic current claims such attention; and because Berkeley and Bowne
are representative sponsors, not to say leaders, of the movement, it is
essential to define their relationship. It concerns us as students of
history, no less than as students of philosophy, to know something of the
course by which idealism has moved from Bishop Berkeley to Borden P. Bowne.
B. Materials and methods of Kesearch*
In studying the thought of these two men, reference must be made
primarily to the writings of the men themselves. Bishop Berkeley began
his philosophical writing in early youth, his "Essay Towards a Hew Theory
of Vision" being published in 1709, while the author was only twenty-four
years old. His famous "Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Know-
ledge", in which he clearly set forth his idealistic system of philosophy,
was published one year later. In 1713 appeared his "Three Dialogues Between
Hylas and Philonous" , a work intended to popularize hia theory of knowledge,
and to demonstrate the theological and metaphysical implications thereof.
In 1721 came his "Be iaotu" , an essay in Latin on the caiise of motion. Other
works appeared as follows: 1752, "Alciphron; or the Minute Philosopher",
a series of dialogues written in America, and calculated to refute the
doctrines of the iPree- thinkers; 1733, "The Theory of Vision, or Visual

5Languaee, showinc the icinediate presence and providence of a iJeity";
1734, "The Analyst; or a uiscourse addressedto an Infidel uathematician"
;
1735, "A Defence of Free Thinking in Hathemat ic s" ; and the "Siris",
a work published in 1744, and described by the author as "A Chain of
Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Goncernine the Virtues of Tar-
water, and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from
another", a fantastic aeries of philosophical speculations, which "be-
gins with tar-water and ends with the Trinity." Berkeley also published
numerous shorter essays, sermons and discourses of a miscellaneous
character. All of these works have been collected and published in
a single edition of four volumes by Professor A. Campbell Fraser, the
first edition coming from the press in 1871, and the latest revision
in 1901. Among the v/orks in this collection appears, in addition to
the above, the youthful diary kept by Berkeley during his student days
from 1705 to 1708, and published for the first time by Professor Fraser
in 1871. This journal, known as the "Commonplace Book", contained
important memoranda originally set down for the author's private use,
and never intended for publication; yet as a record of the evolution
of Berkeley's philosophical conceptions during the formative period of
his life, the work is of exceptional value to the student of the Berke-
leian system. This value has been greatly enhanced by the careful
investigations of Theodore Lorenz, who published the results of his
study in 1900 and 1901 in Archiv fur Geschiohte der Philo sophie .
"
Still greater service in the interpretation of Berkeley's diary has
been rendered by Benno iSrdmann, who, stimulated by the work of Lorenz,
continued the investigations, and in a monograph published in 1919
under the title, "Berkeley's Philosophie im Lichte Seines Wissen-
schaftlichen Tagebuchs", gives us what is doubtless the true chrono-
logical order of the entries in Berkeley's journal. Mention will be

6made later of 3rdmann*s attitude toward Berkeley's philosophy.
Like his predecessor, Borden i^. Bowne also "beean his philosophical
writing- in youth. His first notable work was begun while the author
was still an undergraduate in college; it was published in 1874 under
the title, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer." This book was a criti-
cism of the Spencerian philosophy, and foreshadowed the theistic ideal-
ism v/hich was later to be defended as Bov/ne*s chosen system. This
theistic doctrine is worked out more particularly in Bowne* s "Studiea
in Theism", published in 1879, in his "Philosophy of Theism", published
in 1887, and finally in his "Theism", wherein the former works are
thoroughly revised and extended so as to express the author's ripened
conclusions. The last named work was given as the Deems Lectures at
Hew York University in 1902, and published in book form in the same
year. In the department of pure philosophy, Bovme first published
his "Metaphysics" in 188E; the epi stemo logical portions of this work
were afterward separated and published as a separate volume in 1897
under the title, "Theory of Thou.ght and Knov/ledge" . The remainder of
the original writing was completely revised and published in 1898 as
Bowne' 3 "Metaphysics". in 1887 appeared his "Introduction to Psycho-
logical Theory" and in 1892 his "Principles of 3thics". The remainder
of his writings were either popularizations or specific applications
of these earlier doctrines. Bowne* s later works include: "The Immanence
of Ciod" - 1905; "Personalism" - 1908; "Studies in Christianity" - 1909,
containing Bowne* s more distinctly theological conceptions; "The Sssence
of Heligion" - 1910, a volume of sermons published posthumously; and
"Kant and Spencer, a Critical Survey" - 1912, also posthumously pub-
lished. In addition to these works, Bowne has contributed numerous
articles to various magazines, chiefly to the Methodist Review and to
2ion*s Herald.

7Secondary llaterial on Berkeley .
Other materials upon which the writer has drawn in the present
study include a great number of expository, historical and critical
works, which have been written abo^it the two men by other thinkers.
In the case of Berkeley, this secondary material comprises a vast
quantity of writings, a detailed list of v^hich woiild cover many pages.
I'he compilation of a Berkeleian Bibliography was undertaken in 1910
by H. Ralph Xslead, Heference Librarian of the University of California.
In justification of his endeavor, Mead tells us, "This bibliography is
a preliminary investigation looking towards bringing together here at
the University of California as complete a collection of works regard-
ing Bishop Berkeley as can be procured. Such a collection would be a
most fitting memorial of him, in whose honor our city (Berkeley, Cali-
fornia) is named. xaead's bibliography gives a list of 339 v/orks re-
lating to Berkeley or to the Berkeleian philosophy. It coiild hardly
have been regarded as exhaustive at the time of its compilation, and
so many additional works on Berkeley have appeared since 1910 that the
list in any case must be largely supplemented, if it is even to approx-
imate completeness.
Only a few of the works concerning Berkeley need be mentioned here.
Heference should be made to l>avid Hume*s "Treatise of Human Mature",
wherein is disclosed Hume's attitude toward Berkeley, Norman Kemp Smith's
"Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason", which takes up in illum-
inating manner the relation between Berkeley and Kant, the works of
Thomas Reid and also the works of Sir William Hamilton, revealing the
attitude which existed toward Berkeley on the part of the Scottish
School, the essay on "Berkeley's Life and Writings" by John Stuart Hill,
showing Mill's enthusiastic sympathy with Berkeley and also his points
of disagreement, and the writings of T. H. (rreen, which make detailed
l-jaead, A Bibliography of (ieorge Berkeley, p.4

8criticism of the philosophy of Berkeley. Specific reference will be
made to each of these writings when we cone to trace Berkeley's in-
fluence upon the thinkers who followed him.
Writings of Berkeley's Contemporaries.
Among Berkeley's immediate contemporaries, there were few who
regarded his work as sufficiently important to call for extended
review or criticism. Dr. Samuel Clarke, the one man who might have
been expected to give the most intelligent criticism, was content to
pass by the doctrines of Berkeley with the withering comment that they
were "of little use on account of their abstruseness. Two publica-
tions, however, of this early period should be mentioned: "Geometry no
Friend to Infidelity", being an answer to Berkeley's "Discourse ad-
dressed to an Infidel iiiathemat ician" , which was published in 1734
under the pseudonym, "Philalethes Cantabrigiensi s" . The author was
Dr. James Jurin, who sought to defend Sir Isaac :Newton and the British
mathematicians against the charges of Berkeley. This publication
called forth a reply from Berkeley entitled "A Defence of Free Thinking
in Mathematics." This in turn was answered by Jurin in 1755 in a work
entitled "The Minute Mathematician." The same controversy called forth
additional criticism from a mathematician named J. Y/alton, who pub-
lished in 1735 a work called "Vindication of Sir Isaac Mewton's Fluxions"
and another pamphlet entitled "Catechism of the author of The Minute
Philosopher fully answered." The first of these papers was answered
by Berkeley.
Another contemporary work deserving of notice was the "Letter to
Dion (Berkeley) occasioned by his book called, Alciphron, or the Minute
Philosopher" by Bernard de nandeville , author of "The Fable of the Bees"
which latter work Berkeley had specifically attacked in the second dia-
logue of Alciphron. a work in defence of Berkeley was written in 1737
l-Balfour's jissays and Addresses, p . 52
i
9"by Andrew Baxter under the title, "Dean Berkeley's scheme against the
existence of matter and a material world examined and shown conclusive,"
Besides these more controversial works, we may mention "Blementa Phil-
osophica" (1752) by Hev. Samuel Johnson, the American disciple of Berke-
ley, who dedicated his book to Berkeley and acknov/ledeed the adoption
of the Berkeleian principles. On the whole, hov/ever, the eighteenth
century was surprisingly devoid of works relating to Bishop Berkeley
or his teachings; Mead's bibliography records scarcely a dozen pub-
lications of this period, and these relate chiefly to Berkeley's medi-
cinal panacea, "tar-water".
Biographical Works.
The latter part of the nineteenth century showed an increasing
interest in the nan and his work, many notable volumes being devoted
to his life, letters, and doctrines. The beginning of the present
century has likewise shown renewed interest in the thought and life
of the Bishop of Cloyne. It is significant that this period of In-
creased interest has been identical with the time of Bowne's youth and
maturity.
An important biographical essay concerning "Bishop Berkeley's
Gifts to Yale College" was published in 1865 by Daniel Coit Gilman,
Librarian of Yale College. This paper is specially valuable as show-
ing the substantial contribution which Berkeley made to American edu-
cation, the influence which he exerted directly and indirectly upon
American thinkers, and the error of those critics who have been too
quick to brand Berkeley as an impractical dreamer and visionary.
Oilman shows that a sane and far-sighted policy was manifest in Berke-
ley's efforts for the promotion of learning in the western hemisphere.
This opinion is confirmed by Noah Porter, (the younger), in his paper
on "The Two Hundredth Birthday of George Berkeley" delivered at Yale

in 1685; and thd influence is clearly pointed out by Isaac Woodbridee
Riley in his "American i'hi lo sophy , the Early Schools", 1907. The nonu-
raental work of modern tines concerninc Bishop Berkeley is unquestion-
ably that of Alexander Campbell Fraser, who, in his essay on "The Real
World of Berkeley" (Ilacnillan* s Mae:azine, 1862 , followed by another
essay in the North British Review, 1864), so caught the attention of
the world of scholarship that he was invited to prepare a complete
edition of the works of Bishop Berkeley with notes for the Clarendon
Press, Oxford. This work ap^-eared in 1871, and contained many of Berke-
ley's writings which had never before been published. This v;as followed
in 1874 by a volume of Selections with notes, and another small volume
in 1881 for Blackwood's Philosophical Classics. By the beginnine of
the present century, nearly twenty- thousand copies of these three pub-
lications had been sold in iiurope and America, and Professor Fraser,
in his e ighty- second year, was again commissioned by Oxford Jniversity
to publish Berkeley's complete works with notes. This last named pub-
lication appeared in 1901, together with an excellent biographical
sketch. Fraser* s ovm admission that he was himself "at tracted to phil-
osopihy largely by Berkeley, in the morning of life more than sixty years
ago"^, reveals the sympathy of his viewpoint. His last named v;ork is
the edition used in the body of this treatise.
Follov/ing Fraser' s work of 1871, numerous biographies appeared.
One of the most appreciative accounts is that of (ieorge 3. morris in
his "British Thought and Thinker s", publi shed in 1880. He emphasizes
the superiority of Berkeley over Locke, and observes that "Locke is
emphatically Berkeley's starting point, and explains his most glaring
deficiencies."^ The essay closes with that enthusiastic line which
Miss Calkins has quoted in her "Persistent problems", "Berkeley the
truest, acutest philosopher that Great Britain has ever knownr"^ An-
1-Fraser, \7ks.I.vii 2-Liorris, British Thought cc Thinkers, £04 3-lbid.233

other notable b ioerapJiic al sketch is that of Arthur Janes Balfour,
first published in the National Review in 1683, and later Included
in his "Essays and Addresses", 1893. Mr. Balfour's work is particularly
good in showlne how the historical setting tended to ma£:nify the im-
portance of Berkeley, whose thought, says Balfour, "anticipated some-
thing of the spirit of the nineteenth century*"^
Historical Accounts.
Among the historians, we find mxich evidence to sustain the judg-
ment of Fraser that Berkeley "suffered more from misunderstanding than
almost any other modern thinker."^ But we also find confirmation of
the opinion that "during a part of his lifetime, he was the foremost
metaphysician in Europe in an unmet aphy sical generation." Generally
speaking, the German historians treat Berkeley as of slight importance.
4Ueberweg calls him "the Platonizing Berkeley"
,
gives the most meagre
sketch of his system, and dismisses him without serious criticism.
T7indelband is more generous, but feels that "Berkeley is correctly
understood only from the point of view of Hume"^, for in Windelband»s
judgment, Hume is "England's greatest phllo sopher . "° It was Hume, we
are told, who reduced the Berkeleian system to consistency, and hence
to skepticism. Schwegler gives the briefest possible exposition of
Berkeley's doctrine. ITuch more sympathetic is the account of Weber,
who confesses his agreement with the Berkeleian metaphysics, "the only
metaphysics that may be successfully opposed to materialism." Less
sympathetic in exposition, biit more vigorous in criticism is the treat-
ment by Johann Sduard Erdmann, who points out Berkeley's inconsistency
in portraying finite spirits as at once active and passive; "Spirits
are said to be purely active beings; to suppose that they are passive
is equivalent to making them material; now towards God, they are said
1-Balfour's Essays & Addresses, 45 2-Fraser I.v, 3-Ibid.v. 4- Ueber-
weg 11,450 5-^indelband , 476 note 6-lbid,441 -Tleter ,Z97

to stand in a relation of reoeptivity, that is, exactly in the position
of the rejected tabula raja.."-'-
An interesting view of Berkeley is tliat of Andre LeFevre, the
"brilliant French materialist and atheist. He unjustly regards Berkeley
as an out-and-out solipsist, and his fiery criticism savors more of
polemic than of logic, yet one charge which he does make should be
noted. He contends that Berkeley's interest is primarily religious,
and his reasoning merely an excursion for theology's sake. This is
not strictly accurate, yet it contains an element of truth.
Much more discriminating is the writing of Charles Renouvier.
He is particularly interested in Berkeley's theory of perception, of
which he gives a reasonably fair account. He criticises Berkeley for
his empiricism and also for his failure to give a comprehensive account
of "spirit". He sums up his estimate as follows: "Nous dirions en deux
mots: la doctrine de Berkeley est vraie, elle est meme la seule defend-
able en metaphy sique
,
aujourd'hui, en tant que refutation du material-
isme; elle devient paradoxale et fausse, par suite de la confusion que
Berkeley induit lui-meme en erreur par une vicieuse application de la
croyance qu*il combat, faitepartout entre la matiere et le monde ex-
terieur reel."^
Like the German historians, the Italian thinker, Uuido De Ruggiero
has little to say about Berkeley. One observation is of special inter-
est. He notes a relationship between Berkeley and Bergson. 'j?hese two
philosophers agree, we are told, in holding that "Matter is exactly
that which we see and touch, or better, perceive."^ But whereas Berkeley
had been under the "illusion" of subjectivism, projecting outside the
mind "the web of our perceptions", Bergson on the other hand starts from
the very beginning with the ego in the midst of the external world, "and
1- J,3.3rdmann , 266 2-Renouvier, Le Per sonnalisme , £56-257
3-Ruggiero, Modern Philosophy, 176

then little by little, we detach from its firm structiire our "bodies
and ourselves. Here we see Berkele iani sn reversed, and in this re-
versal, for the first time, becoming coherent."^ Inasmuch as Bowne*s
philosophy has been compared with that of Bergson, this suggestion of
Ruggiero's is of more than ordinary significance.
Harald Hoffding, the Danish philosopher, has a good account of
Berkeley in his "History of Hodern Philosophy", Vol. I. Though he be-
gins with a word of admonition to the reader to be patient in the con-
sideration of one who partly advanced the development of philosophy,
but who finally arrived "far from the course of thought in which popular
consciousness moves, and alone can move"^, yet his account is surpris-
ingly fair, and his criticism is thoughtful. ' Hbffding inclines to em-
phasize Berkeley * s work as a psychologist much more than his work as a
metaphysician, but he also notes the importance of Berkeley's reasoning
in the field of epi stemology • Berkeley* s religious bent is pointed out,
and it is stated that he "abandoned himself" to a "my stico-pantheistical
conception more and more in the last years of his life."^
It may fairly be said that the best presentation of Berkeley's
thought and influence is that given by the English and American histor-
ians. H. E, Gushman gives an admirable sketch in his "Beginner's
History of Philosophy." Frank Thilly's "History of Philosophy" is also
exceptionally good. While the presentation by A. K. Rogers in his
"Student's History of Philosophy" has the special merit of offering,
along with the author's exposition and criticism, a number of carefully
selected quotations which are most illuminating. Rogers is one of the
the
few writers who has appreciated^ acutene ss of Berkeley in anticipating
objections to the idealistic philosophy. Not being able to call forth
intelligent criticism from his contemporaries, Berkeley himself raises
possible objections by anticipation, and "although he does not meet them
3-ibid!422'^
iUodern Phi lo sophy , 1 7 6 2-H8ffding's Modern Philosophy ,414
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all with complete success, there is very little that has since been
urced against him which he does not anticipate more or less clearly."-^
Holers feels that Berkelej/'sjchief weakness is the assiiraption of empiri-
cism as the startinc point for the idealistic reasoning;. Hoeers also
traces in his "Snelish and American Philosophy Since 1800" certain lines
of Berkeleian influence as manifested in modern time.
Miscellaneous Writings on Berkeley.
The nineteenth century brought forth a number of publications of
miscellaneous character dealing with the philosophy of Berkeley, some-
times in a serious vein of criticism, sometimes in a popular lecture
form, but all indicating the widespread interest which was felt in
Berkeley*^ life and doctrine during the period v;hen Borden P. Bowne was
a young man. Among the works may be noted "Sight and Touch" by T. K.
Abbott (1865), which attempts to disprove Berkeley's theory of vision,
a theory which, as James Ward observes, has opened a "nev/ chapter in
the theory of knov/ledge , and one the full significance of which has
hardly yet been realized."^ Bowne freely accepted the Berkeleian side
of this controversy.
John J?"i3ke, in his "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy" (1874), pays high
tribute to Berkeley for "his discovery of the true theory of vision, the
first truth ever discovered in psychology which stands upon the same
footing as the demonstrated truths of physical science."*^ Berkeley is
also praised for "the magnificent arguments by which he brovight to a
close the seven- hundred-year s war between the Realists and the nominal-
ists** and for his doctrine of idealism, "the psychologic basis of which
has never been shaken", which indeed "forms the pivot upon which all sub-
sequent metaphysical speculation has turned.""^ Fiske*s chief criticism
is directed against Berkeley's theory of knowledge, not for its relativity,
1- Rogers* Student's History of Philosophy, 372 S-oTard's Naturalism and
Agnostic ism, 428 3-Fiske, Outline of Cosmic Philo sophy , 1 . 74 4-Ibid,74

"but for the idealistic implications drawn therefrom. Says he, "What
never has been and never can "be refuted is the clear scientific reason-
ing' by which Berkeley proves that we cannot knov; the objective reality.
What can be, and already has been, refuted, is the unphilosophic infer-
ence that there is no objective reality . Unquestionably, Fiske is
here pointing out a real weakness in Berkeley's argument, a weakness
which Bowne also criticised, but Fiske' s proposal to solve the diffi-
culty by appealing: to the Spencerian doctrine of an "Unknovm Reality"
of which "Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations"^, is
utterly contrary to the thoug'ht of Bowne.
An interesting attempt to claim Berkeley as a pantheist v/as made by
Constance 3, Plumptre in her "General Sketch of the History of Pan-
theism" (1879), A number of supposed pantheistic quotations are cited,
though t?ie author admits that Berkeley himself "would have repudiated
the accusation with honest indignation, " What MiaB Plumptre failed to
note is t?ie fact that certain statements of almost any idealist can be
labeled "pantheistic", if detached from their legitimate setting. The
works lacks both logic and accuracy,
A discriminating and scholarly exposition of Berkeley's teaching
was written for Macmillan's Magazine in 1871 by Thomas H. Huxley, under
the title, "Bishop Berkeley on the Metaphysics of Sensation." This
essay was again published in 1873 in the volume of Huxley's "Critiques
and Addresses", and appeared yet again in 1894 in Huxley's book on "Hume:
with Helps to the Study of Berkeley." This interpretation was distinctly
sympathetic, so much so that A. K. Kogers is led to observe that "At
times, Huxley v/ould aeem to be headed irresistibly toward Berkeleian
idealism."^ This sympathy with Berkeley was of great consequence by
,reason of the prestige of Huxley in the v;orld of scholarship. Huxley
goes so far as to confess, "If I were compelled to choose between ab-
1-J?'iske, outlines of Cosmic Ph. 1, 77 2-Ibid.88 3-Plumptre, History ofPantheism, il.7y 4-Hogers, iing . .x;ii.ner . yh. oince 1800, p. 324
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solute materialism and absolute idealism, I should feel compelled to
choose the latter alternative."-^ In the end, hov/ever, he comes to a
position of aenosticisn, affirming his agreement with Locke "that we
simply know nothing about substance of any kind.**^
A very significant passage occurs in (r. P. Ladd*s "Theory of Real-
ity" (1899), significant not merely because the passage makes acknow-
ledgement to Berkeley, but more especially becaiise Ladd, like Bowne
,
was a pupil of Lotze, and we may well believe that the idealistic in-
fluence, mediated through Lotze, and manifest in the reasoning of Ladd,
must undoubtedly have been felt in a similar way by Bowne. A. K. Rogers
links Ladd and Bowne together as representatives of a single doctrine.
^
The passage from Ladd is as follows: " there i
s
a who le sy s tem of ont o-
lo/riQal doc trine o oncealed in every man* s work- a- day exper ienc e with
things ."'^ "I may find myself induced to acknowledge that the ultimate
cause of my apprehension and thought of all things as spatial and tem-
poral is the influence - or force exercised - upon me, of the World-
Ground, ur, to adopt for the moment the Berkeleian hypothesis: the
being of things - all the being they have as things - is their being
perceived by me and by other finite minds; but their being in reality,
is their being willed by l»od, in an orderly way, to arise in my con-
sciousness and in the consciousness of other men#"^ Ladd proceeds to
explain that by the phrase "in an orderly way", he means not merely
according to the so-called natural lav7s, tut also, and more especially,
according to the categories of Space and Time. This qualification does
not materially weaken the emphatic Berkeleian character of the statement;
and the reasoning is essentially the same as that of Bowne, who derives
his metaphysics by tracing the ontological implication of the categories.
An example of the popular and somewhat facetious treatment occasion-
ally accorded Berkeley is found in the essay on "The Influence of Berke-
1-Huxley, Orit. X- Addresses, 347 2-Ibid.348 3-Rogers, Sng
. & Araer
. Ph
,
iaince 1600, p. 524 4-x,add, xheory of xveality,b t)-.it)id,97
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ley" "by Stephen Paget, Paget presents Berkeley as a kind of charmer
whom one cannot ultimately believe, but whon one can never refute - a
charmer who wins his reader partly by the beauty of his language, partly
by his sunny and optimistic temperament, but chiefly by his "love of
common sense*"-'- The last phrase at once suggests the Scotch Philosophers,
whose principal quarrel with Berkeley was based on the belief that he
had violated "Common Sense."
Recent Criticism.
Some mention should be made of the more recent attempts to inter-
pret the significance of Berkeley's philosophy from the critical stand-
point. William Henry Sheldon in his "Strife of Systems and productive
Duality (1918) makes certain valid criticisms, but he makes the mistake
of calling Berkeley a "sub jectivist" , which was not strictly true.
J. A. Leighton's "Field of Philosophy" (1919) does better, Leighton
himself adopting the critical reasoning of Berkeley with reference to
Locke. Leighton criticises Berkeley, however, for the inadequacy of
his doctrine of nature, and the insufficiency of his account of the
uniqueness and discreteness of finite selves.^ A, Seth Pringle- Pat t i son
in his "The Idea of trod" (1920) attempts no systematic exposition of
Berkeley's work, but his criticism of the Berkeleian theory of knowledge
is particularly good. He sharply objects to Berkeley's separation of
the "subject" of thought from its "object", for, says he, "the subject
is himself a pure abstraction, apart from the real system with which he
is in relation and which gives him his mental filling."*^ Yet he agrees
with the Berkeleian criticism of Locke's underlying "subptance", and the
criticism by anticipation of Xant's "thing- in- it self
"
, since an object
by itself is no less an abstraction than a detached subject, »'To know
a thing through its qualities or phenomena - its modes of action - is to
know the real thing in the only way in which uod or man can know any-
1- Pagex, Another lievice ,4ii 2-Leighton, J?'ield of Ph.ii01-ii08
2- i^ringlQ-i-attison, i-ho idea of uO<i, 1^2
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thing;. — The phenomenon is the noumenon so far as it has manifested
itself, so far as we have grasped it in knowledge •' Bowne also grapples
with this same problem, which undoiibtedly represents a genuine weakness
in the Kantian system, and presents a difficulty which was only partially
understood by Berkeley.
,
treorge izalloway's discussion of Berkeley in "The philosophy of
Keligion (1921) is not so good. Ualloway agrees with Berkeley's account
of perception, arguing that JSxtension and solidity are relative to
the percipient mind, and it seems quite as hard to say what they can be
apart from being experienced"*^, yet he goes on to urge that "it is an
entirely illegitimate assumption that, because we can shov; that exper-
ienced objects are d_e facto related to our consciousness, they have no
being apart from our consciousness."^ Galloway seems to think that this
solipsistic proposition was what Berkeley actually maintained, whereas
Berkeley's contention was not that objects have no being apart from
"our consciousness", but that they have no being apart from all conscious-
ness, or more exactly, apart from God's consciousness. Like Berkeley,
Galloway emphasizes the large importance of epistemology in relation to
religion and metaphysics, but failing to grasp Berkeley's complete doc-
trine, the criticism is somev/hat weak.
A sympathetic treatment of Berkeley is found in "Moral Values and
the idea of i»od" by W. H. aorley (1921), aorley adopts Berkeley's view
of nature as a system of meanings, and perception as a process of inter-
pretation, but he insists more unequivocally than does Berkeley on a
definite criterion of judgment by which our interpretations may be tested.
The criterion proposed is the principle of coherence - "one portion of
experience has always been interpreted by means of another portion of
experience; and this must always be our method."^ Instead of leaping
l-Pringle-Pattison, xhe idea of (iod , 162-3 2-Galloway, Ph. of Keligion,405
3- Ibid, 406 4-borley, Moral Values, 268
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immediately, hov/ever, to the theistic conclusion, as Berkeley does,
borley at first merely affirms two implications of experience, (1) the
principle of causality, and (2) the fact of value. it is only after
seeking the objectivity of these two principles "by a dialectical review
of the various metaphysical hypotheses that Sorley finds himself shut up
to the theistic conclusion. "Since existence and value belone to the
same universe, they must have the sane ultimate ground, -- This ground
or principle of reality will therefore involve the will to goodness as
well as intelligence and power; and this is what we mean by God."^ Thus
Sorley follows a different chain of reasoning, tnt in the end arrives at
an idealistic conclusion, which he frankly admits is of the "Berkeleyan"
type
Quite otherwise is the view of Berkeley advanced by the Keo-realist,
R. B. Perry. In his "Present Philosophical Tendencies" (1916), he grants
the validity of Berkeley's criticism of the dualism of Descartes and of
Locke, but he stoutly maintains that Berkeley's argument fails to estab-
lish Idealism. "There is, as Berkeley justly contends, no substitution
or representation, no duplication or mystification"^, says he; the object
"simply assumes a certain status, definable by the special relationship
percipi
.
and involving no forfeiture of its nature or identity. But this
does not at all imply that whatever assumes the status of idea, must be
idea in order to be at all, or that there are no things that are not ideas."
"Ideas" are merely a "subclass" of "things"; they are merely "things in a
certain relationship, or things in respect of being known. "^ Thus while
accepting the ep i a temological monism of Berkeley, Perry contrives by his
"relational theory of knowledge" to hold to the neo- reali st ic doctrine of
reality. He admits the "ego-centric predicament" of Berkeley, but be-
lieves that this is merely a circumstantial difficulty which can b,e over-
1-Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, 479-480 2- Ibid . 47 7-478
3-Perry, Present Philosophical Tendenc ie s , 12 5 4-Ibid.l25 5-Ibid.308
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coniQ by "analysis in situ", so that realism may be asserted as against
idealism. And since "the theory with which Berkeley startled the v;orld
in 1710 is essentially the sane as that which flourished in the nine-
teenth century in the form given it by Fichte and Hegel, the only dif-
ference being that this latter form ("Ob jective 'Idealism" ) , affirms that
"the mind in question is not the human mind of psychology, but a univer-
sal mind"*^, it follows that the sane reasoning which refutes Berkeley has
also undermined all idealism of v/hatever sort.
Of similar tone is the sharp criticism of Berkeley expressed by
Douglas Olyde Macintosh in "The Problem of 3&iowledge" (1915). Berkeley
is spoken of as the "pioneer and typical representative" of that par-
ticular form of idealism called ''Psychological Idealism", which is de-
fined as "the doctrine that things are ideas in the mind, or in con-
sciousness; that they depend for their existence upon their being in the
mind, or at least in the conscious relation to some subject."*^ In un-
qualified terms of condemnation, Hacintosh declares that Psychological
Idealism "is, in all its forms, a malady which the psychologi st-philo-sopher
needlessly inflicts upon himself; in all its forms it is an unnatural,
4
unnecessary, and indefensible dogma." After reading this vituperative
utterance, one is prepared to find some high-handed polemic in the dis-
course, but the reasoning proceeds along less violent lines, and the
criticism in essence is the same as that of Perry mentioned above - the
charge that Berkeley improperly identifies the thing-as- thought with the
thing-as-existent - a criticism brought against Berkeley much earlier by
T. H. Green.
Two other criticisms, not quite so recent, should be mentioned here,
the estimate of Berkeley by Josiah Royce in "The Spirit of Modern Phil-
osophy" (1892) and the analysis by Miss ilary Calkins in "The Persistent
l-?erry. Present Philosophical Tendenc ie s , 134 2-Ibid.l35
3-Maointosh, The Problem of Knowledge, 94 4- Ibid. 97
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Problems of Philosophy" (1907). The treatment of Berkeley on the part
of Royce is illuminating, hut hardly impartial. Royce* peculiar artistic
style of discourse leads him to speak of the history of philosophy as a
developing: symphony, of v/hich the hero is Immanuel Kant. In order to fit
into the symphony harmoniously, Berkeley is tempered down to a minor in-
terpretation, and is portrayed in rainbow colors as "the ever- f a sc inat ing
Bishop Berkeley"!, "a born child of Plato - whose origin - is divine"^,
given to "gentle private musings", many of which are "too pretty to be
uttered at all."*' And though Royce himself, in his doctrine of "Ideas"
and a knowable reality, shows a striking similarity to Berkeley, he fails
to acknowledge any relationship, and allots to him "the third place in
order of rank"^ among British thinkers, the chief value of his work being
"the rediscovery of the inner life,"^
Miss Calkins gives one of the clearest and most sympathetic expos-
itions of Berkeley which is to be founcl among modern writings. Her criti-
cism also is thoughtful. She agrees with Berkeley that "so called 'mater-
ial' things are really the ideas of some mind, or minds; and that matter,
as unknown cause or background of these material things, does not exist. "°
Her conclusion, however, is not the theistic idealism of Berkeley, but an
absolutism of the Roycean type, in which "I, the limited self, am included
within the unlimited spirit,"''' - a doctrine which Miss Calkins calls,
"Monistic Personal Idealism."
Special Studies of Berkeley.
This survey of the literature concerning Berkeley should include
finally some mention of particular investigations of the philosopher's
life and doctrine. A dissertation on "The Principle of Synthetic Unity
in Berkeley and Xant" written by Samuel il. Bick (1898) is of special
interest because of Bowne's supposed kinship both to Berkeley and to Kant.
1-Hoyce, Spirit of Hodern Philo sophy ,71 2-Ibid.86 3-Ibid.e7 4- Ibid. 93
5-Ibid.92 6-Calkins, Persistent Problems of Phi lo sophy , 147 7-Ibid.l45
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Dick endeavors to show how Berkeley, in his conception of the Will, fore-
shadows the Xantian teaching of "the Transcendental Sgo or Synthetic Unity
of Apperception. A noteworthy paragraph of the writing makes mention
of Bowne, in v.'hose doctrine the author discovers a close similarity to
the metaphysics of Berkeley, Dick tells us that "Dr. Bowne of our own
2time does not widely differ from this conception of Berkeley" , sustain-
ing his statement with a quotation from Bovme's first edition of the
n.
"Metaphysics", v/hich has a marked Berkeleian flavor*
Of special importance was the work of Theodore Lorenz, whose articles
appeared in "Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic" in 1901. As noted
earlier, Lorenz called forth the even more significant work of Benno 3rd-
raann, whose researches concerning the meaning and importance of Berkeley's
"Commonplace Book" forms one of the mo st valuable chapters of modern
Berkeleiana. Srdmann rates Berkeley much more highly than do most other
(jerman critics. His general estimate is thus expressed, "Berkeley war kein
reprasentat iver
,
synthet i scher treist wie Platon oder Kant, Augustin oder
Thomas von Aquino, Descartes oder Leibniz, Hegel oder Comte, Sr verelnigte
nicht die geistigen atromungen seiner Zeit, sondern reagierte kritisch
gegen deren rat ionalistische Denkweisen und die ihnen entstammende liatur-
auffassung aus religiosen Jaotiven. -- Sine Schule konnte solcher Lehre
nicht erstehen. Antreibend aber hat sie wie nur wenige gewirkt . ""^ (Italics
mine] 3rdmann*s interest centers in the Commonplace Book as an original
historic document revealing the growth of a philo soi-hic system in the mind
of a man. This work, he feels, is absolutely unique. Says he, "Ich kenne
nur ein umf assenderes Dokument dieser Art: das wi ssenschaf t liche 'i'agebuch
des jugendlichen Berkeley."^ This valuable document, so long hidden from
knowledge, until rescued by eraser in 1871, was bereft of its full signifi-
cance by reason of the unintelligible order of the notations. This serious
M « a*
1-Dick, Principle of Synthetic Unity in Berkeley & Kant, 72 2- Ibid. 35
3-Bowne, ile taphy si c s ( ed
. 1882 ) ,466 4-I5rdmann, Berkeley's Philosophie im
Llohte seines V/issensohaftlichen Tagebuchs
, 101 5-lbid.9
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defect has 'been corrected "by Krdraann, who £:ives ample evidence to sustain
his arraneenent of the material.
An illuminating treatment of Berkeley appeared in 1911 in the mono-
Cra2feh of Jay William Hudson on "The Treatment of Personality by Locke,
Berkeley and Hume." This v/ork is of special interest to our present study
"because of its bearing on the Personalistic philosophy. Hudson seeks to
show that ethical personality can be sustained only by assuminf: an a-priori
element of mind, and is actually sustained by the Snglish empiricists only
by making' such an assumption. But the assumption of svich an a-priori ele-
ment is inconsistent with the empirical hypothesis, Berkeley, who was
distinctly friendly to ethical personality, is consequently not a "radical"
empiricist; but Hume, who was "radical", shows the logiCRl and inevitable
outcome of empiricism in scepticism. That Berkeley's defence of the ethi-
cal personality forced him, if Hudson is right, to make an unrecognized
appeal to the a-priori element of mind, makes him more logically the fore-
runner of Kant, and brings him into closer relationship with Bowne*
G, A. Johnston has an interesting article in The Philosophical Review
(Vol. 24, July, 1915] on "The i^evelopment of Berkeley's 3thical Theory."
The contention is that Berkeley regarded the general happiness as the
summum bonum, and while he did not systematically formulate his ethical
doctrines, and so could hardly be called a "theological Utilitarian", as
Fraser holds, yet "he was moving in that direction, and if he had given
to the questions the thought necessary to produce a systematic work, he
might have been the first Utilitarian. "1 The argument is interesting,
but not entirely convincing.
Of much greater importance is the more recent work on "The Develop-
ment of Berkeley's Philosophy" (1923) by the same writer. Johnston shov/s
that while Berkeley' s "general 'Weltanschauung remains unchanged from first
to last"^, there is in Berkeley's later thought a distinct change of
l-Johnston in Phil. Hev. (1915) p. 430 2-John8ton, iJevelopment of B's ph.258
1(
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emphasis different from that of the early years. In early life, Berkeley
had emphasized the sense element in experience and the particularity of
the ohject; with the gradual development of his thought, these aspects
hecorae less prominent "And concurrently, reason and the universal element
in knowledge proportionately increase in importance."^
aeoondary Ha t e r i a 1 on Eowne »
Passing from the consideration of the literature on Berkeley to
that on Bowne, one is immediately struck with the comparative meagreness
of the latter material. No large books have been written upon Bownej
and the whole material comprises a few small books and a small number
of miscellaneous magazine articles. Scarcely a mention is made of Bowne
by the historians; and if one were to estimate the importance of the man
by the amount of commentary nov; existing in published form, one must con-
clude that Bowne might soon be forgotten. Yet in view of the favorable
character of such recognition as has been accorded him, it would seem
that the silence of philosophic writers may in some measure be due to a
lack of acquaintance with Bowne *s thought and work. This is a difficulty
which can be overcome only with the lapse of tine; for Bowne has left a
legacy of philosophic writings, which eventually must become known, and
win a place in the general literature of philosophy according to its
merits. On the whole, it is not surprising that so little should at this
time have found its way into print concerning Bowne, for he spent his
whole philosophic career in a single institution, he wrote but little
for the philosophical journals, and it is now scarcely fourteen years
since he died. If it took tine for Berkeley's v/ork to draw forth an
expository and critical literature, it may likewise take time for the
growth of literature concerning a thinker like Bowne, who was much less
original than Berkeley.
A fine portrayal of "Bowne as Teacher and Author" v;as written in 1920
Johnston, Development of Berkeley's Philo sophy ,259

25
by A. C, Knudaon, a former pupil of Bowne , and himself a teacher and
author of no slight distinction. The article appeared in The Personalist,
Vol. I., MO. 2, a philosophical journal published by another of Bowne's
former students, Halph Tyler Flewelline. Professor Knudson's pen-picture
of Bowne is drawn with a sympathetic touch. Vhe article points out the
two basic principles which underlay Bowne* s system: "first, personality
is the key to reality, and second, life is the test of truth. "-^ The
legitimacy of these principles is defended. We are also told something
of the exceedingly high esteem in which Bowne was held by eminent think-
ers of his day.
A biographical sketch of Bowne somewhat more intimate in detail
appeared in The Personalist for January, 1921 (Vol. II., No. 1). This
sketch is entitled "An Intimate Portrait of Bowne**, and was written
presumably by Bowne* s wife, Mrs. Kate M. Bowne. The present writer is
indebted to this portrayal for numerous biographical facts mentioned in
later paragraphs.
The Methodist Review for May- June, 1922, devoted special attention
to Bowne. ^ Not only does this issue give an illuminating biographical
account, written by Bishop F. J. IfcConnell, and an Interesting summary
of Bowne* s heresy trial, collated by the Editor, but it also presents
the personal estimates of Bowne as expressed by some ten leading edu-
cators and representative thinkers of America and England. While there
is not entire agreement among these writers in the estimates of Bowne's
philosophical system, there is unanimity concerning the character and
merit of the man. All pay tribute to his power of thought, his clarity
of utterance, and his nobility of soul. This Journal also gives (p. 398)
a list of sixteen different articles which have been contributed to its
pages in times past by Professor Bowne.
l-Knudson in The Personalist. Vol . I. ,No . 2 ,p ,
7
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Sxpository and Critical Writings.
A snail number of expository and critical works on i>owne have
appeared. Shortly after Bowne's death in 1910, a little volume was
published by Oharles Bertram Pyle entitled, "The jr'hilosophy of Borden
P. Bowne and its Application to the Keligious Problem." The book con-
tains a brief introduction by Washington (iladden, and is itself a re-
print of two papers originally delivered by the author as popular ad-
dresses, vvhile it has the merit of citing some excellent quotations
from Bowne, it lacks critical insight, and suffers from the excess of
enthusiasm with which the author sings the praises of his former teacher.
Of greater significance is the little book on "Personali sm and the
Problems of Philosophy" published by Ralph Tyle'irlewelling in 1915.
"The author does not aim at an exhaustive discussion, but, rather, at a
brief and suggestive treatment that shall define for the popular mind
the relation of Bowne's thought to other philosophical endeavors."^ On
the whole, this modest aim has been accomplished. One could wish that
the author had pointed out the weaknesses in Bowne *s system, if such
there be, as well as the elements of strength. Professor i''lewelling
frankly confesses that the writing is inadequate, and expresses t?ie hope
that
-a more detailed and technical work"^ than his small volume may yet
be undertaken by some one eqiial to the task. His volume is written in
the spirit of loyal discipleship to a beloved master. the book has an
introductory chapter written by hudolf J^ucken, v;ho speaks in glov.'ing
terms of the service which Bowne rendered to philosophy, and points out
phases of his system specially meritorious.
A memorial volume by former students of Bowne was prepared on the
tenth anniversary of his death, and published in 1922 (two years after
the tenth anniversary), under the title, "Studies in Philosophy and
theology." the book v;as edited by Professor 0. wilm of Boston iJni-
1-J?'lewelling
, personalism « the problems of Philosophy
,12 2-lbid,13
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varsity, who has himself written an introductory chapter, appreciative
of Bowne's contribution to philosophy, I'his chapter includes a letter
from Creorge h, iPalmer, which reveals Professor i'almer's hi^h esteem for
Bowne# The chapter also tells of Bowne's attitude toward Bergson, with
whose rejection of mechanism Bowne agreed, but as elsewhere observed by
i-rofessor Hockine, "Bowne anticipates the intuitionism of Bergson without
falling into the anti-intellectuali sra of the intuitionist position."^
The memorial volume also presents an article by George a. Ooe on "The
iimpirical i<'aotor in Bowne's ahinking:" , which points out the difference
between the empiricism of Bowne and that of the Jinglish school to which
Berkeley belonged. An article by Bishop acConnell on "Bov/ne and the
aocial questions" is likewise interesting because of the social concern
of Berkeley, with whom Bowne is to be compared. ihe book has the further
merit of showing objectively Bowne's power as a teacher, since all of the
writers were trained under Bowne's instruction, the memorial volume
admirably proves that Bowne had the power to quicken other minds. One
of Bowne's former students has observed, **It v/as his power to awaken the
scarcely suspected spiritual energies of his students that has given him
his eminent place among the intellectual and moral leaders of his gen-
eration,"*^
Special Studies of Bowne.
Much has been said of Bowne* s relation to Lotze. A doctor's dis-
sertation upon this subject was written in 1909 by Gilbert Haven Jones.
The work was done at Jena University under the direction of Professor
Sucken. 77hile not profound, the study is a moderately good objective
presentation, and brings out important likenesses in the doctrines of
the two men. That Bowne is, in some measure, indebted to Lotze is abund-
antly clear, but that he advanced the- Lotzian position in significant
raanner is not so generally recognized, nor is it sufficiently brought out,
1-Methodist Review, C7. No. 3, 372 2-Ibid.375 (article by G.A.Wilson)
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in the jud^yaent of the present writer, by the exposition of Dr. Jones.
Otherwise, the conclusions of the study seem valid.
Two other special studies of Bowne have come to the attention of
the writer, both in manuscript form, in the Library of Boston University.
Both are dissertations for the Doctorate in Philosophy. One is an essay
by Srnest Lyman Hills entitled, "A Comparison of the Hain Points in the
Epi St eraological Theories of Borden Parker Bowne and Henri Bergson" (1914).
Dr. Mills believes that Bergson excels Bowne in his empirical basis of
knowledge, and are:ues that Bowne* s doctrine should be corrected by the
teaching of Bergson.
The other of these two dissertations likewise relates to Berg-
son. The writer is ^7. H. Powell, and the subject, "The Hetaphysics of
Henri Bergson - A Criticism according; to the Philosophy of Borden P.
Bowne" (1915). The author differs from the man Just mentioned in holding,-
that Bergson should be corrected by Bowne; he feels that Bergson' s doc-
trine is weak by reason of its divorce from theism. When the doctors
disagree, who shall decide?
Occasional References.
In addition to these special writings on Bowne, there are occasional
references to Bowne in the general philosophical literature, a few of
which may be merely mentioned. William James quotes Bowne with approval^,
Richard Falckenberg^ , Frank Thilly^, W. Windelband^, and A. K. Hogers^,
all make incidental reference to Bowne, while C. A. Beckwith gives con-
siderable place to the doctrines of Bowne in explaining the idee of God.o
The favorable character of these references would seem to indicate that
the recognition of Bowne may increase as tine passes, but as yet the recog-
nition has been comparatively slight.
1-James, Principles of Psycho logy , 1 . 219 2- Falckenberg , Hist, of Modern
Philosophy, 569 (note) 582 3-Thilly, Hist, of Ph. 562 4- Winde Iband , Hist,
of Ph. 230 5-Roger3, English & American Ph. Since 1800, 324
5-Beokwith, The Idea of God, 262, 108, 289 and 291
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Concerning: the subject of the present essay, nothing has been written.
Professor V/ilm,l Professor Brightinan^ , and Bishop HcConnell^, have all re-
ferred to Bowne's doctrinal relationship to Berkeley; and Dr. Dick, as
mentioned earlier, has specifically affirmed a similarity between the
metaphysical systems of the two men; yet the relationship has never been
clearly defined, and yre must pursue our study independently.
Our review of the literature concerning both men has contributed to
the object of our present study at least three inferences. First, it has
shown us that the influence of Berkeley has been widespread in modern
time, so that no careful student of philosophy would be likely to escape
the influence. Second, we have found that during the years of Bowne's
early life, when he would presumably have been most susceptible to such
influence, there was a special interest in the philosophy of Berkeley
among scholars, awakened by the publications of Fraser (1862, 1864, 1871,
1874 and 1881) and augmented by numerous other writings and lectures
which followed in quick succession. By the beginning of the present
century, when Bowne was in his ripest maturity of thought, the system of
Berkeley had gained wide recognition and a considerable degree of accep-
tance. It seems entirely reasonable to suppose that Bowne was duly im-
pressed by this growing interest in Berkeley, and by the Berkeleian liter-
ature which was abundantly accessible. No student of philosophy, possess-
ing the religious instinct and an alert mind , could well have run the
course traveled by Bowne, withovit feeling the influence of the Churchman
philosopher. Bishop Berkeley, whose teachings formed so important a part
of the mental atmosphere of the day. Our third observation bears out this
suggestion, for we found no less than four different writers affirming
a relationship between Bowne and Berkeley,
Out line of Procedure .
The plan of tho prosont study will bo to present first a portrayal
1- 711m. Studies in Philosophy and Theology, 9
2-Methodist Keview, GV.,#3, 371 3- Ibid. 342
)
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of the two men whose doctrines are bein£; studied, showing the elements
of similarity and of difference in their general outlook on life; second,
to seek for direct evidences of Berkeley's influence upon Bowne , as re-
vealed in Bowne's own admission, in his references to Berkeley, and in
his use of Berkeleian phrases; third, to seek for indirect evidences of
the sane influence, (a) as mediated through the teachings of other eminent
thinkers, and (t) as revealing itself in the reasoning of Bowne himself,
this latter phase of the study constituting the major portion of the
treatise; and finally, through an otjeotive estimate of the two men,
to note the elements of strength and of weakness which they have in
common, as further Indicative of doctrinal kinship.
II, BERKELEY AIID BOWNE.
A. Comparison of the two thinkers, showing parallel traits and
similarity of outlook.
George Berkeley was born in Ireland in 1685. As noted by Balfour,
this was an age of great intellectual activity, Francis Bacon had been
dead but sixty years, Cescartes but thirty-five years, while Eobbes and
Spinoza had died only within the preceding decade. Locke, ITewton and
Leibnitz were still in their prime; Toland, llandeville
,
Shaftesbury and
Clarke were still young men; Berkeley himself visited the aged ilalebranche
;
and among the literary figures of the day, Berkeley was an intimate friend
of Addison and Steele, Swift and Pope. Thus in his intellectual heritage,
Berkeley was richly endowed.
At the age of fifteen, Berkeley matriculated at Trinity College,
Dublin, which remained his headquarters for the next twenty years. Though
greatly stimulated by the writings of other thinkers, Berkeley was a dis-
ciple of none, his work showing the genius and power of a creative mind.
He accepted the empiricism of Locke, but opposed Locke's dualism; he op-
posed certain of the mathematical assumptions of Hewton, but accepted his
Ii
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scientific descriptions^; he opposec* the deism and materialistic as-
sumptions of Toland, Berkeley's philosophical diary fenown as "The Com-
monplace Book" gives interesting; sidelights upon his mental life during
these years of undergraduate study, and indicates something of the pro-
cess by which his idealism was wrought out.
In 1707, Berkeley published his first work, a Latin treatise on
Mathematics, and received his flaster's degree and admission to a Fellow-
ship in the same year. Fraser tells us that "After the customary arduous
examination of that University, condiicted in the presence of nobility,
gentry, and high officials, he passed with unprecedented applause.'*^ In
1709, he took orders in the Anglican Church, and net Percival, who was
to remain his life-long friend and counsellor. In the same year, he
published his "New Theory of Vision", v;hich narked a distinct revolution
in the psychology of sight. His famous "Treatise Concerning the prin-
ciples of Human Knowledge", containing the essentials of his idealistic
system, appeared in 171©, Thus, before he was twenty-eight years old,
he had completed the formulation of his v/hole system of philosophy. From
this time on, he produced nothing which, fron the critical point of view,
could be called new, Balfour explains this cessation of creative thought
by two considerations: first, there was lack of intelligent criticism of
Berkeley's doctrine; second, Berkeley himself was led by his practical
turn of mind into social and religious reforms, which left him little
opportunity for original, constructive thinking. This breadth of inter-
est was not without its compensations, for it served both to balance- his
judgment, and to extend his influence, "Scarce any man of his generation
touched contemporary life at so many points."^
In 1713, with the manuscript of his unpublished "Dialogues" in his
pocket, he went to London. "He was there only seven months. He had the
1-Fraser , ill
.
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assistance neither of wealth nor of family connection, and did not even
carry with him, so far as we icnow, any powerful recommendations from his
native country; -- yet we find him almost immediately received into the
Intimate society of the Whig men of letters, like Steele and Addison,
and of the Tory men of letters, like Swift and Arbuthnot. -- He went to
Court, he was introduced to ministers and statesmen, and finally obtained
an appointment as chaplain to a special embassy of Lord Peterborough."^
The explanation of this phenomenal triumph appears to have been the ex-
ceptional charm of ierkeley's manner, the brilliance of his Intellect,
and the purity of his character. Pope*s classic tribute to him is well
known, "To Berkeley, every virtue under heaven." Atterbury Is said to
have remarked, after an interview with Berkeley, "So much learning, so
much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, i did not think
had been the portion of any but angels till I saw this gentleman."^ And
Mr. Lewies observes, "There are few men of whom England has better reason
to be proud than of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. To extraordinary
merits as a writer^ he united the most exquisite purity and generosity
of character; and it is still a moot point whether he was greater in head
or heart»"^
During 1713 and 1714, he traveled in JSurope as private chaplain.
Heturning to England in 1715, he seems to have been depressed by the evil
conditions which he had observed. He was discouraged also by the burst-
ing of the "South Sea Bubble"; and when he again returned to England in
1721, after a second period of travel on the continent, he began to enter-
tain deep concern for his own country. His social idealism found express-
ion in "An Essay towards preventing the Buin of Great Britain", which
made its appearance in the same year. Such experiences turned his thoughts
toward the new world of America, where he hoped that a better civilization
1-Balfour, Essays and Addresses, 54 2-Quoted by Plumptre, History of Pan-
theism, 87. 3-lbld.87
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mieht be founded, in 1723, he disoloses in a letter to Lord percival hia
dream of founding a college in Jbermuda, v/hich should serve as a missionary
training school for the evangelization and instruction of the iJorth Amer-
ican Indians. His enthusiasm for this project was stimulated by a bequest
of money which was left him unexpectedly by one of i3wift's consorts, a
woman named Vanessa. 2his legacy, upon settlement, proved to be much
smaller than Berkeley had hoped; but his ardor was undiminished, nor did
he relinquish his hope, even when he received appointment to what he him-
self called "the best i>eanery in the kingdom, that of Derry"^, at a salary
of £.1100. He was willing to give up this munificent appointment to be-
come a missionary educator at £.100 a year.
Something of Berkeley's personal influence over men is apparent when
we learn that he raised in private subscriptions for this project some
£.5000, and secured a grant of £20,000 from the House of Commons. In 1728
,
Berkeley actually came to America, and settled at Newport, Rhode Island,
preparatory to founding the College. Much gratuitous criticism has been
heaped upon Berkeley because of this reputed visionary and fanciful pro-
ject, but Berkeley's mistake lay rather in placing too much confidence in
the English government, than in the indulgence of fanciful dreams. He
readily saw, upon reaching Ehode Island, that the Oollege could not function
effectively at Bermuda. "He therefore wrote to his friends to do their
utmost to get the patent altered for some place (which probably would have
been jsiew lork) on the continent, but they could never gain the point*"^
Walpole, the Prime Minister, failed to fulfil his promise in allowing the
grant, and Berkeley was obliged to return to England in 1731 with the
great purpose unrealized.
But let no one think that Berkeley failed to register a lasting in-
fluence upon the growing intellectual life of America. Ji>r« Samuel Johnson,
an excellent classical scholar, had become his disciple during the American
-iy-raser.i.pref
.1. 2-Papors of aevr Haven Coim7 Historical Society ,1,150
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visit - the same i>r« ciainuel Johnson who afterward became president of
Columbia University.* Moreover, Berkeley gave his Rhode Island Farm of
96 acres to Yale OolleeOt with the provision that the income therefrom
should be granted each year to three students of Yale, to be known as
"Scholars of the House", who should be maintained by this bounty.
"Among the number of persons - over 200 - who have enjoyed the fruits
of this endowment, are two college presidents - president Wheelook, the
founder, more than a century ago, of Dartmouth College, and Timothy Dwlght
,
^'resident of Yale College from 1795 to 1817.**^ She list also includes
nearly one hundred ministers of the gospel, and many leaders of thought
in other walks of life. Moreover, out of the subscriptions which had
been paid privately by personal friends, Berkeley purchased a library
of 1000 volumes of classical literature, which he gave to Yale College,
He also '^made a similar gift to the library of Harvard College,"^ which,
unfortunately, was burned in the Harvard fire of 1764. That something
of this direct influence in America may have reached Borden p. Bowne
one hundred and fifty years later cannot be proved, but it would seem
not unreasonable.
One enduring expression remains in the popular mind, as marking this
dream of Berkeley's for a better time in the western world - the poem of
six stanzas, composed by Berkeley, and closing with the well known lines,
"Westward the course of empire takes its way,
The first four Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the i>rama with the day;
Time's noblest offspring is the last."
When the westward "course of empire" reached the pacific coast, and the
seat of the University of California was to be named, the President of
Johns Hopkins university, mindful of this vision of the English Idealist,
suggested the name, Berkeley, which most appropriately was accepted.
•Note - Jonathan jidwards, who held views similar to Berkeley's, seems to
have reached his conclusions independently.
1-Jlorris, British Thought and Thinkers, 231
2- Ibid.231
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&• 3» laorris is probably right in hia prophecy, "There will be academic
shrines to his memory in this country as long as our land shall endure."^
Appointed Bishop of Cloyne in 1734, Berkeley lived a life quiet and
contented for the next eighteen years. The one important piece of phil-
osophic writing which came from Berkeley's pen dviring this time was the
"Siris", which marked Berkeley's third great enthusiasm, the confidence
In the virtues of •*tar-water** . The immediate effect of this writing was
to win converts, not to Berkeley's philosophy, but to his reputed pana-
cea; folks dosed with tar-water until they went about, as Dickens says,
"smelling like a newly painted fence." The philosophical portions of
the essay are valuable because of the light which they cast upon Berke-
ley's mind in later life, showing the influence of Plato, and showing
also Berkeley's increasing emphasis upon the will and the reason* The
Siris has its biographical importance also, for it shows Berkeley, true
to his own ideal of scholarship, dedicating "his age as well as youth,
the later growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of truth."^
For the rest, he devoted himself to religious service and social
uplift. In 1752, he removed to Oxford, where he died peacefully in
the following year»
Markedly similar in many respects was the life of Borden P, Bowne*
He was born in Leonardvi lie , Kew Jersey, in 1847, Like his predecessor,
Berkeley, Bowne also came into the world during a time of intellectual
vigor. Hegel, Schleiermacher and Herbart , had died within the preceding
sixteen years; Schelling and Schopenhauer, Gomte and Victor Cousin, were
active leaders of thought; J. 3, Mil, T. H. Green, John and Bdward Caird,
and Hermann Lotze, were all in the prime of life; while among Bowne 's
contemporaries were numbered William James, Josiah Royce, Hugo nflnster-
berg, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, James Ward, Rudolf ISucken and
l-Morris, British Thought and Thinkers, 231 2-Fraser, III,, 299
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Henri Bergson. In the scientific world, Darwin, Spencer and Huxley were
leading authorities; in literature, Emerson, Oarlyle and Ruskin were
popular writers; while the religious leaders of the day included such
names as Phillips Brooks, Henry Ward Beeoher, B. H* Chapin and Theodore
Parker. Like Berkeley, Bowne also reacted strongly against certain cur-
rents of thought widely accepted in his time, while defending just as
strongly certain other tenets, regardless of their unpopularity. He
accepted the pragmatism of Mill, but rejected his anti- religious meta-
physics and his hedonistic ethics. He stoutly opposed the mechanism and
agnosticism of Spencer. He reacted against the positivism of Comte. He
rejected the realism of Herhart, but accepted his teleological conception
of God* He accepted the per sonali st ic idealism of Lotze, but opposed his
mechanism.
Like the Bishop of Cloyne, Bowne came from good stock, and his early
years are marked by unusual activity of thought. "Before he had ever
read or heard discussions relating to the Trinity, he had developed the
doctrine of Sabellianism for himself, and had rejected the doctrine of
the resurrection of the physical body,'*''" Bowne was educated in Penning-
ton Seminary and New York University. Having fitted himself for college
during a sumner vacation, entirely without help, he entered the sophoaore
class without conditions, and graduated as valedictorian of his class,
"having had an unusually brilliant record during his entire college
course - in fact, the highest record of any man that ever graduated from
the xiew York University."^
Like Berkeley, Bowne began his philosophical writing early in life,
his critical work on "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer" being written
during his senior year at the university. President Uoah Porter of Yale
University was attracted to the young philosopher by the brilliance of
1-K.M.B. in The Personalist, II., #1, p.
8
2- Ibid.8
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this first publication, and contracted with him a friendship which con-
tinued through life. As the guest of president Porter, Bowne was intro-
duced to leading scholars of the day, and spent one memorable evening
with certain "graybeards" in discussion of the philosophy of Herbert
3pencer» "Henry Ward Beecher was present, and took a lively part in the
discusBion*""^
During 1873-75, Bowne carried on graduate study in philosophy at
the Jniversity of Halle, Paris and &6ttingen. At the last named insti-
tution, Bowne came under the instruction of Lotze, whom he greatly es-
teemed, though he did not wholly agree with Lotze in doctrine* That
Lotze himself recognized the intellectual power of his young friend, is
evident from a story related by Bishop Francis «J • McConnells "One summer
day, Bowne went to call on Lotze at his home in Germany* As Bowne left,
he remarked, looking at the clouds which were rising in the valley, 'A
storm is rising.' Lotze looked across the valley and replied, in a
puzzled ways 'But nothing to the storm of doubts and questionings which
you have raised in my mind concerning some of my positions.'"^
Returning to America, Bowne received his A. M* from his alma mater
in 1876# He served for one year as assistant-professor of modern lang-
uages in aew York University, whilst working at the same time on the
staff of the independent. In 1876, Bowne became Professor of Philosophy
at Boston University and Dean of the (rraduate School; and though' he re-
ceived many tempting Invitations to other posts, he continued in this
apiJointment^in 1910. He made a tour of the world in 1905-06, and there-
after was one of the at aunche st exponent s of the missionary enterprise.
Certain of his religious writings had provoked such controversy
that Bowne was indicted in 1904, and tried by his Methodist brethren for
heresy. Though he was unanimously acquitted on the charge, the report
l-K.M^B, in She Personalist ,11
•
,#l,p.9 2-lbid.ll (quoted)

of the trial is most illuminating, as it clears up beyond a shadow of
doubt certain special points of doctrine in Bowne's religious thought.
The record also indicates something of £owne * s mastery of language and
argument in debate*
Although forced by the conditions of his day to engage in frequent
theological and philosophical controversies, it was probably true that
"Me never provoked a quarrel and he never retreated from one."^ As
Professor George H. Palmer has said, "Bowne was ever a respecter of
persons* When dealing with an individual, he was most considerate,
sweet even, keeping himself in the background, ready to listen. But he
was also a man of profound and ardent convictions, who believed he had
a message of great importance (as I am sure he had) and when through
writing he dealt with the undiscriminating public, he drove that message
home with pungent insistence and a superb scorn of all who were disposed
to other views*"^ He was greatly beloved by his students and intimates,
and the tributes quoted concerning Berkeley can be matched by the follow-
ing utterance of Bishop itoConnell in relation to Bownet "I never knew a
finer, purer soul* I never heard him say anything coarse - even minor
vulgarities of speech disgusted him; i never heard him say anything mean;
i never heard him say anything at bottom cynical* His personal religious
life was intense***^
His intellectual labor was continued to the very last, and when he
died suddenly in 1910, he was even then at work on a new volume, nearly
completed*
7he similarity between Borden P* Bowne and Bishop George Berkeley
is clearly apparent. Both were men of brilliant intellect in an age of
intellectual activity. Both began their speculative work young, and
Continued such activity to the last; Berkeley died at the age of sixty-
l-K.M.B. in The Per sonal i st , il
. ,ff 1 ,p , 8 2-wilm, Studies in Philosophy
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eight; Bowne died at the age of sixty-three. Both were interested in the
same causes, were broadly humanitarian, and were notably lofty of thought
and pure in character* Both were possessed of exceptional literary abil-
ity, and wrote with charm of style and clarity of utterance©
As churchmen* Berkeley and Bowne exhibited numerous similar traits*
Hellgion, for each of the men, was of supreme concern* Both dedicated
themselves early in life to the gospel ministry, and to a ministry primar-
ily intellectual in character* For both, the tenets of religion were
largely influential in determining the final cast of their philosophical
systems* Both produced sermons rich in mental content, and earnest in
evangelical appeal, though Bowne seems to have been more fervent than
Berkeley. Both were self-constituted champions of the faith, opposing
naturalism and agnosticism, Berkeley's attack on "the infidel :titiathemati-
oian", Halley, being paralleled by Bowne ' s attack on Spencer. Similarly,
Berkeley's war on "the Free-thinkers" was somewhat paralleled by Bowne"
s
opposition to the ultra- rationalists , who would fain have reduced religion
in its entirety to a matter of logical demonstration, there was, however,
a genuine difference in the place allowed to faith by the two men, Berke-
ley holding that the being of God was capable of demonstration, whereas
Bowne regarded theism as the most probable hypothesis, ultimately resting
upon the assurance of faith* There was likewise a difference in regard
to the official authority of the Church, Berkeley being somewhat conser-
vative and a defender of the status quo, while Bowne appeared at times
quite radical, even opposing, as Bishop McGonnell tells us, all official-
ism as such* 'x-he missionary impulse, which moved Berkeley so strongly
in his earlier life, came much later to Bowne, but it did come, after his
trip around the world in 1905. He was planning a trip to Roberts College
when he died* On the whole, it must appear that the two men, as expon-
ents of the Christian gospel, and as leaders of the organized Church, had
very much in common, and differed in but few points.
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Aa aduoators, Berkeley and Bowne also seemed to te moved by a com-
mon impulse. The quest for truth was for both a primary passion. Both
felt the importance of higher education, and both labored for the ad-
vancement of the intellectual life of youth. Berkeley gave great stimu-
lus to the minda of the young men with whom he talked, while Bowne awak-
ened the intellectual powers of a host of students. Berkeley would have
founded a college, and did in fact contribute to the early growth of
Yale College; Bowne gave the best years of his life to a like cause in
Boston University. It was chiefly as a writer, however, that Berkeley
proved himself an educator; moving in that select circle of literary
men of which Addison and Steele were shining lights, Berkeley also pro-
duced a literature which, philosophical though it was, from a literary
point of view was in no way second to the best. In the case of Bowne
also, his books were written primarily for instruction. "Authorship
simply extended the range of his voice and multiplied the number of his
students, -- Had he devoted himself to polite literature instead of to
philosophy, he would certainly have attained high distinction as an
essayist. As it is, his writings have a marked literary flavor."^
Coupled with this power of thought and eloquence of expression in
each case was the magnetic personality of the man. Berkeley's power is
evident in the account of his labors for the college at Bermuda. "The
Scriblerus Club, meeting at Lord Bathurst's, agreed to rally Berkeley,
who was among them, on his Bermuda scheme. He asked to be heard in
defence, and presented the case with such force of enthusiasm that the
company 'were struck dumb, and after a pause simultaneously rose and
2
asked leave to accompany him.* Bermuda for a time inspired London."
Compare with this incident the following reference to Bowne: "To an al-
most unprecedented degree he possessed the power of excitation over his
1-Knudson in The Personalist, I*#E,p«5
2- Fraser .I.pref .1
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studants* He frequently sent them forth from the lecture room so stimu-
lated by his profundity and brilliance that they felt, as one of them
said, as though their 'heads were expanding to the bursting point.
Thus both men were educators of rare power* Berkeley's special genius
led him into creative philosophical thought and practical service of
his fellows; Bowne also engaged in philosophical construction, less
original than Berkeley, but similar in logical clarity and cogency; in
personal vocation and talent, Bowne was pre-eminently the teacher*
In the practical aid of social betterment, Berkeley undoubtedly
excelled Bowne* Berkeley's instinct seems to have been such as delighted
in social intercourse, while Bowne, though friendly at heart, seemed to
many to be rather retiring in disposition, not to say unsocial. Possibly
it was this difference of temperament which led Berkeley into active
social service, while Bowne remained in the class room, Berkeley's con-
crete social service was prodigious* Mot only by his personal efforts,
but by his writings as well, did he engage in social uplift* Three
notable essays tell of his interest in this directions "An Essay Towards
Preventing the Ruin of (ireat Britain", "A Proposal for a College in
Bermuda", and "The Querist", dealing respectively with the social needs
of England, America and Ireland* Berkeley's suggestioiis on political
economy are the more remarkable for their anticipation of economic doc-
trines later worked out in detail by such authorities as Turgot, Adam
Smith, aalthus and Ricardo.
Sir James Mackintosh remarks that The Querist probably "contains
more hints, then original, still unapplied in legislation and political
2economy than are to be found in any equal space." Berkeley considers
the problem of government (Querist, par*8 ) , the relation of industry to
the standard of living (20), the nature of wealth (29, 38, 42), the
1-Knudson in The Personali st
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origin of industry, money and credit i46-7), treatment of criminals
(53), the ideal state (62), development of home industry (64), manu-
facture, art, trade, coinage, home-rule, drunkenness, housing, national
resources, the liquor problem, vanity, extravagance, democracy (181-2),
papal schools (191), the idle rich (201), eugenics (206-7), banking,
paper-money, profit-sharing (355), vagrancy (384), prison reform (389),
absenteeism (408), good roads (545), unemployment, poverty and indolence;
indeed, it seems that Berkeley took a lively interest in every social
and economic problem of his day*
By contrast, Bowne seems to have felt that "his chief duty was in
the realm of strict metaphysics and that the application of his principles
to social philosophy would have to be the task of those who were to follow
him* » he himself did not consider that his own obligations lay primar-
ily in this field,"^ Mevertheless , no one could hold the regard for
ethical principle which Bowne held, and place emphasis on personality as
he placed it, without being drawn into the social and economic interests
of his own time* And so, although "Bowne did not give himself to a close
study of social questions until rather late in his professional career"^,
he did have such interest at heart, and eventually it awoke into active
expression*
We are indebted to Bishop jiicConnell for our account of this side of
Bowne' s life* He tells us that the students of Bowne '*never misunder-
stood; they knew that i)r* Bowne had a passion for social righteousness
which never waned"^^ and that "about the year 1906, i)r* Bowne remarked
to his closer friends that his interest in abstract philosophical questions
as such was beginning to fade out as compared to his interest in the
larger social and international themes. Eis Journey around the world,
made at about this time, did much to deepen his interest in the greater
1-MoConnell in Wilm's Studies in Philosophy and Theology 1292- ibld.l29 3-lbid*133
i
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human needs.**^ "He felt that the huge outlying races of the world had
vast contributions to make to the moral and spiritual content of the
human ideal* Almost the last thing 1 heard him say was that if he were
to live his life over, and were to teach philosophy and ethics again,
2he would sooner work in China than anywhere else on earth." "After long
ethical discussion of social themes, he would return to the words of
Voltaire's (Sandide: 'Meanwhile, let us cultivate the garden* '*'^
From these observations, it should be clearly apparent that Bowne
as well as Berkeley had large social sympathies, and that his inclinations
were all in the direction of social uplift* nence, although Berkeley was
far more active than Bowne, although Berkeley held rigidly to the auto-
cratic form of government of his day while Bowne was emphatically demo-
cratic, although Berkeley grappled with specific social problems while
Bowne was content to let his ethical principles carry their own social
implications, the two men were nevertheless very much alike in mental
and spiritual attitude toward the social needs*
The two men exhibited parallel tendencies also as philosophers* In
the general trend of mind, they seemed to possess kindred natures. Both
were true lovers of wisdom, and looked upon philosophy as a kind of life
mission. Both held to a few primary principles, and wrote extensively*
Berkeley's dialogues were intended to explain and popularize his "Prin-
ciples", while Bowne is reported to have said "that there are but few
fundamental principles of human thinking, and if he wished he could have
stated his philosophy on six pages, but that people might understand it,
he put it into many books*"* Both belonged to the school of personali st ic
idealism, and each reacted against the realism of a preceding thinker •>
Berkeley against the realism of Locke, and Bowne against the realism of
Herbert Spencer** Both insisted upon the reference to experience as the
1-MoConnell, in Wilm's Studies in Philosophy and Theology, 137 g-ibid iss <3-Ibid*143 4-Pyle, Philosophy of B.P.B. ,10 * '
*Bowne also opposed the realism of nerbart*
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starting point for speculative thinking, though there was, as we shall
see, a difference in the "empiricism" held by the two men. Both gave
large place to epistemology and ethics, and both found the solution of
philosophy's chief problems in a spiritualistic and theistic metaphysics.
Both suffered from lack of intelligent criticism, and both showed marks
of growth during the years of philosophic discipline. There were some
differences, but as philosophers, Bowne and Berkeley obviously stood
very close together.
In addition to the resemblances Just noted, there are particular
points of doctrine which seem to be virtually identical. The war on
"abstractions" was waged with equal vigor by both men. One of Bowne*
s
former students reports that a favorite admonition of Bowne* s was,
"Gentlemen, beware of abstractions!" Bowne accepted Berkeley's theory
of vision. Both agreed that reality through and through must be know-
able. Both agreed that minds and their ideas (or minds and their activ-
ities) are the sum total of reality. Both emphasize the significance
of the Self for the theory of knowledge. Both reject the correspondence
theory of truth. Both find the key to reality in personal life. Both
speak of Nature as a languag.e. Both hold to the immanence of God, Both
affirm the cardinal importance of religion. All of these agreements,
and possibly more, are apparent on the surface of their teachings. Such
striking resemblances would strongly suggest doctrinal dependence; but
the hypothesis is not in any sense proved. Similar doctrines might
conceivably have been independently developed. Just how far the phil-
osophy of Bowne was actually dependent upon the reasoning of Berkeley
both historically and logically is a problem which we may hope to solve
only with a much closer and more detailed study of the two systems.
One statement, however, can safely be made at this time, without
fear of successful contradiction - Bowne and Berkeley were very much alike
)i
I
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in personal character, in purpose, in vocation, and in trend of thought.
In the light of this marked similarity, it would be strange indeed if
there were not some deeper and more fundamental relationship of thought*
To discover this deeper bond of relationship will be the purpose of the
remaining sections of this essay,
B* iJirect evidence of Berkeley's influence upon Bowne*
Of special importance in determining the relationship between
Bowne and Berkeley is the testimony of Bowne himself, Bowne makes few
acknowledgments of indebtedness to other thinkers, but he does affirm
his relationship to Berkeley and to Kant, In the conclusion of Bowne*
s
latest revision of the "Hetaphy sic s" (p,423), he observes, "This is
what is called my idealism — Historically, it might be described as
Kantianized Berkeleianism. ** Bowne* s students recall that he sometimes
spoke of himself as a "Kantianized Berke leian** • Mrs, Bowne gives us
a particularly valuable bit of evidence in the form of a note which
Bowne himself once wrote to her, in answer to her own question as to
his philosophical position, "It is hard to classify me with accuracy.
I am a thei stic ideali st « a Personali st . a transcendental empiricist,
an idealistic realist, and a realistic idealist: but all these phrases
need to be interpreted. They cannot well be made out from the diction-
ary, neither can I well be called a disciple of any one» I largely
agree with Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold half of Kant's system,
but sharply dissent from the rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's
philosophy, with a complete rejection of his theory of knowledge* I am
* l^orsonali st . the first of the clan in any thorough-going sense. •^
It might seem that Bowne 's own statement concerning the relationship
of his system to that of Berkeley should be taken as final, but this is
not necessarily true, for it is quite possible that Bowne either mis-
1-The Personalist
,
il.,fl,p,10
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Judged hia own system, or that he misunderstood Berkeley. Accordingly,
we have to examine other direct evidences of the Berkeleian influence.
We may consider next the direct references which Bowne makes to Berkeley
in his writings*
In Bowne* 8 earliest work, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer", there
is no reference to Berkeley, but there are numerous references to John
Stuart Mill, who was confessedly Berkeleian* These references are mainly
in the form of criticism of Mill's agnosticism, which was the chief mark
of Mill's difference from Berkeley. Similarly, in Bowne' s "Introduction
to Psychological Theory", aill is criticised for his associat ionalist ic
psychology (135f) and for his account of the physical order as "per-
manent possibilities of sensation" (lolf), doctrines which smack of the
Berkeleian teaching, but lead off into scepticism in the first instance,
and realism in the second - conclusions which Berkeley in no way approved
On page 265 of the Psychological Theory, Bowne cites with approval Berke-
ley's "i^ew Theory of Vision", and on page 266, he seems to criticise
Berkeley for not extending the "vision" argument to the whole field of
perception; but this was precisely what Berkeley did, when he put forth
his "Principles of Human Knowledge"; so that Bowne ' s account of perceptio
would really seem to accord with that of Berkeley. In the "Principles
of i^thics", Bowne criticises Hill's hedonism (^5) and thus by implication
criticises Berkeley also in so far as the latter was hedonistic; Berkeley
is not mentioned by name. Kant is criticised for his failure to supple-
ment the "good will" with empirical content; this criticism would favor
the position of Berkeley.
The first edition of the "jdietaphy sic s" il882) contains numerous
references to Berkeley. On page 452, Bowne tells how Berkeley sustains
the objectivity of the sense order, agreeing with Berkeley against his
critics* On page 456, he observes that "the psychology and theory of
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knowledge of many idealist a, notably in the oase of Berkeley, have "been
very imperfect and often mistaken; but this fact does not affect their
metaphysics." On page 461, he accepts Berkeley's account of "matter**,
saying, "It is in this analysis of the object that Berkeley is at his
best, and it is here that the strength of his argument lies. No empiri-
cal philosophy can escape his conclusion,** On page 463, he observes, "If,
then, the object be only a complex of sense-qualities, as the sensation-
ists maintain, Berkeley* s subjective idealism is a demonstrable necessity.'
Bowne's meaning here seems to be that radical empiricism necessarily leads
to "subjective idealism** or solipsism, and he gives Berkeley credit for
proving this fact# In the following paragraph, he agrees with the Berke-
leian account of the primary qualities, which, equally with the secondary,
exist only by an act of thought. But Bowne appears not to recognize that
the a-priori element involved in such act of thought had also been ad-
mitted by Berkeley. On page 468, he points out the limitation of Berke-
ley* s view, in that •*the object of perception is strictly individual** and
hence, "there is not the least necessity for any two persons having the
same presentations.*** Undoubtedly, this is a real weakness in Berkeley's
system. (This point will be considered later in the discussion of "object-
ive reference" of ••ideas".) This criticism is further developed on page
469, though it is admitted that **Berke ley , at times, goes so far as to
affirm a universality of the object in perception." This affirmation,
however, Bowne holds, was an assumption rather than a logical consequence
of Berkeley* s system. Bowne* s own solution of the difficulty is thus
suggested, "If the world as it appears, though phenomenal, were phenomenal
of a world process or cosmic movement apart from our thought, these dif-
ficulties could be escaped." (p. 469) Pursuing the analysis on page 470,
Bowne asserts that in Berkeley's view, the world has only conceptual ex-
Note - Berkeley himself raises this point in the speech of Hylas -
See Fraser, I.,p«466
Ii
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Istence for God, though Berkeley himself was not always willing to accept
this position. Leibnitz has pointed the way out of the difficulty, Bowne
thinks, by affirming that **the world was not merely a divine thought, but
a divine act also." This criticism fails to take account of Berkeley's
recognition of the activity of the Divine will.
In Bowne* s "Theory of Thought and Knowledge**, he observes on page 11,
"What the eye gives is one thing; what we see or perceive is quite another.
Since the publication of Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, this fact has
been a commonplace of psychology.** On page 132-133, speaking of *»gen-
eral notions**, or abstract ideas, Bowne refers to Berkeley* s doctrine
that **the mind has only a particular idea before it, and that on the
ground that a real object always must be particular**, and offers the
comment that "Some truth, some error, and much confusion mingle here»**
Bowne' s own explanation of the abstract idea is that it is a predication
of logical meaning . In the chapter on "Thought and Th 1 ng»*
,
(p«301),
commenting on the proposition that **thought makes things", Bowne sug-
gests as one possible meaning of this conception, ••that things are
nothing but a system of presentations, as in the common view of Berke-
ley* s theory** - a view which is "unclear** because **it is not plain where
and for whom the order of presentations exists. If it be independent
of finite minds, our knowledge of it is not explained, and we unwittingly
and to no purpose stumble out of epistemology and into metaphysics. If
it depend on finite minds, then each mind makes its own world. Either
alternative has its special embarrassments.** In the chapter on "Realism
and Idealism** (p.318), Bowne speaks of "the Berkeleian idealism" as a
philosophy which **views things as a system of presented ideas without
any material substance. • This conception is mentioned as a special form
of idealism distinct from "the sensational philosophy, according to which
things are only groups of sensations, real or possible. »• This would seem
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to imply that there is in the Berkeleian idealism somethine not derived
from sensation. On page 348, we are told that **3ince the time of Berke-
ley and Hume, it has been patent to all critical thinkers that consistent
empiricism must destroy materialism altogether*
In the revised edition of the "Hetaphysic s" , on page 16, Bowne •
s
language suggests that Berkeley's view makes the essence of being con-
sist in perceivabili ty , whereas the true essence is causality, or "actions
"Things, when not perceived, are still said to exist, because of the be-
lief that, though not perceived, they are in interaction with one an-
other, mutually determining and determined. Real things are distinguished
from things having only conceptual existence by this power and fact of
action*" The adoption of this conclusion is the **only means of saving
ourselves from Berkeley*" It seems clear that Bowne here feels that he
departs from Berkeley; yet the criticism fails to allow for the fact that
it was only of sense objects that Berkeley affirmed "esse is percipi";
concerning minds, Berkeley as well as Bowne asserted the causal criter-
ion of being* It is noteworthy that in this edition of the Metaphysics,
Bowne omits the discussions of Berkeleianism which were included in the
earlier edition; yet this is the volume in which, at the close, he de-
scribes his own system (p*423) as "Eantianized Berkeleianism."
In "Personali sm" , on page 17, Bowne includes Berkeley among the
"men who have helped philosophy forward," and notes with satisfaction
that Berkeley was not a "stall-fed" philosopher* Again on pages E3 and
24, he mentions Berkeley among the "intelligent thinkers", and affirms
that practically, matter was the sane to him as to anyone else. Berkeley
would agree with the "conviction of common sense", says Bowne, that "There
is an order of experience which we do not make but find, with which we
have to reckon, and to which we must adjust ourselves in order to live
at all*"
:
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In the Critical Exposition of "Kant and Spencer**, on page 107, Bowne
again refers directly to Berkeley, avowing that "Kant and Berkeley t after
all, seemed to differ not so much in the idealistic outcome as in the
doctrine of knowledge. Certainly Berkeley would not have wished for any*-
thing more immaterial than Kant's view becomes when it is consistently
and correctly interpreted.** And since Bowne himself is ready, as indi-
cated on the following page, to accept the idealistic outcome, we have
here an explicit acceptance of the Berkeleian metaphysics.
All of these direct references to Berkeley Indicate that Bowne
held a favorable attitude toward the philosophy of Berkeley, though
not one of complete acceptance. He clearly felt that his own system
corrected certain of the mistakes of Berkeley, yet with the idealistic
metaphysics, he maintained his agreement.
Hot only does Bowne make these specific references to Berkeley
"by name, but it was apparently his practice also to make use of certain
phrases and forms of speech which were characteristically Berkeleian.
Not all of these phrases can be traced in Bowne' s writings, but we are
told by former students of Bowne that he frequently used in the class
room such Berkeleian expressions as theses "Nature is a language with
mind at both ends", a slight variation of Berkeley's "Nature a divine
language"; "learned dust", found in Berkeley's *'Principles of Human
Knowledge" (Fraser, I»,249); "We have first raised a dust and then
complain we cannot see** , also used by Berkeley in "Principles of Human
Knowledge" (p.238); and "lost and embrangled in Inextricable difficulties"
and "miserably bantered" in the attempt to conceive time by itself
(Bowne, Metaphysics, revised, p. 167), a direct quotation from Berkeley's
language on the same topic (Fraser, I., 311). The use of these and other
typical Berkeleian expressions would indicate that Bowne had been deeply
impressed by his reading of Berkeley, and that certain phrases used by
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the latter were deemed to "be specially appropriate forms of expression*
Having traced the direct evidences of the Berkeleian influence
upon Bowne , we cone now to an examination of the indirect evidences
of such Influence through a closer study of the philosophical systems
of the two men*
C« Indirect evidence of the Berkeleian influence upon Bowne:
examination of the philosophical systems of the two men*
The philosophy of Berkeley can best be understood by viewing it
in the light of the empiricism of John Locke, which forms its logical
background and preparation. Locke had opened up an entirely new cur-
rent of philosophy by thrusting the problem of epistemology into the
forefront of speculative thought* He reasoned that before inquiring
into the nature of reality, one ought to ask concerning the mind»s
ability to know* How does the knowing process take place? and What
can the mind know? Locke answers that knowledge is possible through
the mind*s possession of ideas; we have in mind certain states of con-
sciousness, or ideas; and these ideas are all that we do have, or can
have, in consciousness* Truth is indicated by the agreement of ideas,
one with another. There are ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection,
the latter being derived from the former. There are simple ideas and
complex ideas, the latter being dependent upon the former. The mind is
active only in the forming of complex ideas, but even in this activity,
the mind adds nothing new. There are ideas of modes - (qualitative
conceptions dependent upon siibstance), ideas of substance (signifying
particular objects or substances), and ideas of relations (such as
cause and effect, time and space). What is the origin of ideas? They
are imprinted upon the passive mind (tabula rasa) by the objects of
sense. The power which any natural object possesses of producing a
BOSTON UN'VERSITY
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sensation, is called a quality . Such qualities are primary or second-
ary. Secondary qualities such as color, odor, taste, etc. reside not
in the object, but in the mind perceiving the object. Primary qualities
alone (form, impenetrability, etc.) reside in the object. Our knowledge
is true knowledge only when our ideas correspond to the real object
itself.
Berkeley carried this argument forward. He agreed that the mind
knows only its own ideas, or states of consciousness, and that certain
of these ideas have objective validity while others are purely subject-
ive. In this assertion, Berkeley is taking "ideas** in the wider sense,
to include anything which can be regarded as mental content. He agreed
that truth is indicated by the agreement of ideas one with another. And
he agreed that epistemology precedes metaphysics. But he pointed out
certain inconsistencies in Locke's position, wherein he emphatically
disagreed. He insisted that every idea must be particular, since real-
ity is necessarily concrete and particular. He denied Locke's oorres-
pondenoe theory of truth, avowing that an idea can be like nothing but
another idea. And he proved that the primary qualities, as well as the
secondary, belong to the mind of the perceiving agent, for it is only by
abstraction that the qualities of an object can be separated one from
another. But having gone so far, Locke's realism (or dualism) is obliged
to give way before an idealistic metaphysics.
Since our only knowledge of natural objects is based on our exper-
ience, and since experience reveals objects to us merely as combinations
of sensations, or ideas, and since all ideas are necessarily properties
of mind, it follows that "all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth
hath not any subsistence without a mind." Now since it is clear that
great portions of the natural order do not owe their subsistence to any
finite mind, it follows that such subsistence is upheld by an Infinite
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Hind, or God. The objectivity of finite perception is thus guaranteed
ty the active and infinite mind of &od. And the total universe may he
said to consist of these two factors, minds and their ideas. Of ideas,
or things, their esse est -Dero ipi . Of spirits, or minds, one may say
esse est percipere . Berkeley affirms his agreement with "common- sense"
,
(1) that things really exist, (2) that they are Just what they are known
as - l»e., idea-complexes, or groups of sensations, hut he denies that
things are something wholly apart from all perception. He disagrees with
the scholastics, and also with Locke, who had affirmed an underlying, but
unknown "substance** behind the objects of sense.
But now, using the term "idea" in the narrower meaning of sense-
presentation, it seems that we cannot have "ideas" of spirits; for ideas
are passive while spirits are active; but since we do undoubtedly know
spirits, we may be said to have "not ions ** of spirits.* Similarly, we
have "notions" of relations, all relation being an act of mind. The
being of God is manifest in the order and works of nature, an ideal or-
der, yet an order independent of our finite minds, since we do not make
it, but find it. And since the uniformity and orderliness of nature
enables us to make predictions and plans for our human good, we may think
of nature as a "divine language" whereby CrOd*s thoughts are disclosed to
us, for our guidance and uplift*
Ethically, the summum bonum is the general happiness, but there can
be no happiness apart from righteousness; hence, human duty calls for
righteousness and devotion to social service. Berkeley's hedonism Is
both altruistic and qualitative, and his religious nature gives a strong
bent toward perfectionism. He finds it hard to understand why, when the
"light of the Gospel is held forth to guide every man through piety and
virtue into everlasting happiness", men should "scramble for a little
dirt within the sight of heaven." (iV. ,89 ) Men are free agents, and it
•Note- (The doctrine of "Motions" was introduced in Berkeley's second
edition.
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rests with us to "work out our own salvation with fear and tremhllne.**
(IV«,201J "We should make life and Imnortallty our principal business**
(IY«,91), for even granting that certainty Is unattainable, and prob-
ability the guide of life, yet "When life and immortality are at stake,
we should play our part with fear and trembling, though "twere an hundred
to one but we are cheated in the end*** (17, ,91)
The being of tiod is the clearest inference from the data of common
experience. The order of nature tells perpetually of a benevolent and
loving Deity, who constantly cares for his human children, and who is
immanent in the whole creation. The laws of nature are merely the ways
of (rOd, and miracles are but provisions for conserving special moral
values. Yet religion is primarily a matter of revelation, rather than
a matter of experience, and while Berkeley accepts the Ohrlstlan eschat-
ology, his conception of &od seems to follow the outlines of the Old
Testament rather than the revelation in Christ. The trustworthiness of
Crod is our best assurance of immortality; and the pragmatic value of
religion is religion* s best claim to validity.
Though Berkeley rarely uses the term "person"*, his use of the word
**mind** or "spirit" is equivalent. The percipient mind is active and
causal; the ideas of the mind are passive and inert. It is by analogy
drawn from our own experience of the causal nature of will, that we are
able to understand the causal origin of ideas or presentations that come
to us objectively. Sense impressions are but symbols of moaning, and
cannot be regarded as the causes of other sense impressions, but rather
as signs from which we may infer the sequence of other symbols, all of
these signs being alike the work of the causal activity of God,
With this summary of the Berkeleian doctrines before us, we may con-
sider briefly how these conceptions affected the thinking of other phil-
osophers who followed Berkeley, and. who in turn presumably Influenced B(»rae,
*i!iote- Berkeley purposely declines to use the Iterm "person" so as to
avoid misunderstanding, presumably theological sunder a landing .( i , ,41
)
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The man who immediately fell heir to the doctrines of Berkeley was
the scotch philosopher, David Hume. Twenty-six years younger than Berke-
ley, Hume came to his maturity while Berkeley was at the zenith of popu-
larity. Hume accepted the empirical starting point of Locke and Berkeley,
and like them also, he began his speculation with an analysis of know-
ledge. His system presents pure empiricism carried to its logical con-
clusion, and ending in scepticism. In his study of "Ideas", he is con-
sciously dependent upon Berkeley, and refers to him with approval;^ "but
in the conclusions of Berkeley, Hume thinks that the '^argument admits of
no answer, and produces no conviction*" Hume's treatment of abstract
ideas is similar to that of Berkeley. in the view of "matter", there is
also similarity of treatment, but with some difference; Hume agrees that
primary qualities as well as secondary are properties of mind {i#,221),
that so far as our knowledge of material objects is concerned, their esse
is percipi . that nothing is ever present to the mind but its ideas (1.71),
and that we cannot affirm a double existence of perceptions and objects,
nor can anything be like an idea but another idea; yet with all of these
admissions, he allows for a possibility of things-in- themselves (1.68 oc
166), which, like the Kantian dinge-an- stoh , remain forever unknowable.
He differs from Berkeley in not tracing agency, or causal efficacy, to
mind; the "ultimate force and efficacy of nature is not known." (Green's
edition, p. 453) The doctrine of Mind differs distinctly from that of
Berkeley, Hume holding to a rigid assooiat ionalistic psychology. "What
we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different per-
ceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though
falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." (I#,200)
It was this failure to discover in mind either a ground of relations or
a causal agency, which led to Hume's extreme scepticism.
1-References on Hume, unless otherwise noted, are to the Everyman edition
of the Treatise of Human Mature.
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The mind* 8 assoolatlon of events in causal relationship is due
merely to habit, based upon an observed order of sequence, and a cer-
tain propensity to feign, "Hume denies, accordinely, the possibility
of our knowing the nature and mode of the objective connection between
causes and effects, and the philosophical legitimacy of our attempting
to transcend, by means of the causal idea, the whole field of exper-
ience and to conclude to the existence of CrOd and the immortality of
the soul.""'' It was this scepticism which aroused the wrath of the
Scottish realists, and disturbed the "dogmatic slumber** of Immanuel
Kant. But it should be noted that the scepticism was a consequence of
Hume's rigid adherence to the empirical presuppositions and the episte-
mological reasonings of Berkeley, coupled with an unwillingness to fol-
low Berkeley in his metaphysical assumptions, and a rejection of Berke-
ley* s introspective evidence of the Self*
Following Berkeley, the idealistic philosophy found its next
great development in the work of Kant* Berkeley's influence upon Kant
seems to have been mediated chiefly through Hume. According to the
careful analysis of Norman Kemp Smith in his "Commentary to Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason", it seems doubtful whether Kant had ever read
any of Berkeley's own writings. Kant's knowledge of the English lang-
uage was very imperfect, and it has not been conclusively proved that
he had read a single English book.* His citations from Hume, which
occur in the introduction to tha Prolegomena, refer to the German trans-
lation of Hume's writing. He might have read the "Dialogues Between
Hylas and Philonous", which appeared in German translation in 1781,
but from the tone which he adopts toward Berkeley, it does not appear
that he availed himself even of this opportunity.** But Kant at least
knew what Hume tells of Berkeley (Enquiry, sect. xii. pt.ii. at end);
l-Ueberweg~s~Hl story" of"philosophy , II . ,131
*Note- A contrary view is advanced by Prof. George C. Cell.
•**Note- An opposite view is maintained by ^aihingersPhilos.Monatshef te
,
1883, p.bOlff.
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and he may also have read the references in Beattie*s **I]ature of Truth.*'
Prora the former work, Kant would have learned of Berkeley's empirical
view of apace, and also of the sceptical tendencies of his idealistic
system. He might also have been led to infer that Berkeley denied all
reality to sense objects. Seattle would have confirmed this last im-
pression, and also he would have suf;:ge8ted that Berkeley lacked any
criterion for distinguishing between valid perceptions and dreams.
Berkeley's direct influence upon Kant must accordingly have been very
slight, because of the probability that Kant had never read Berkeley.
The indirect influence, however, was very great, for it was the con-
sideration of Berkeleian ideas which led Kant to emphasize the anti-
empirical aspect of his work, as opposed to subjective idealism*
Kant misunderstood Berkeley, as is evident from his classification
of Berkeley with the Bleatics.^ He charges Berkeley with holding that
"All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but mere
illusion, and only in the ideas of pure understanding and Reason is
there truth"^, a charge which, as Kemp Smith says, •'excellently illus-
trates Kant's perverse interpretation of Berkeley's teaching. let
Kant's own doctrine of "phenomena" is identical with Berkeley's doctrine
of "ideas"; in his earlier writing, indeed, he asserts that everything
known is in mind, admitting that the external reality of things is not
capable of strict proof. He appears not wholly satisfied with Berkeley's
account of "matter", and tells us that he is going to refute the account^
but this promise he fails to fulfil, "doubtless for the reason that,
however unwilling he may be to make the admission, on this point his own
teaching, especially in the Dialectic, frequently coincides with that of
Berkeley."^ On page 400 of the Critique of Pure Reason (Max Mfiller trans
lation), Kant speaks of the phenomenal order as idea, yet this position
1-Mahaffey & Bernard's transl. of Critique of Pure Reason, 147 2- Ibid. 147
3-H.K.3mlth' s Commentary , 159 4-Max Mtlller,306 5-U . K* Smith , 157
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is denied in the Prolegomena . ^ The explanation of this inconsistency
appears in the fact that Kant*s first edition of the Critique, published
in 1781, had raised a storm of criticism^ in which Kant had been ac-
cused of subjectivism, a position which Kant conceived as identical with
that of Berkeley. "Such comparison never failed to arouse Kant's wrath. "2
Accordingly, in the Prolegomena, which was published two years later,
Kant was at special pains to disprove the charge.
"A» Brdmann has shown, the original plan of the Prolegomena was
largely modified in order to afford opportunity for reply to this 'un-
pardonable and almost intentional misconception.* Kant's references
to Berkeley, direct and indirect, now for the first time manifest a
polemical tone, exaggerating in every possible way the difference be-
tween their points of view."^ Kant criticises Berkeley because: (1) he
regards things as mere presentations, denying the only true reality,
things-in- themselves ; yet Kant admits that in so far as we know things
at all, they are phenomenal"^; (2) he fails to note the true character
of Space as a category of thought, treating it as wholly subjective, and
hence reducing space objects to mere illusions^; but this quite over-
looks Berkeley's partial anticipation of the categories"; (3) the prob-
lem of Time is overlooked; Kant urges that if Berkeley had applied to
this aspect of experience the same treatment which he accorded Space,
he must needs have held that minds as well as sense-objects are illusory;
the problem of Time did indeed perplex Berkeley^, but he was at least
aware that such a problem existed which could not be wholly solved on
the basis of empiricism; (4) Berkeley offers no criterion for distinguish-
ing between valid perceptions and dreams, whereas Kant offers the coher-
ence criterion; but this charge is not strictly true, for Berkeley also
had suggested coherence as a criterion, though he did not clearly face
l-Mahaffey & Bernard's transl. of Critique of Pure Reason, 146-7
K.Smith, 153 3-Ibid.l58 4-Mahaffey & Bernard, 43 5-inK. Smith, 154
6- Eraser, I. ,279-280 7-ibid«311
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the total question of knowledge objectivity^; (5) Berkeley* s Idealiem
rests on empiricism rather than criticism, whereas the true idealism
must start with the inquiry as to how experience is possible; this criti-
cism is undoubtedly valid, yet it should be recognized that Berkeley felt
the limitations of his system, and even went so far as to suggest an
"•-priori" element in experience^; finally (6) Kant avowed that Berkeley's
idealism was "visionary" and "mythical" - a charge that savors much more
of polemic than of logical argument.
In addition to these specific charges brought against Berkeley,
there were other differences between the Berkeleian and the Kantian
systems. (1) According to Kant, consciousness is not merely an event
of psychology, as with Berkeley*; it is a grasping of universal meaning
in particular states or experiences. (2) Berkeley's theory of personal-
ity rests upon his theory of consciousness, whereas Kant distinguishes
between the phenomenal self and the noumenal self. (3) Kant clearly
raises the question of the validity of experience, a problem which Berke-
ley falls to grasp. (4) Kant denies that God can be known by speculative
reason; Berkeley believed that the being of God could be demonstrated.
(5) Berkeley's ethical system is hedonistic; Kant's ethics is formalistic.
(6) Berkeley clearly affirms that the Divine Will is the world ground;
Kant is ambiguous in this respect.
notwithstanding these criticisms and points of difference, there
were numerous elements of logical identity between the two idealistic
systems. Both Kant and Berkeley affirm the activity of the mind In know-
ledge. Both regard knowledge as possible only through the unity of con-
sciousness. Both accept the Ideality of Space, and (Berkeley in a degree)
the ideality of Time. Certain of the Categories are recognized by Berke-
ley as modes of thought, notably Mumber^ and Relation*. There is a strik-
1-Fraser, l.,275 £-Ibld,291 *But note likenoac to iiant described
3«Ibld,264 4-.Ibid*338 "ti'-e following parcgraph.
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ing likeness in the respective accounts of thought, Kant regardlne Mind
as consciousness of meaning, Berkeley (In his doctrine of signs} holding
that the function of thought is to find significations. Both accept the
coherence criterion of truth. Anticipating Kant, Berkeley has gleams of
the a-prlori function of thought, the bare empirical data being Insuf-
ficient to give a complete account of knowledge. Though normally hedon-
istic in his ethics, Berkeley admits, in discussing the problem of evil,
that sin resides in an evil wlll«^ The belief in CrOd, Freedom and im^
mortality, is emphasized by both, though differently derived, Berkeley
assuming God to account for sense experience, Kant basing the belief on
the moral life. For both, the practical Interest has fundamental import^
ance.
It thus appears that Kant unwittingly owed a very great deal to
Berkeley, while certain points in his system which were later to come
under the fire of criticism - the separation of things-as-known from
things- in- theraselve 8 , the affirmation of an unknowable reality, the de-
fence of what Berkeley calls "corporeal causes", and the failure to
ground the objective order in the Immanent will of a supreme Intelligence
2
- had already been anticipated and attacked by Berkeley* This relation-
ship is of great importance to our present study, for Borden P. Bowne
,
as we have noted, likens his system to the combined doctrines of these
two earlier thinkers, Berkeley and Kant.
Another source of opposition to the Berkeleian position was the
Scottish school of Heallsts, founded by Thomas Reld, and numbering among
its adherents James Oswald, James Beattie, l>ugald Stewart, Thomas Browne
and Sir William Hamilton. No attempt will be made to trace the Berke-
leian influence in the detailed doctrines of each of these men, but the
general position of the school may be Indicated in the position of Reld.
Originally a Berkeleian, Held was startled by the sceptical outcome of
1-Fraser, 1,, 454 2- Ibid .391; 270 ; 275; 295
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the empirical hypothesis in the hands of Hume, and retracing his steps,
he came to the conclusion that the Berkeleian theory of knowledge must
be erroneous. According to the Berkeleian doctrine, as Reid viewed it,
experience consists wholly of subjective modifications, and hence in-
evitably leads to solipsism. He thinks that Berkeley has "proved by
unanswerable arguments what no man in his senses can accept."^ Hence,
he rejects the Berkeleian doctrine, not because of its false logic, but
because of its forbidding consequences. In doing this, he appeals to
Berkeley's own principle of **Common Sense'*^, declaring that **Comraon Sense
declines the artillery of reason and laughs at logic." Opposing the
epistemology of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, which arose from the tradition-
al conception of the mediatory character of ideas. Held argues that we
do not know ideas at all, for there are no ideas in the instrumental
sense; there is only the active mind and the external object itself which
the mind directly apprehends. If ideas are anything at all, they are
names for the mental act of apprehending real objects. The real object
of any true perception must be an independent reality other than one's
own mental states.
Berkeley's view, it was said, makes perception purely individual,
and so makes it impossible for two or more minds to perceive the same
object. Berkeley was not unaware of this problem, which involves the
objective reference of ideas, but he gave no very clear analysis of the
social identity of perception,^ Again, it was charged that Berkeley's
doctrine makes the existence of God a more certain fact of knowledge than
the existence of other finite minds. Berkel<9j' would doubtless have ac-
knowledged this charge, but he would have regarded it as a merit rather
than a defect of his system. It was a point denied by Xant and also by
Bowne* In place of the Berkeleian idealism, Reid defends a metaphysical
1-Reid's Intellectual Powers (Hamilton's ed,),283;285 2-Fraser,l, ,485
3-Fraser,I. ,467
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dualism and a realistic epistemological monism; in place of the Berke-
leian logic with its coherence criterion of truth, Beid advocates a
doctrine of intuition, supplemented by observation, "What at bottom he
is maintaining", says A* K« Rogers, "is, that life is more fundamental
than reason or logic; that our most inexpugnable beliefs grow directly
out of the needs of life, and are not grounded upon argument, because
arguments are grounded upon them. Belief, in a word, is prior to rea-
soning, and supplies it with its necessary material*"^
Bowne denied the epistemological realism and the metaphysical dualism
of the Scotchmen, but he agreed that ideas have objective reference and
that certain primal beliefs of life must be intuitively accepted. Hamil-
ton's defence of an unknowable object of religious belief anticipated the
doctrine of Spencer, which Bowne vigorously opposed. On the whole, it
may be said that the Scotchmen were unfair to Berkeley, largely because
they misinterpreted his doctrine in a solipsistic fashion* Nevertheless,
their criticism helped to correct certain weaknesses of the Berkeleian
idealism; and Bowne profited by these corrections*
Among the thinkers who have professed to favor Berkeley, few, if any,
have been so extravagant in their praise as John Stuart Hill* In phrases
of superlative degree, he assigns Berkeley to the foremost place among all
philosophers ancient and modern; "he is the one of greatest philosophic
genius" for to him we owe "three first-rate philosophical discoveries each
sufficient to have constituted a revolution in psychology, and which by
their combination have determined the whole course of subsequent philo-
sophical speculation.**^ These discoveries ares (1) the theory of vision,
(2) the non-existence of abstract ideas, and (5) the nature and meaning of
externality. That these discoveries have made Berkeley "the turning point
of the higher philosophy in modern times". Mill regards as an historical
fact which admits of no dispute,"^
1- A.K. Sogers, JBnglish ac American Philosophy Since 1800
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In spite of these laudatory phrases, however. Mill has certain
points of criticism which he urges against Berkeley. He feels (1) that
Berkeley has not given a valid criterion for distinguishing between
fancies and true perceptions; the suggestion that the former are volun-
tary while the latter are not, is exaggerating the function of "will",
for fancies as well as percepts may be quite involuntary; similarly, the
suggestion that percepts are "not excited from vrithin" is insufficient,
since it presupposes the point at issue. Mill suggests "potentiality"
as the permanent element in perception; material objects are "permanent
possibilities of sensation."-^ (2) ilill objects to Berkeley*s professed
intuition of causal efficiency as resident in the will; "it is in vain",
says he, "to consult consciousness about the existence of a power. Mill
agrees with Hume that causality is no mor9 discoverable in an act of
volition than in the sequence of external events. Mind is but the per-
manent possibility of feeling. (3) Mill objects to Berkeley's argument
for the i>eity, who is introduced as a "repository" for objective "ideas**.
This is "the weak and Illogical part" of Berkeley's system*^ Finally (4)
Mill objects to Berkeley's failure to distinguish between ideas and sensa-
tions. Mill agrees with Berkeley concerning the pragmatic value of relig-
ion,^ the utilitarian ethics^, and the practical social interest^. He
thinks that the part of the Siris "best worth reading is that which treats
of tar-water".
Like Berkeley, Mill was unable to hold consistently to the empirical
theory of knowledge. Bowne is said to have remarked that "God never in-
tended Mill to be the empiricist that he was." Mill accepted the "esse-
is-peroipi" doctrine, but curiously enough, he failed to apply it to
general cosmology. Hence, Mill thinks of &od , not as creator, but as a
finite being, whose presence in the universe is proved by the evidence of
1-Mill, iSssay on Berkeley's Life and Writings, 281 2-.Ibid,283 3-Ibid.287
4-Ibid.29a 5-Ibid,294 6~lbid.;^96-7
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design, tut whose limitation is proved by the fact of evil. In spite of
Bill's professed adherence to Berkeley, this rejection of Berkeley's
central doctrine of God brings ilill much closer to Hume than to Berkeley*
Accepting Berkeley's doctrine of "esse is peroipi" without the theistic
hypothesis as a basis for objectivity. Mill comes perilously close to
solipsism, from which he saves himself only by abandoning the purely sen-
sat ionalistic view of the self, and by affirming the objective reality
of space as the ground of the external order*
It thus appears that Mill borrowed large portions of the Berkeleian
doctrine - notably Berkeley's empirical assumptions, his theory of know-
ledge, and his hedonistic ethics - but in the rejection of Berkeley's
personali st io and theistic doctrines. Mill attains only a fragmentary
system, much less consistent than that of Berkeley. Mill's criticism of
Berkeley undoubtedly had large influence in aiding Bowne to correct the
deficiencies in question, while avoiding certain of Mill's mistakes and
also his extravagance*
One of the most formidable sources of criticism which the Berkeleian
philosophy had to meet was the argument of the Meo-Hegelian thinker,
Thomas Hill Green. Green was much like Berkeley in personal standards
and ideals, and like Berkeley, he looked upon personality as the supreme
principle for the interpretation of reality and value An important
difference appears between their respective theories of knowledge; for
Berkeley, *the world is a system of ideas, and God, or the Supreme Mind,
is needed as the author and ground of these ideas; for Green, the world
is a unitary system of relations, and God, or the Absolute Mind, is es^
sential to make these relations intelligible. Berkeley regards knowledge
as the apprehension of inert ideas by the active mind; Green thinks of
knowledge as a synthetic system of relations which is built up by active
mind. For Berkeley, active spirits only possess the ontological predicate
1-i.H. Green, ii'rolegomena to JSthio s ,par • 184
1I
1
t
65
for Green, it is mind and its object taken toe«ther in "essential cor-
relation", which constitutes reality.^ Where Berkeley says "esse is
percipi**. Green would say "esse est intelligi", following the doctrine
of Heeel»
Green criticises Berkeley because his writings, "though professedly
philosophical, really form a theological polemic"^; because the logical
consequence of his doctrine is to reduce the mind to "a succession of
feelings which cannot even know themselves"^; because Berkeley presents
the moral and spiritual attributes of God as "revealed", "without enquir-
ing into the possibility of such revelation to a merely sensitive con-
sciousness"*; and because Berkeley fails to grasp the true element of
permanency in ideas. As mental states, says Green, ideas are necessarily
evanescent and particular; the only permanency which can be found is the
permanency of meaning, law, or mode of relationship, and such permanency
grounded in a permanent constitutive mind, Berkeley fails to establish.
Berkeley has an answer to this criticism^, but the answer is only partially
satisfactory, for Green's contention that the Berkeleian ideas are par-
ticular, and hence disjunctive, is quite true of Berkeley's earlier doc-
trine*; the rejection of abstract ideas, even as modes of relationship,
left Berkeley without a logical medium for organizing ideas into per-
manent syntheses.
This failure to provide for the objective validity of relations
leads to still more serious consequences. In identifying feeling and
idea, and in doing away with space and body, even as abstract ideas,
Berkeley has denied the possibility of all permanent relations, and thus,
says Green, "in his hurry to get rid of externality as independence of
the mind, he has really got rid of it as a relation between bodies, and
1-Green, works, I. 141 2-Ibid,133 3-lbid«136 4-lbid.l35
5-Fraser ,I« ,273
Hote - in the Siris, Berkeley does make provision for the permanency of
ideas, after the manner of Plato* The Berkeleian system, however, is
commonly identified with Berkeley's earlier teaching.
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in so doing (however the result may be disguised) has logically made a
clean sweep of geometry and physics. This is indeed a serious charge
- one which had "been made also by Kant - nor is Berkeley able, in the
judgment of the present writer, entirely to clear himself. 'Jhis is one
point at which the Kantian epistemology must enter the idealistic system
to enable it to stand.
(ireen admits that Berkeley did recognize the function of relations
as distinct from ideas, but he points out that Berkeley introduces this
distinction only in the second edition of the Principles, and then it was
introduced "without any recognition of the fact that the whole reduction
of primary qualities to mere ideas was thereby invalidated."^ This dif-
ficulty can be corrected. Green believes, only by admitting rationality,
not perceivability , as the essential attribute of the real. The "esse is
peroipi" doctrine, which was defended in Green's day by John Oaird^ arises,
according to Green, from confusing the proposition "that no object can be
conceived as existing except in relation to a thinking subject, with the
proposition that it cannot exi st except in that relation*""^ The object-
ivity of ideas is guaranteed, says Green, not by their "liveliness" as
Berkeley suggests, but by their coherence; and since coherence is af firm-
able not of feelings, but only of conceptions, it follows that ideas cannot
be isolated presentations; still less can they be mere feelings; they must
be recognissed for what they are in fact - conceptions, logically related
one with another* Berkeley's account of God is inadequate because of his
inadequate doctrine of ideas; for God is not the mere subject of a suc-
cession of feelings, but the constitutive ground of the cosmic system of
intelligible relations, Finally, it is charged that the Berkeleian meta-
physics, resting as it does upon a defective epistemology, is fatal to
true spiritualism and theism alike; for at best, it gives us only a world
1-Green, Works l.,145 2-lbid.l51 3-J,Caird, Introd. to Phil, of Relig.147
4-Green, Works , ill
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of "feeling substances" whioh vanish with the cessation of feeling#
'i'his detailed criticism of Berkeley by T. H# Green is of special
importance to our present study, for Green's criticism represents the
influence of both Kant and Hegel; his own conclusions, though idealistic
and personalist ic , are strongly marked by the Hegelian rationalism. Bowne
was keenly aware of the criticisms advanced by Green, and in his own
philosophy, he endeavored to meet them, but without going over to the
Hegelian camp*
' The last of the thinkers to be considered among those who followed
Berkeley, and who may reasonably be supposed to have modified the Berke-
leian idealism before it reached Bowne, is Hermann Lotze* Lotze was
Bowne* s personal friend and teacher, the one philosopher to whom Bowne is
most often likened; and though Bowne himself professes to have transcended
his teacher, their lines of reasoning are very much alike* Lotze' s great
principle for solving the problems of philosophy is personality. It is
in the active mind that we find the synthesis for change and identity, the
one and the many, freedom and necessity, appearance and reality. In this
doctrine, we find anticipated the proposition of Bowne, that the key to
reality is personal life.
Lotze was not directly dependent upon Berkeley, and makes slight
mention of him in his writings; he drew rather from Leibnitz and Spinoza,
yet the many striking resemblances between the doctrines of Lotze and
those of Berkeley seem to indicate a close logical relationship. Lotze
himself aptly, though perhaps unconsciously, describes the process by
which Berkeley's philosophy was wrought out, in one of the last articles
which he wrote. "Philosophy is always a piece of life," says he; "except
in rare oases, a prolonged philosophical labor is nothing else but the
attempt to justify scientifically a fundamental view of things which has
been adopted in early llfe."-^ This description is applied directly to
1-Lotze, Philosophy in the Last Forty Years, Oontemp.hev. Jan»1880
,p, 137
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Berkeley "by W. R. Sorley^, and it mlg-ht have been applied with almost
equal propriety to Bowne» Sinoe Lotze aeeras here to "be 8tatin£; a con-
viction, it appears that he himself had had the same experience. Lotze
was more interested in Logic, in Physiology, and in Mech&nioal Science
than was Berkeley; and he differed also in making Ethics, rather than
Epi stemology , the starting point of Metaphysics.^ Otherwise, the dif-
ferences are not great*
In Bpistemology , Lotze agrees with Berkeley (1) in his initial
attack on abstractions; pure being does not exist; as an abstraction, it
is a legitimate conception, tut it is not applicable to reality. (2)There
is agreement in nominalism; Lotze tells us that the Idea ( Idee ) must have
concrete content.^ (3) Both Berkeley and Lotze emphasize the Unity of
Consciousness as essential to thought or experience. The introspective
evidence of this unity, and its significance for a spiritualistic view of
reality, appears in Lotze* s statement, "We must single out as the decisive
fact of experience, that compels us in the explanation of mental life to
put in the place of matter an Immaterial form of being as the subject of
phenomena, that Unity of Conac iousness without which the sum-total of our
internal states could not even become the object of our self-observation."
Both agree (4) that "no single idea is a copy of the cause which produces
it, and even the connections which we think we cognize between these still
unknown elements are not primarily the very relations that really obtain
between the elements, but only the form in which we apprehend them»"5 In
this statement of Lotze* s appears an identity with Berkeley's rejection of
the copy theory of ideas, and Berkeley's assertion that relation is an act
of mind, but a disagreement with Berkeley's rejection of externality. (5)
Lotze agrees with Berkeley that the mind is shut up to its own ideas, but
argues that our knowledge may be none the less valid and objective, since
1-Sorley, Jloral Values 6e the Idea of God, 259 2-Lotze, Metaphysic s , 536
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w« can have faith in the reason itself, as well as in the trustworthiness
of "that reality, which includes us in itself, (and) has given our spirit
only such necessities of thought as harmonize with it»"^ Berkeley would
have said, we can trust God* Finally, Lotze's theory of knowledge gives
large tolerance to the esse-est-percipi doctrine, "but not complete accept-
ance. Lotze says, "Let us therefore cease to lament as if the reality of
things escaped our apprehension; on the contrary, their reality consists
in that as which they appear to us; and all that they are "before they are
made manifest to us is the mediating preparation for the final realization
of their very being»"^ This conception is somewhat qualified by the state-
ment found elsewhere, "Every appearance presupposes as the necessary con-
dition of its appearing a real being in the inner relations of which lie
the grounds that determine the form of its appearance. "3 aven space and
time may be subjective conditions of thought in the sense that the causal
ground of the phenomenal order "must itself be subject to an order neither
spatial nor temporal, which acting upon us is by us translated into the
form of spatial and temporal order©"^ This compares very closely with
Berkeley's account of how the Divine Will acts upon finite mind. The dif-
ference is found in Lotze* s clear admission of the objective reference of
ideas, and an epistemological dualism* The dualism, however, is not ulti-
mate, and finds its solution in a spiritualistic metaphysics*
Lotze' s metaphysics accords closely with that of Berkeley* He agrees
(1) that a thing is what it is known as, but denies that it can be regard-
ed as merely the sum of its qualities; the complete conception of a thing
must include the past and future history of the thing*^ Lotze also allows
for (2) the freedom of the finite spirit, and suggests a kind of divine
immanence, but the account is mora absolutistic than theistic, so that
Lotze has been charged with pantheism. (3) Lotze clearly recognizes that
1-Lotze, Metaphysics, 166 2-Lotze, Microco smus ,352 3-Ibid*349 4-Ibid*349
5-Iotzt, Metaphysics, 59
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if phenomenal reality is to be defined as akin to conscious states, only
a spiritual nature can belong to that reality which is subject of the
states* (4) He notes also the error of the claim of natural science that
cause and effect must be equal and like. (5) He agrees with Berkeley
that the essence of true being is activity, and the concept "substance**,
if it be used at all, must mean "that which can produce or experience an
effect.**^ (6) His rejection of materialism is as complete as Berkeley* s.
"A world of atoms and movements of atoms can never develop from itself a
trace of mental life; - it forms on the contrary nothing more than a sys-
tem of occasions, which win from another and a un-lque basis the manifest-
ation of an activity possible only to that basis alone*"^ This sounds
much like Berkeley's doctrine of signs and significations. Lotze comes
at last to a community of spiritual beings as ultimate reality, which,
though conditioned by phenomenal bodies obedient to mechanical laws, and
though they are dependent upon "the one genuine being or existence", are
nevertheless "gifted with the strange capacity, which no knowledge can
further explain, of feeling and knowing themselves as active centers of
a life which goes out from them,"'' Whether or not the soul be immortal
is uncertain, consciousness alone being the one sure fact. Immortality
belongs to faith*
•There is manifest here the same general idealistic interpretation
which we find in Berkeley. Many of the utterances, if couched in slight-
ly different phraseology, might have been taken from Berkeley's own writ-
ings. The concept of value is emphasized more, and the ethical standard
is perf ec t ioni st ic rather than hedonistic. There is lacking the clear
assurance of Crod and immortality which is found in Berkeley; yet the
thought is profoundly religious, and the emphasis on personality unmis-
takable. On the whole, we may conclude that the philosophy of Lotze,
1-Lotae, Metaphysics ,426 2-Ibid,533 3-Ibid.534
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aside from its absolutism and its mechanism, differed from that of Berke-
ley only in certain minor details of doctrine and points of emphasis*
We come then to the ' conclusion that the Berkeleian idealism, as it
reached Borden P. Bowne subsequent to the work of other thinkers, had had
its more serious deficiencies exposed and reduced by unsparing criticism.
Hume had shown the inadequacy of a purely empirical theory of knowledge;
Kant had indicated the constitutive function of the mind itself in the
I-
acquiring of knowledge; the Sc^otchmen had emphasized the need of initial
postulates rooted in life, and also the necessity of an objective basis
for valid thought processes; Mill noted the insufficiency of theological
assumptions as a basis for metaphysical speculations, and by the inade-
quacy of his own qualitative hedonism, he also showed the defect of the
Berkeleian ethics; Green showed that ideas must be conceptual in essence,
and that they must be united in a synthesis of logical relationships
grounded in mind; Lotze showed how the subjectivity of consciousness may
still admit objectivity of knowledge, how epistemological dualism may be
bridged through a spiritualistic metaphysics, and how the antitheses of
thought find reconciliation in living personality*
With this array of criticism before us, it might seem that there
could be little of the original Berkeleian philosophy remaining; but this
suggestion is dispelled when we observe that these comments mean, not re-
jections, but rather developments, of Berkeley's central idealistic con-
ception. Whether a single thinker can admit all of these criticisms and
at the same time retain at the heart of his system the fundamental doc-
trine of Berkeley - that minds and their activities constitute the sum
total of reality - we may determine from our investigation of the system
of Bowne. To this examination, we now direct our attention*
Berkeleian influence traced in the writings of Bownei
i* Theory of Thought and Knowledge.
The epistemological reasoning of Bowne is of particular interest to
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our study because of Bowne*9 express statement that It constitutes his
chief point of difference from the philosophy of Berkeley. Yet the dif-
ference may prove to be less serious than Bowne supposed. At the outset,
we find a suggestion of likeness, for Bowne regards his position as being.
In some sense, empirical. He tells us that "experience is the fundamental
fact in all theorizing, and since reality can be known only in experience,
in the largest sense of that word, we may say that philosophy alms at a
rational and systematic comprehension and interpretation of experience."^
It is true that when Bowne speaks of "experience", he has in mind some-
thing far greater than the traditional conception of sense experience;
hence, he applied to his view the term "Transcendental Empiricism", be-
cause he aims to include the Kantian factors of creative mind. As Hocking
remarks, "Life is will, plus thought and experience; and Bowne ' s critical
achievement is that he worked out a view, which he was willing t,o call
empirical because based on experience, but "transcendentally empirical",
because the experience he was concerned with far exceeded the realm of
the senses*"^ Bowne' s own criticism of JSngllsh empiricism is indicated
in the sentence, "Empiricism tells us that we get objects only by exper*
lence, but falls to perceive that experience itself rests upon a complex
rational activity*"^
Now it is true that Berkeley did not grasp the Kantian principle of
the criticism of experience, but neither did he rigidly adhere to the
assumptions of empiricism. We have contended, and we shall endeavor to
point out still more clearly, that Berkeley admitted a degree of mental
activity in the apprehension of sense objects, and that he anticipated in
a measure the Kantian a-prlorl and the doctrine of the categories. In so
far as this was the case, his "empiricism" would provide for the assump-
tions of Bowne, In any event, the fact that Bowne begins his epistemology
1-Bowne, Theory of Thought & Knowledge, 3 2-Methodlst Review, C7. #3 ,p ,372
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with the analysis of experience would indicate that he and Berkeley ap-
proach the epistemological problem from the same general direction*
Again, the importance which Bowne attached to the epistemological
inquiry brings him close to the position of Berkeley. His epistemology
was logically preliminary to his metaphysics* He explicitly avowed his
belief that "our notions of knowledge and its nature (and) our conception
of reality and causality — are the things that decide our general way of
thinking and give direction to our thought even in morals and religion."^
This was quite in keeping with the conviction of Berkeley, who followed the
judgment of Locke in affirming that the inquiry into the ways and possibil-
ities of knowing should precede the search for metaphysical reality. In
one important respect, however, Bowne differs here from Berkeley. He does
not make epistemological considerations serve as the basis for his person-
alistic metaphysics; rather, he reaches his personalist ic conclusion by
reasoning from the nature of the object in experience*
Considering the general nature of thought, Bowne first settles the
psychological problem which Berkeley considered in his "New Theory of
Vision**, namely, whether the datum of sense is identical with the object
of perception. Berkeley had argued that visual sensation gives naught
but lines and colors; these symbols, being interpreted in consciousness,
are made intelligible by the mind itself which contributes the meaning,
acquired, so Berkeley suggests, from the other senses, especially from the
sense of touch. Bowne also holds that the meaning is contributed by the
mind, and he gives Berkeley the crfedit for having made the discovery,
which, so he says, has become a **comnonplace of psychology** since the pub-
lication of Berkeley's essay. But Bowne applies the principle, not to
visual sensation alone, but to all other sense data as well* The senses
give us naught but symbols; the mind, by a creative act of thought, con-
tributes the meaning. Berkeley had suggested this, and in his later writ-
1-Bowne, i>ersonalism, preface viii.
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ing, he assumed it, but Bowno more clearly states it as a universal prin-
ciple •
Bowne next establishes an understanding with his readers, so that he
N.
may clear himself once for all of the possible charge of solipsism - a pre-
caution which Berkeley neglected to take, with troublesome consequences,
as we know, "Our thoughts", Bowne declares, "claim to be valid for an
order of fact or reason which our thoughts do not make but discover, and
which is common to all and not merely special to me,"^ Berkeley had also
faced the question of objectivity of perception, and his language somewhat
resembles that of Bowne, He says, "When 1 open my eyes, it is not in my
power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular
objects shall present themselves to my view* and so likewise as to the
hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures
of m^^ will«"2 But Bowne goes further than this; it is not only of our
sense perceptions that Bowne asserts an objective status; even our individ-
ual feelings, moods, and private mental states, since they are actual hap-
penings in the total system of reality, may be considered as possible ob-
jects of knowledge for all* In their occurrence as mental states, they are
indeed subjective; but as objects of knowledge, they have an objectivity
which is common to all* It is this element of universality and objective
reference of thought, which "distinguishes the judgment - at least in its
Intention - from a subjective union of ideas. "^ Where Berkeley had af-
firmed the freedom of sense objects from dependence upon the finite will,
Bowne asserts the independence of all valid objects of thought; where
Berkeley had summoned the Divine Spirit to maintain the objects, or "ideas",
not yet apprehended by finite mind, Bowne asserts the principle of ob-
jective reference, together with a dualistic epi steraology ; where Berkeley
had contended for the identity of thought and existence, Bowne allows a
separation, but at the same time, he affirms that the laws of thought are
1-Bowne, Theory of Thought & Knowledge, 14 2-if'raser, I#,E73
3-Bowne, Theory of Thought « Knowledge, 14
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paralleled "by the lav/s of existenoe. The final explanation of the exist-
ent world is not for Bowne a question of epistemolo^y . This problem, he
leaves to netaphysios.
Coming to the logical presuppositions of epistemology , Bowne affirms
11) the unity and identity of the thinking self, (2) the law of identity
and contradiction, and (3) the continuity of relations among the objects
of thought*^ With the first and second of these conditions, Berkeley was
in emphatic agreement; indeed, he was one of the foremost advocates of
the unity and identity of the thinking self, this point being one of the
chief elements of difference between Berkeley and Hume# For the inter-
dependence of external objects and events, however, in a determinate order
and a necessary causal relationship, Berkeley's system makes no adequate
provision. It was because of this omission that Berkeley drew upon him-
self the criticism of Green, who declared that if Berkeley were consistent,
he must needs abolish geometry and all physical science* Phenomenal
causality, to Berkeley, meant merely the habitual association of sign
with thing signified. Bowne, on the other hand, felt that the claims of
natural science were rooted in the permanent bonds of causal relationship
in the objective order; he accepted what Leibnitz called "the law of suf-
ficient reason". In emphasizing this feature of external relationship,
and in making the relationship ultimately rest in the constitutive nature
of ilind, Bowne clearly goes beyond Berkeley.
Passing to the criterion of truth, the two thinkers are again in
agreement, neither Berkeley nor Bowne directly faced this problem of
logic and worked it out in a comprehensive and conclusive manner. But
the problem was not ignored. In his "Principles of Human Knowledge",
Berkeley had recognized that intuition and consistency are the chief
guides to truth, and in addition, he had completely overthrown the inade-
quate correspondence theory by his statement that "an idea can be like
1-Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 20
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nothing but another Idea."^ In the Alciphron, Berkeley considers the
problem more fully, shows the Insufficiency of mere sense perception as
a criterion, and definitely advocates coherence, system and consistency
as the test of validity. In addition, there is a large element of prag-
matism apparent in Berkeley's writings*^ These are the same principles
to which Bowne also makes appeal throughout his writings. He tells us that
"The test of formal truth is the law of contradiction" and »*The test of
concrete truth is practical absurdity."^ In matters of religion, both
Bowne and Berkeley recognized that probability is the guide of llfe.^
Notwithstanding these fairly clear principles, however, we find in Bowne
an extra- rat ional element strongly suggestive of the Scottish "Common
Sense" intuition. Occasionally, the principles of intuition and prag-
matism come into conflict with the principles of coherence and consistency;
and when such conflict occurs, the former principles appear to have the
preference, following Bowne* s dictum that "Life is deeper than logic."
"ilan is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration;" says he, "and these are
far more powerful factors than the logical understanding."^ We are as-
sured that "belief is made for us as well as by us, that it is wrought out
in action rather than in speculation (and that) we can not discredit
the great catholic beliefs and tendencies of humanity without involving
the whole system of knowledge in disaster."^
Berkeley also recognizes the strength of this value-claim upon specu-
lative thought, in the interest of morality and religion* His attack on
the Free- thinkers makes use of the identical argument just quoted from Bowne.
Says Berkeley, "It seems our minute philosophers act the reverse of all
other wise and thinking men; it being their end and aim to erase the prin-
ciples of all that is great and good from the mind of man, to unhinge all
order of civil life, to undermine the foundations of morality, and -- to
1-Fraser, 1,261 2-Ibid.247, 249, 273, 325, 332: also Vol. il. 344, 345
3-Bowne , Theory of Thought 6e Knowledge ,374 4-Praser , II ,312
5-Bowne .Theory of Thought « Knowledge ,376 6-lbid«377
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deerade human kind to a level with "brute "beaste***! But Berkeley defends
these inherited values, not merely on the ground of intuition, or cathol-
icity, "but on the ground of rationality. When Aloiphron objects to the
above language, asserting that much superstition and "rubbish" may have
been "gathering upon the soul from our very infancy", and that "what men
vulgarly call the Truths of ilorality and Religion should be tolerated
only "provided they may be rationally deduced", auphranor replies, "You
are right? i do not therefore take it for granted that they are rationally
deduced, I only suppose that, if they are, they must be allowed natural
to man. If among various opinions about the same thing, one be grounded
on clear and evident reasons, that is to be thought true, and others only
so far as they consist with it#"^ The test of coherence should apply,
Berkeley would say, even to the catholic and universal beliefs.
In his debate with the Mathematicians, Berkeley declares, "No great
name upon earth shall ever make me accept things obscure for clear, or
sophisms for demonstrations."^ He takes his stand with those "who are
not afraid to sift the principles of human science, who think it no honor
to imitate the greatest man in his defects, who even think it no crime to
desire to know, not only beyond Sir Isaac Newton, but beyond all mankind."
That Berkeley was sincere in this position is abundantly clear from his
own place in the history of philosophy; he did not hesitate to break with
the universal assumptions of mankind, when reason seemed to prove to him
the ideality of the material world and the subjectivity of all conscious-
ness. His place was won "by challenging an axiom." It would seem that
while there is general agreement between Berkeley and Bowne concerning the
coherence test of truth in formal reasoning, and the pragmatic test in
concrete action, and agreement also in cherishing the inherited body of
religious and moral beliefs, yet in Bowne' s admission of an extra-rational
l-Fraser,II.57 2-Ibid.61 3-Fraser , III .70 4-Ibid,70
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element in hie syatera, Bowne differs from Berkeley. This point auge^sts
the Scottish "Common Sense" rather than the Berkeleian logio,
Bowne* s chapter on "Some Structural Fallacies'* follows closely the
reasoning of Berkeley. Bowne is said to have regarded this as one of his
most important chapters. The fallacies mentioned are: (1) the fallacy of
the universal, (2) the fallacy of abstraction, and (3) the fallacy of
language. The first consists in "the mistaking of class terms for things"
a phrase which at once suggests the nominalism of Berkeley. The second
is a special form of the first; both are fallacies of abstraction; as
abstraction is applied to concepts, Bowne calls it the fallacy of the
universal, but as applied to principles, it is the fallacy of abstraction.
Again we are reminded of Berkeley's unrelenting war on "abstractions."
Bowne provides for a certain legitimate use of abstraction; he tells us
"Thought cannot get on without the universal, but it must be critical in
its use. In like manner thought cannot get on without abstract principles
but it must be equally critical in their use. As the concept may be valid
for things without being the thing, so principles may be valid for things
without being the thing. And as the concept must be specified into par-
ticular values when applied to any real thing, so principles must undergo
2
specification and oven modification when applied to actual cases."
Berkeley also admits, "i find indeed 1 have a faculty of imagining,
or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have per
oeived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. But 1 deny that
I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities
which it is impossible should exist so separated."^ Both Bowne and Berke-
ley are contending against the ligitimacy of regarding an abstraction as
a concrete reality, and in this respect, both are in agreement. There is,
however, another aspect of abstraction, wherein Bowne differed from Berke-
1-Bowne, Theory of Thought cc knowledge ,244 2-Ibid.251
3-Fra8er,I»242
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ley, namely In the doctrine of the "idea"; this phase of the respective
teachings will "be considered presently in reference to "the meaning of
•idea*"* Bowne ' s exposition of the fallacy of language is virtually
identical with Berkeley's attack on the same fallacy ,1 In Bowne" s con-
demnation of the "fancy that a new name means a new thing**'', we are re-
minded of Berkeley's criticism of the rree- thinkers
,
who, according to
Berkeley, sought to palliate the hatefulness of vice merely by changing
the names of the common sins. 3 Bowne * s whole discussion of fallacies
accords very closely with the Berkeleian teaching*
'j?he chief emphasis in the epi stemo logic al study is laid by both
Bowne and Berkeley on the question of how knowledge is possible, or, in
the language of Bowne, "Is the mind active or passive in knowledge?" One
would suppose that the empirical assumptions of Berkeley would lead him
to say that the mind is passive, accepting the tabula rasa conception of
Locke, but it is just here that his system breaks away from the tradition-
al logic of empiricism, and the personalistic principle comes in. Pure
empiricism argued that knowledge is a relational state between the mind
and the external world. Berkeley avowed that all relation is an act of
mind,^ 'X'he world is not thing, but idea; and to know is to apprehend such
ideas, defining at the same time their relationships. Curiously enough,
he did not carry his conception to the point reached by Kant and by Bowne,
who went on to say that the thinking mind is not merely active, but creat-
ive. "Sensations must be fixed and defined with reference to a permanent
meaning before they can be anything for thought***^ Even in the "passive
experience" of seeing a color, "the mind does more than simply read off
what is given. For in calling it a sensation, whether in distinction from
the self or from other sensations, we already posit it as a definite and
self identical content. "6 Every sense perception involves an act of Judg-
1-Fraser ,1.250, 251, 252 2-Bowne, Theory of Thought & Knowledge ,262
3~Fra8er ,il . 74 4-Fraser ,1,338 5-Bowne, Theory of Thought & Knowledge, 39
6-Ibid.38

80
mont , and such Judgment is posailsle only as the mind transforme the
sense impression into a permanent meaning* The sense impression as it
occurs is a continuous and evanescent flow of sense affection; the mind
does more than receive the flow; it transforms it into fixed and abiding
ideas.* And the judgment, "by which the sensation becomes articulate in
consciousness, is the mind's predication of relationship among these per-
manent ideas. Thus "perception is really an active process "by which the
mind builds its objects for itself.**^
In a significant passage, Bowne indicates Just how far he might be
able to go with Berkeley, and just what his difference must be: "If, then,
the world be essentially tiod»s thought," says he, "it becomes our thought
only as we, by our own mental activity, build up that thought for our-
2
selves, and thus share or participate in it." "An abiding order, inde-
pendent of our finite and individual thinking, and in this sense a real
order, is the necessary presupposition and implication of our thinking. ""^
But such a "world of things can exist for us only as the mind reconstructs
it as a world of thought."^ Even in conversation between persons, "no
thoughts pass between the speakers, but each mind thinks and thus grasps
the other's thought*"^ In this recognition of the constitutive task which
the active mind has to perform in every act of conscious apprehension,
Bowne shows the influence of Immanuel Kant. Berkeley admitted the active
character of mind, but it was Kant who showed that it must be constitutive
and creative.
This consideration of the relation between the mind and its object
brings us to the question concerning the meaning of "ideas". For Berkeley,
this word had a very wide meaning. It is used in two senses. In the first,
or wide sense, it means any possible state of consciousness. In the nar-
rower usage, it means sense impression, mental image, or sense object; it
1-Bowne, Theory of Thought de Knowledge, 48 2-lbid.55 3-Ibid.57
4-Ibid.56 5-Ibid.55
*-Note - In the Siris, Berkeley advocates a view somewhat similar to that
of Bowne*
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is in this narrower application that Berkeley identifies things and "ideas
Since all sense objects are ideas or combinations of ideas, the term con-
notes the ideality of the physical world. "Ideas" are passive, inert,
and particular. Because they are passive, they cannot represent an act-
ive being; hence, we cannot have "ideas" of other minds; but in view of
the fact that we obviously do have some knowledge of other minds, we may
be said to have "notions" of spiritual beings.* "Ideas" are picturable;
and since our knowledge of relations is unpicturable , we mnat also use
the term "notions" in reference to our knowledge of relations.* It is
in his use of the term "notions" that Berkeley allows for objective refer-
ence and epi steraologio al dualism, for the "notion", as such, is not the
object of conscious attention; the "notion" is a state of consciousness
which refers to a reality beyond itself. There is also a partial pro-
vision for the mediatory character and objective reference of "ideas",
for it is admitted that "ideas" may suggest "notions of God, virtue,
truth, &c."-^ Moreover, "ideas" may suggest other "ideas" ; and mere
names may serve to arouse passions, excite to action, and the like, "with-
out any ideas coming between."^
Berkeley clearly felt the need for the objective reference of ideas,
but he was prevented from affirming it as a universal proposition by one
important circumstance, namely, the particularity of "^ideas". Having ac-
cepted the argument of Locke that "all things that exist are only particu-
lars"^, he was driven by his view of the subjectivity of consciousness to
affirm that all ideas are particular; hence, there could be no such thing
as "abstract ideas". "A word becomes general by being made the sign, not
of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of
which it indifferently suggests to the mind,"^ It was not because of in-
difference toward the logical demands of the problem of consciousness that
note - The doctrine of "notions" was introduced only when Berkeley came
to write the second edition of his "Principles'*.
l-Fraser ,1.383 2-Ibid.415 3-lbid.25ii 4-Ibid,244 5-Ibid.244
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Berkeley maintained hla peculiar theory of •'ideas", but tecause of hiB
inheritance of the Lockean ep i stemo logy
,
coupled with his own revolt
against materialism*
The Berkeleian "idea" is inert, picturable, concrete and particular,
and it may signify either subjective mental processes or objective sensible
things. One cannot wonder that this unusual signification of a common
term of psychology should have created much criticism and countless mis-
understandings. But, as St. George Stock observes, Berkeley "had a very
good reason for retaining it in the teeth of objections. For it served
as the flag and symbol of the insurrection he headed against the existing
order of thought, marking, as it did, that Hatter was deposed and that
Mind reigned in its stead. Berkeley himself confirms this suggestion
in the following passage from Hylas and Philonous, speaking in the char-
acter of the latter* •*! own the word idea
.
not being commonly used for
thing
, sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, be-
cause a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by
that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the im-
mediate objects of the understanding.** Berkeley, as well as T. H. Green,
understood that Geometry requires universal conceptions, but he evidently
believed that he had made provision for this need through his admission
that a particular idea may be "universal only in its signification."^ He
admits that "all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions*'*,
but denies that there are any universal "ideas".
If we now accept Berkeley's meaning, allowing the terra "notion" to
stand as a designation of mental processes which have universal logical
signification and also objective reference to realities other than them^
selves, we shall find that Bowne and Berkeley stand close together, but
with a real difference. Bowne agrees with Berkeley that existential real-
l-3tock. Attempts at Truth, 179 2- Fraser , 1 . 453 3-Ibid.329 4-Ibid,247
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ity must be concrete and particular, but he denies the use of the term
"idea" as thus applied, Bowne admits the ideality of the sense order,
but he restores the terra "idea" to its ordinary connotation of mental
state. Admitting that every sensation is particular, and that conceptual
being can be said to exist only as it becomes particular, Bowne shows
that in order to think, we must pass beyond the particulars to the uni-
versale. As a psychological event, every mental process is indeed par-
ticular, but as an intelligible conception, every state of consciousness
is universal. The ideas of sense, so far from being particular, cannot
enter into articulate consciousness at all until they first become uni-
versal* For in Bowne* s meaning, the universale are the ideas, and these
ideas are the contribution which the mind itself makes to the knowing
situation.
For Bowne, an "idea" is not a thing, or a sensation, or a feeling,
but an abiding, logical meaning, of universal scope. Hence, a color
sensation is nothing for consciousness until it becomes a sensation of
color. A recurrence of experience is Impossible except as it becomes an
experience of recurrence* Knowledge is not merely apprehension, but com-
prehension. It involves more than the investing of particular impressions
with logical meanings; it requires the putting together of ideas which
belong together. Perceptions are complete, as noted above, only when they
have been articulated in consciousness through an act of judgment; and
judgments are possible only through the instrumentality of universal ideas.
Taken by themselves, these universale are indeed mere names of abstract-
ions, but by objective reference, they attain particular content; and
thus every valid idea signifies a universal meaning embodied in a con-
crete reality, in his failure to see the true function of universals,
Berkeley left himself exposed to the criticism of Kant and of Green, In
his doctrine of "notions", he appears to have been groping toward the
principles just outlined, and in the Siris, he affirms the Platonic doo-
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trine of unlversals, but in his earlier philosophy, through his ambiguous
usage of "ideas", he left himself without the necessary logical forms for
handling or assimilating the empirical data of experience. It remained
for Kant to develop the reciprocal dependence of universal and particular,
showing that "Form without content is empty; content without form is
blind." Bowne accepts the Berkeleian doctrine in its idealistic impli-
cations, but he modifies the account of the knowledge process according
to the teachings of Kant«
In setting forth his account of the categories of thought, Bowne
explicitly disclaims "responsibility for any historical scheme of the
categories such as that of Aristotle or Kant. The only contention is
that there are immanent principles which underlie articulate exper-
ience and make it possible*"^ Berkeley also had recognized such immanent
principles of thought, and while he did not, of course, arrive at a com-
prehensive view of the Kantian categories, it is surprising to find how
far he went in that direction. "liumber," says Berkeley^ "is entirely the
creature of the mind."^ Space also is conceived as phenomenal"', and so
also is mechanical causality.^ Relation is an unpicturable principle of
the mind^; and 'i?irae, considered as a simple "idea", was so impossible a
conception that when Berkeley confronted it, he felt himself "lost and
embrangled in inextricable difficulties."^ The very principles of know-
ledge are in one utterance spoken of as "a priori"''', and Berkeley avows
that "all relations" include an act of the mind. In all of these admiss-
ions, we find clear anticipations of Kant, jsioreover, we should not forget
that it was the consideration of the deficiencies of pure empiricism as
found in Hume, that impelled Kant to develop the a-priori character of
thought. Like Kant, Berkeley also had contrived to escape the scepticism
of Hume by affirming a unity of oo.nsciousness , with certain a-priori
1-Bowne, Theory of Thought a Knowledge, 59 2-Fraser ,1.264; also 111.262
3-Fraser, 1.279; 323 4-ibid.285; 383 5-Ibid.307 6-Ibid.311 7-Ibid.291
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powers of thought, nevertheless, the modern doctrine of the categories
remained to be derived "by Kant j and in spite of Bov;ne*s unwillingness to
accept Kant* 3 complete table of the categories, it seems evident that he
borrowed much more from Kant than from Berkeley.
Bowne»s table includes the following categoriesj Time, Number, Space,
Quantity, Motion, Being, Quality, Identity, Causality and purpose, with
some account of the **doubtful categories" of Necessity and Possibility,
Although this scheme is essentially Kantian, much of the argument is de-
cidedly Berkeleian. Relation is recognized as a primary principle, for
the categories are merely modes of relating the data of consciousness,
Bowne tells us, "Things can be related for our thought only as they are
related by our thought" and again, "The fact of relation is revealed only
in the act of relation."''" In considering Number, Bowne says, "The unit
does not establish itself; for one and the sane object may be one or many,
according to the point of view or the mental aim.**^ Compare with this
the argument of Berkeley, "We say one book, one page, one line, &c
.
; all
these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And
in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some j)articular com-
bination of ideas arbitrari ly put together by the mind."2i
Concerning Time, Bowne tells us, "Time is primarily a law of thought
whereby the mind relates events under the form of antecedence and sequence
and thus makes the temporal experience possible."^ "The consciousness of
time — rests ultimately upon a mental activity whereby the contents of
consciousness are temporally related to one another and to the abiding
self."^ Compare with this statement the language of Berkeley, "Time there.
fore being nothing abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds,
it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the
number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or
l~Bowne, Theory of Thought & Knowledge, 63 2-Ibid,70 3-Fraser ,1.264
4-Bowne, Th. of T. & K.66 5-Ibid.69
I
86
mind.^l Of Space, Bowne says, " Jnref lect ive thought identifies the ex-
istence of things in space wit?i a knowledge of the same. But here again
reflection on the general fact that a relation can exist for the mind
only in and through the relating act disposes of this view." Compare
the words of Berkeley, "Some, perhaps
,
may think the sense of seeing doth
furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we
have elsewhere shewn (in the Essay on Vision), that the ideas of space
and distance are not obtained by that sense.
Bowne defines Motion as "change of place, or as the passage of a
body from one place to another*"'^ The conception involves the relations
of both time and space. Berkeley says, "the idea I have of motion doth
necessarily include relation", "there must be conceived at least two
bodies; whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is
5
varied." In his "De iiotu", Berkeley considers the three principles,
Motion, Space and Causality. The gist of his argument goes to prove the
interdependence of space and motion, and the phenomenal character of
causality; true causality, after the analogy of the finite will, is re-
ferred to the will of (iod.
Much of what Bowne has to say about Quantity is matched by what
Berkeley says of Extension. Bowne* s account of Being is similar to Berke-
ley's account of Substance; while in Bowne* s discussion of Causality and
Purpose, we have arguments quite like those which Berkeley adduces in
support of his doctrine of God* Thus, Bowne finds it "a question whether
true causality can be found in the phenomenal at all, and not rather in
a power beyond the phenomenal orderi**^ and for the complete "systematiz-
ation ana unification** of the objects of consciousness, he finds neces-
sary "the elevation of causality to intelligent and volitional causality,
with its implication of plan and purpose."''' Beside these suggestions, we
l-Fraser ,I.31£ 2-Bowne, Th. of T. & K.73 3- Fraser ,1.1523 4-Bowne,
Th. of T. 4 K.76 5-Fraser, 1.320 6-Bowne, Th. of T. & K.91 7-Ibid.l04
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may put the question of Berkeley, in the character of Philonous, "ITow I
desire to know - whether you can conceive any action besides volition;
and - whether you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or
active Cause of our ideas, other than Spirit, is highly atsurd and un-
reasonable?"^ These examples will suffice to show that although Berkeley
did not make systematic deduction of the categories, he did advance sug-
gestions which anticipated them, and many of the arguments which he brought
forward in defence of his idealistic position have proved applicable to
the later account of the categories.
It should be noted that the comparisons drawn above have been based
upon Berkeley's early writings, for the reason that in these we find the
most complete exposition of his idealistic system. If, however, we take
into account his later doctrine as set forth in the dlris, we find the
anticipation of the categories still more clearly in evidence. He men-
tions with approval the fact that Plato held certain "original ideas" or
principles of thought to be native properties of the mind; "that is, notions
which never were or can be in the sense, such as being, beauty, goodness,
likeness, parity. Some, perhaps, may think the truth to be this: that
there are properly no ideas . or passive objects, in the mind but what were
derived from sense; but that there are also besides these her own acts or
operations; such are notions ."^ He explains that these "notions" are not
to be identified with "Innate ideas"; they are formative principles "latent
in the soul** and "in need of sensible occasions" for manifestation; the
conclusion is that "mind, knowledge, and notions, either in habit or in
act, always go together*"*' Father than this, Berkeley could hardly have
gone without actually forecasting the doctrine of Kant. Accordingly we
may say that while Bowne's exposition of the categories depends upon Kant
rather than Berkeley, and probably owes nothing directly to the latter, yet
Bowne does sustain a close logical relationship to Berkeley, and as we have
l-jjraser,l»431 2-U'raser , ill #272 3- Jfraser , ill . 273
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seen, he makes use of numerous Berkeleian arguments in support of his
deductions*
Passing now to the question of the validity of finite thinking, we
find that both Bowne and Berkeley agreed that consciousness is necessarily
subjective; the mind knows nothing directly but its own mental states.
Both were likewise agreed that notwithstanding this fact, we can have
accurate knowledge of a reality which is other than our own thinking;
consciousness, though subjective, may yet possess objective validity.
Ijeither Bowne nor Berkeley would admit that idealism means solipsism.
Just how this validity of knowledge is possible involves the problem of
objectivity, or the status of the object in consciousness. 2he principal
elements of this problem have already been met in consideration of the
mind's activity in consciousness and the criterion of truth. The re-
spective solutions of the problem of objectivity have therefore been
anticipated, and need only a few words of further exposition©
Bowne deals with the problem in his three chapters, covering in order
The Motion, The Judgment, and Inference. "Conceiving, judging, inferring,
- are only different phases of one indivisible process. All are depend-
ent on the constitutive activity of thought. After admitting the particu-
larity of concrete reality, Bowne explains why he cannot agree with Berke-
ley that **the mind has only a particular object before it."^ "It is quite
true that I cannot conceive of an actual triangle which does not belong
to some one of these classes — but it is equally true that 1 can so deal
with the conception of triangularity as to need to take no account of the
sizes or ratios of the angles, and so as to get results valid for all tri-
angles whatever.**^ Besides, if the conception is to be particular and
singular, it must be absolutely particular and must be the very triangle
itself; or, if it be the conception of a man, "I ought to be able to name
my man, and tell his age, height, nationality, occupation, the color of
1-Bowne, Th. of T. <& K.118 2-Ibid.l32 3-ibid.l33
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hlfl eyes and hair. Thna the doctrine perishes of Its own absurdity,"^
A oonoeption, which as an act Is particular* must still In its validity
he universal. "Hence to the question, 7/hat has the mind "before It in
the case of general notions? the answer Is, Their meanine*"^ This point
has been explained before, and need not be enlarged upon. The act of re-
lating these notions with reference to their validity for an Independent
order, is known as Judgment. Inferences are syllogistic reasonings based
on one or more Judgments. Thus does Bowne lift the problem of objectivity
of knowledge out of the realm of psychology into the realm of logic.
The immediate object of consciousness both for Berkeley and for Bowne
is the mental state or concept* But the mode of establishing its validity
for independent reality differs. Berkeley holds that it is valid for obip.
jective reality because it is the objective reality itself; it exists in
nature as a mental act, and as a mental act it enters the finite mind; its
esse is ]5ercl£l.» distinguish objective ideas from purely subject-
ive ideas only by their coherence and consistency one with another; ob-
jective ideas are existentials in the mind of &od» Bowne holds that the
valid idea is valid, not because it enters the mind from an existential
realm of ideas without, for strictly speaking, it does not enter the mind
at all - rather it is created in the mind; it is valid because it accur-
ately defines the meaning of a particular existential reality; he does
not say that the idea resembles the reality (for he would agrees with
Berkeley that an idea can be like nothing but another idea), but he af-
firms the fact of its reference to concrete reality. Thus by a doctrine
of universal logical meanings whose reference to objective reality may be
put to practical test, Bowne provides for the validity of knowledge. Berke-
ley had made partial provision for such a doctrine of objectivity in his
theory of "notions", and in his Slris, he clearly affirmed the phenomenal
character of all natural objects, but he never revised his system to give
1-Bowne, Th. of T, & K.133 2- Ibid. 133
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a consistent and comprehensive scheme of objective reference,
«^hat is the place of Knowledge in the total system of Heality?
Neither Bowne nor Berkeley would accept the possibility of an order of
unknowable things-in-themselves or of an unknowable substratum underlying
manifest reality. Both rejected this hypothesis on the same ground; (1)
because what is unknowable is unoessarlly unaf f irmable , and (2) because
such a theory, even if granted, could serve no useful purpose.^ neither
Bowne nor Berkeley would admit that knowledge in any sense falsifies real-
ity. Although both held to the subjectivity of consciousness, and both
recognized (if we allow for Berkeley's later views as expressed in the
Siris) the phenomenal character of sense knowledge, yet both maintained
that reality as it is known is the only reality there is: the only differ-
ence allowable is between reality as partially known and reality as more
fully known. Both agreed that all that is real is knowable.^ Bowne
agreed with Berkeley in reducing the primary qualities as well as the
secondary to apprehensions of mind.^ He also presents Berkeley's argument
that the objective order is distinguished from the purely subjective imag-
ination by its being independent of the finite will.^ And with Berkeley,
he holds that while things may exist independently of our finite thought,
they are not to be supposed as existing independently of all thought.^ He
accepts the general idealistic position of Berkeley that "what we call
material things exist only for, and in relation to, mind and consoious-
nessft**^ As against the realistic contention that something in the natural
order can be affirmed as real, which is beyond the reach of sense alto-
gether, Bowne feels the absurdity of the conception, and specifically de-
clares his agreement with Berkeley, who "was not entirely out in his claim
that he alone agreed with common-sense."^
With so large an element of agreement, one might conclude that the
two philosophers had little to divide their doctrines. The difference, in
l-i?'ra8er,jt.266; also Bowne, 'iM-.A K.303 2-Bowne , 'f . 'x . « K.314 3-lbid 34n4-lbid.320 5-lbid.303 6-ibld.319 7-lbid.322
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fact, is not great; not so great. It would seem, as Bowne himself in-
ollnod to "believe. Bowne explains the difference on the assumption that
Berkeley regarded the finite thought as helng Itself the Identical thing
which exists as a natural object In the material order, as though such
thoughts were independent entitles, which, starting out from the mind of
God, made their way ultimately into the mind of man, the world of sense
objects being nothing more than mental presentations whereby the Divine
Spirit speaks to the finite spirit, it must be admitted that much of
Berkeley's argument savors of such a conception, yet Berkeley, no less
than Bowne, regarded the world as God's act, as well as God's thought*^
it was Berkeley's misfortune that he never quite reduced his total system
to a single consistent interpretation; his intent must be inferred from
his occasional statements of the idealistic view, The chief ambiguity, as
noted earlier, lay in Berkeley's peculiar view of "ideas"; this ambiguity,
Bowne intends to correct*
Accordingly, Bowne tells us, "The thought of triangle may refer to
the mental activity of conception or to the contents apprehended. It is
only in the latter sense that thought and being are to be identified.
Thought, viewed as the process of conceiving, comparing, reflecting, in
which our mental life so largely consists, is in no sense identical with
things. Wo particular occurrence whatever in the individual consciousness
is to be mistaken for objective reality. Our thoughts, as mental acts,
or mental products, are never things; it is only their logical contents
which are things. But these contents are all with which the mind can deal,
and they are subject to logic. The laws of thought are their laws.
Grant that there is a universal reason whose contents are reality the
problem of human knowing still remains untouched, unless we show that the
objective reason must specialize itself not only into the world of things,
5-^.?^!!.!!!!!.!^'!_??!f^f^*f
of human thought. "2 undoubtedly, Bowne probes
1-Fra8er,l,295; also 111.261 2~Bowne, T.T.& K. 304-306
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deeper here Into the proljlem of knowledee than Berkeley, but the con-
clusion brings Bowne to a view which is virtually identical with that of
Berkeley - "Our thoughts are not things, but are valid for things; never-
theless, we must at last come down to thinker whose thoughts are things;
that is, to a thinker whose objects are only his realized thought s •**'
It thus appears that although Berkeley and Bowne travel by somewhat
different roads, they corae out at the same place, Berkeley suggests an
epi stemological monism, from which he departs from time to time in order
to provide for the demands of the knowledge problem - particularly, the
knowledge of other selves - but the ultimate explanation of the objects
of knowledge, both in their being and in their intelligibility, is found
in the sustaining mind of God. Bowne rejects epi stemological monism, as-
serting a dualism for valid knowing, whether the objects be sense objects
or other spirits, the objective order being knowable because governed by
the same rational laws which govern finite thought, but he also finds the
ultimate explanation of the being and intelligibility of objects in the
mind of God* For Bowne, as for Berkeley, the place of knowledge in reality
is the same - knowledge is the apprehension by the finite mind of the
thought and meaning of God* Berkeley arrives at his conclusion by reason-
ing from **ideas** to Mind; Bowne reaches his conclusion by reasoning from the
character of the object in experience; but since Berkeley's term "idea**
included the object in experience, the difference is largely one of term-
inology. Berkeley would have found it easy to subscribe to Bowne* s state-
ment, **A study of the object and of the system of objects must show that
they are meaningless, and hence impossible, apart from mind and conscious-
ness, in and for which they exist. -- This is the only idealism worthy of
consideration.**^ God is the cosmic Subject; '*we must provide some cosmic
consciousness as the source and seat of cosmic phenomena; for phenomena
apart from consciousness, for and In which they exist, are nonsense.'*^
1-Bowne, T.T.& K.327 2«Ibid*327 3-Ibid.334
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Both Bowne and Berkeley recognize that all valid knowledge must begin
with the knowledge of Self. And both admit the witness of introspection
as the sufficient evidence of self*^ ^'he self is a unified, active center,
able to interpret meanings, and able to govern its own thoughts by will
and understanding. The knowledge of the self is an immediate intuition.
The experience of selfhood is a part of every experience, although the
reflective awareness of self may be awakened only on special occasions.
Both Bowne and Berkeley agree that one cannot form a mental image of the
self, although the knowledge of self is a central and basic certainty.
We may compare with Bowne' s statement that "in affirming the self, we
affirm nothing piotiirable or sensuously presentable"^ , the declaration
of Berkeley that, "there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for
all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto
us by way of image or likeness, that which acts."^ Neither Bowne nor
Berkeley will accept the associat ionalistic psychology. Berkeley tells
us, "There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend,
and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any qual-
ity or idea or combination of ideas . is clear from the preceding section.
It remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active
substance or Spirit.""^ Bowne' s agreement is expressed in a passage quoted
from Thomas Reid: am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling;
I am something •that thinks and acts and feels.* The self or I is permanent,
and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, acts, and feel-
ings which I call mine.'"^ Or, in his own language, Bowne* s claim "is
simply that I am not thoughts, but I think, and that I who now think am
the same who thought yesterday."^ The conclusion of Bowne* s epistemolo-
gioal account of the self is that "thought exists only in relation to a
conscious and abiding subject. Apart from this relation, it is an unreal
abstraction." This view is so characteristically Berkeleian that it needs
l-Fraser, 1,270 ob 448 2-Bowne ,T. T. & K.27 S-Fraser ,1 .272 4-Ibid.271
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no comment*
While the knowledge of self is an immediate intuition, supported
by the logical implication of the stream of mental states, the knowledge
of other selves has no such immediacy. If, as fowne tells us, all know-
ledge be defined as •*that which is self-evident in the nature of reason,
or which is immediately given in experience, or which is cogently inferred
from the given"-'-, "both Bowne and Berkeley would agree that the primary
laws of logic represent the first type of knowledge, the knowledge of self
the second type, and the knowledge of other selves the third*^ it is not
certain that Bowne would have agreed with Berkeley that •*the existence of
G-od is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men**^, but
Bowne freely admits that "we cannot prove that these other persons
exist apart from our consciousness.**^ Our knowledge of other selves is
through mediate inferences drawn from sense data and based on the analogy
of our own experience of selfhood and self-consc iousness « It is here
that both Bowne and Berkeley unite in defending a dualistio doctrine of
knowing, for it is clear that if we accept the subjectivity of conscious-
ness at all, we must allow that other selves are elements of reality dis-
tinct from our own mental states. Bowne tells us that "our knowledge of
other persons is reached only as we form the conception of personal ex^
istence out of the materials of oiir own consciousness and project it as
real»"^ Berkeley also recognizes that we must infer the reality of other
persons from the ideas which are by them excited in us, and which lead us
to project the experience of selfhood into an objective order.
^
Berkeley departs here from his customary use of the sensuous "idea"
and admits a mental state which can give objective reference - namely, the
"•notion". That we may understand by this term what is commonly meant by
"idea" - i.e., a purely mental state - Berkeley is careful to allow"'', but
1-Bowne, K.368 2-Fraser ,1.307 3-lbid.340 4-Bowne ,T. T. & K.325
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it would not do for Berkeley himself to use the two terms interchang^eably
,
because of the peculiar definition which he has already given to "idea**.
But in this recognition of mental states, which have objective reference,
Berkeley shows his entire agreement with Bowne , in the account of the know-
ledge of other selves. Even Bowne* s statement that we can know the thoughts
of other minds only by first thinking such thoughts ourselves and so mak»-
ing them our own-^, is matched by Berkeley's statement that "we conceive
the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own,
which we suppose to be resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by
means of our own soul»"^ Just why we should affirm an objective order,
in preference to a solipsistio universe, raises a question for which
Bowne has no better answer than the practical absurdity of solipsism^
and the primal assumption of intelligence^; Berkeley's answer is the
observation of causal activity other than that of our own finite will^,
together with the intuition of causality as experienced in the personal
volition*^
Our knowledge of God is a special case of our knowledge of other
selves* As the idea presupposes a mind, so the ideality of the natural
order, according to' Berkeley, presupposes an absolute Mind* The know-
ledge of God is thus an inference, based upon the character of the natur-
al world, as we know it, this natural order being a kind of language;
through this divine "language**, we may understand the meanings and
thoughts of the Supreme Kind, who is the author of nature, just as we
understand the thoughts of finite persons, and so become acquainted with
them through interpreting the sense symbols of finite speech*^ Bowne
likewise represents the knowledge of God as an inference, analogous to
the knowledge of finite persons; and the argument, though slightly dif-
ferent in form, is essentially the same as that of Berkeley* We know
1-Bowne, T.T.i K.324 2-Fraser, I*336 3-Bowne , T.i'.& K.325 4-Ibid»293
5-Fraser,I.339; 341 6-Ibid,272
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G^od not as the author of cosmic "ideas", but as the creator of a cosmic
system of things, which conform to the laws of thought.-^ But when we
I'diaemher that in Berkeley's usage, "ideas" are "things*" , the argument
is virtually the same. ¥or both Bowne and Berkeley, the conception of
(rOd is based on the analogy of the finite self, and the knowledge of God
is an inference from the intelligibility of nature*
There is one clear difference between the two doctrines which de-
serves special mention, namely the ep i st emologic al dualism of Bowne, as
distinguished from the rather ambiguous position of Berkeley. In Berke-
ley's early reasoning, he vacillated between epi stemological monism and
ep i stemo logical dualism; he seems to have inclined toward an absolute
monism, but the logical difficulty which such a position involved with
reference to the knowledge of other selves led hira to introduce, in his
second edition of the Principles, the doctrine of "notions"; this doc-
trine involved a dualistic epi stemology , and the objective reference of
the mental states; but the monism of sense perception was never changed.
The consequence was that Berkeley's epistemology , as it finally stood,
was both monistic and dualistic; in sense knov/ledge, Berkeley upheld
epi stemological monism, but in the knowledge of spiritual beings and in
the knowledge of relations, he admitted epistemological dualism. This
ambiguity undoubtedly marks one of the logical deficiencies of Berkeley's
system, a deficiency felt by the Scottish realists, but more clearly dis-
closed by the reasoning of Kant. Bowne clearly advances beyond the pos-
ition of Berkeley, following the lead of Kant, in affirming epistemological
dualism, and the universality of ideas, with objective reference. This
ambiguity of Berkeley's teaching, together with the failure to provide
explicitly for the constitutive function of consciousness, mark the two
outstanding differences between the epistemology of Berkeley and that of
Bowne
•
We may sum up the analysis of Bowne' s theory of thought and knowledge
1-Bowue, i'.y.ac K. 511; die
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in a few wordss Bowne agreed with Berkeley in the acceptance of the
unity and identity of the self, the account of fallacies*, the recognition
of the mind as active and reality as intelligible, the coherence and prag-
matic criterion of truth, rooted in concrete reality, the acceptance of
formative principles or categories inherent in thought, the spiritualistic
implications of the facts of epi stemology , the intuitive knowledge of self
and the inferential knowledge of other finite selves and of CrOd« Bowne
disagreed in his emphasis on the interaction of objects, the constitutive
character of the mind in experience, the admission of an extra- rat ional
element in belief, the systematic derivation and tabulation of the cate-
gories, the clearer recognition of the universality of ideas, the pro-
vision for objective reference in all valid thinking, and the complete
acceptance of epi stemologioal dualism* This difference seems to be less
than Bowne *s own assertion might lead us to think. It may have been due
to the Influence of the idealistic thinkers who followed Berkeley, or it
may indicate the original insight which characterized Bowne ' s own mind*
There remains one slight difference which should not be overlooked.
Both Bowne and Berkeley faced the problem of bridging a dualism in
epi stemology . Berkeley admitted a duality of thought and object, even
in his epistemologioal monism; but he proposed to solve this dualism by
making the object either another mind, or an idea dependent upon a mind;
80 that the final account of this dualism is found in the conception of
a community of spirits, with (i-od all-governing and supreme. Bowne'
s
dualism is somewhat more complicated. Bowne starts with the admission of
a community of minds, whose primary objects are indeed their own mental
states, but who also find a system of secondary objects, which are other
than their own thoughts, namely, the natural world of things* This dual-
ism also is solved by an appeal to a spiritualistic metaphysics; thought
Note - I am told that Bowne himself regarded his exposition of the fal-
lacies as original, particularly, his naming and defining them. Possibly
Bowne was right. Still, the arguments are identical with those advanced
by Berkeley.
I
96
and thing can come together, not because they are one identical entity,
twt because of their common origin, or source, in absolute Mind; "The
only way out Is to view thinking existence as fundamental, and all im-
personal or physical existence as a manifestation or product of the same.
At this point", says Bowne , "we must go with the absolute idealists and
hold that thought is all-producing and all-embracing. •^ But Bowne does
not stop here. He resorts to the Kantian conception of the three funda-
mental "Ideas** of the reason:- the soul, the world, and God. *»The soul
stands for the finite knower, the world stands for the system of objective
existence, and God is at once their presupposition and bond of union.
We must go behind the finite subject and the finite object to their com-
mon ground and bond of union, if any theory of knowledge is to be possible.
The dualism of the finite must be both founded and transcended tn a mon-
ism of the infinite. *'2 Thus Bowne' s final appeal, like that of Berkeley,
in the solution of the epl stemological problem, is to a spiritualistic
and thelstlc metaphysics.
11* Bowne* s metaphysics*
The examination of the metaphysical system of Bowne with reference
to the Berkelelan influence presents a slightly different problem, for
the reason that Bowne here readily confesses his Berkeleian affiliation,
whereas in the field of epistemology , he discl»imed it. The first edition
of Bowne* s Metaphysics gives considerable space to the discussion of Berke-
ley's view, while the revised work on the same subject closes with the
specific acknowledgment of the Berkeleian character of the doctrines
therein set forth. Uur conclusions, however, must be based, not upon
the personal statements made by Bowne, but upon a detailed examination of
the doctrines themselves.
In the metaphysical Inquiry, Bowne again shows his nearness to Berke-
ley by his personal attitude toward the problem. Undoubtedly, the religious
1-Bowne, T.T.& K.311 2-Ibid.311

99
motive was dominant with both men. Bowne admits at the outset that in
addition to the theoretical interaat in the problem, there is the practi-
cal need of lifting; "popular thoughi; from the sense plane, where it is
perpetually tempted to run off into necessity, mechanism, and materialismj*^
The study of reality, therefore, is not to he made for truth's own sake,
but also for certain religious and moral considerations, which are as-
sumed at the outset. This mode of reasoning in the interest of a par-
ticular view of life is characteristic also of Berkeley, who made his
attack on the mathematicians and the free-thinkers in the interest of
religioua values, and for whom metaphysics was undoubtedly the hand-maid
of religion. For both Bowne and Berkeley, the problem of knowledge has
already indicated the direction in which the solution of the problem of
reality must lie. Accordingly, the metaphysical inquiry is undertaken
not so much to discover a Weltansohauunf; . as to support with arguments
a view already accepted. Of Bowne, it might be said with equal truth,
as it was said of Berkeley, "From the very first his architectonic con-
ception has remained the same. The universe i s an organic system depend-
ent on God for its reality and its knowabllity. It is a spiritual unity,
and the only forces that can work in it are spirits.**
Berkeley made no attempt to set forth a comprehensive system of
metaphysics, as a separate branch of philosophy. His theory of reality
was inseparably bound up with his theory of knowledge, and the details
of the doctrine must be sought out through the various sections of the
different writings. Bowne* s earliest work likewise included epistemology
,
psychology, and metaphysics in a single study, but with the later develop-
ment of his thought, he separated the various phases of study, and ex-
pounded them in different volumes. The metaphysics is a logical sequel
to the epistemology. Just as Berkeley had attained his metaphj^sical con-
clusions by accepting the logical implications of the account of knowledge,
1-Bowne, jaetaphy sic s , revised, 3 2-(x. A. Johnston , The Development of
Berkeley's x>hi lo sophy ,256
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80 Bowne followed a similar procedure, but with a difference in the
method of his deductions. Berkeley found his spiritualistic reality by
reasoning from the subjectivity of consciousness and the ideality of
nature; Bowne, on the other hand, derives his spiritualistic metaphysics
by seeking the ontologioal meaning of the categories of thought, A study
of the object in consciousness had shown the need of affirming certain
principles of thought, through which the mind apprehends the data of
sense* Bpistemology need go no further than to recognize these cate-
gories as essential to articulate and valid knowledge. But metaphysics
may rightly demand that the categories themselves be explained. Thus
the metaphysics, like the epi stemology
,
begins with the analysis of ex-
perience^, but because of the admission of an a~priori element of con-
scioxisness in such experience, Bowne calls his metaphysical viewpoint
not empiricism, but "transcendental Empiricism."^
Both Bowne and Berkeley recognize that the sense order is not ulti-
mately real; but neither of them is ready to admit that the sense order
is illusory^; they agree in the contention that such reality as nature
possesses is dependent upon a reality more ultimate.^ This involves the
admission that there are different gradations of reality, an admission
from which neither Bowne nor Berkeley shrink.^ The dependence of the
natural order upon an order of spirit is commonly expressed by Berkeley
through the use of his term "idea", this word being employed for the
express purpose of indicating such dependence.^ Occasionally, however,
Berkeley speaks of the sense order as "phenomenal"^, a term later given
wide currency by Kant. Bowne declines to use the term "idea" in the
Berkeleian acceptation, and prefers the iCantian distinction between
"noumenon" or ultimate reality, and "phenomenon" or manifest reality.^
Bowne retains the term "phenomenon" but discards "noumenon". The task
of metaphysics, according to Bowne, is to pass from the phenomenal order
1-Bowne, Metaphysics, rev, ihereafter given as Bo.M«r
. )p.5 2-ibid,7
3-Ibid.8; Jraser.I.SO; 23; 26; 283 4-Bo . r , 28 ; Fraser,I.28S 5-Bo.M,r.5;
Fraser,i.277 6-jjraser ,i. 278 7-rraser,iix.264 8-Bo.i4.r.8

101
to the causal order,! The language is Xantian, hut the definition of
the metaphysical task agrees with the conception of Berkeley.
'fhe first category of which Bowne undertakes to trace the ontological
meaning is the category of Being. To what things may we apply the onto-
logical predicate? Here, Bowne agrees with Berkeley; abstract being
objectively is nothing; only the definite can exist,^ Not only must
real being be definite, but it must also be causally active.^ That
reality which is the most active has most being.^ Real being is there-
fore causal, active, and definite; and since the thought of power, apart
from agency, is a mere abstraction, we must say that true "reality Is
always an agent*"^
In all this, Bowne is in agreement with Berkeley* There is agree-
ment also in the statement that "Phenomenal reality is revealed in the
content of sense intuition; but ontological reality can be grasped only
in the unpicturable notions of the understanding* "o The very language
here used is suggestive of Berkeley's dictum, "There can be no idea
formed of a soul or spirit — though it must be owned - that we have
some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind*"''' In one
point, however, Bowne professes to disagree with Berkeley, namely, in
the account of the subordinate reality of natiiral objects. "Things, when
not perceived, are still said to exist, because of the belief that, though
not perceived, they are in interaction with one another, mutually determin-
ing and determined* — When this is omitted, the things vanish into pre-
sentations; and unpresented things are only the ghosts of possible pre-
sentations."® Bowne follows up this attack a little later with the
assertion that, even granting the subjectivity of primary and secondary
qualities, things cannot be mere combinations of qualities^, i*e*, they
are more than presentations; "things have more to do than to appear to us,"
l-Bo*i*r.y 2-ibid*l4; fcraser , X . 244; 266 3-Bo.M*r,17; Fraser,I,270
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This is an attack on Berkeley's esse- is -perolpl doctrine, and assumes
that Berkeley's whole conception of the sense order is that of mere pre-
sentation* Undoubtedly, this view of Berkeley's teaching has much to sus-
tain it in his writing. This was a weakness of Berkeley's early doctrine,
which he tended to correct in his later argument. (r. A. Johnston tells us
that "If the pre- Siri
s
point of view be represented by esse is perc ipi ,
that of 3iri
s
is esse is conoipl » The earlier writings emphasized the
importance of sense perception; the later writings emphasized the reason.
Bowne's criticisms of Berkeley are directed against Berkeley's earlier
views; there is little evidence that Bowne was influenced by the Siris.
Nevertheless, it is not strictly true that Berkeley regarded the objects
of perception, even in his early writings, merely as presentations. Sense-
objects had only a dependent reality, to be sure; and Berkeley, as well as
Bowne, when speaking of ontological reality, affirms that "Nothing but Per-
sons, l»e», conscious things, do exist. Yet a certain derivative power
is allowed to things, for "Bodies &c . do exist when not perceived - they
being powers in the active being*"^ Again, he observes, "Bodies Ac. do
exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken in a twofold sense -
1» Collections of thoughts, <k £• Collections of powers to cause those
thoughts. These later exist; tho perhaps a parte rei it nay be one simple
perfect power,"^ These interesting notes in the Commonplace Book indicate
that Berkeley, like Bowne, recognized the phenomenal manifestation of
causality through the sense order. In the Principles, he actually admits
the interaction of sense objects, but denies that such interaction is true
causality^, which term he reserves, as does Bowne, for ontological beings,
or Spirits. Bowne's criticism, therefore, is scarcely to be accepted
without qualification.
For true reality, Berkeley as well as Bowne, accepted the criterion
of activity; for phenomenal reality, Berkeley proposed the criterion of
1-Johnston, Development of Berkeley's Philo sophy ,253 2-Fraser , lo 59 (par .24
)
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"steadiness, order and coherenoe", and independence of the finite wlll.l
If the total doctrines are taken into account, it seems that by the phrase
"collections of powers", Berkeley meant Just about v;hat Bowne meant "by
"interaction", namely, the phenomenal manifestation of the Divine Will
immanent in the works of nature, through so-called "Natural Laws". Says
Berkeley, "As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so
sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports
it«"^ Berkeley's fault lay, not in his failure to recognize the phenom--
enal expression of causality, but in his failure to provide for it as an
essential part of his idealistic system* This weakness, Bowne sought to
correct
«
With the admission of interaction in the phenomenal order, Bowne Is
confronted with the problem of change and identity. What is the solution
of the ancient dead-lock between Heraclitus and the Eleatics? How can
things be in perpetual state of change, while yet retaining their identity
as things? Bowne' s answer to this problem is found in the conception of
lawo The nature of a thing is expressed in the law of its activity,^ I'he
activity itself means constant change, but the order of this change is
consistent and regular; and this constant principle has a logical meaning
which gives identity to the changing thing* iSxistent being is "a concrete
formula of action*"^ Through its law of action, existential reality may
be rationally understood, but in its ooncretene ss , it presents a mystery -
"that mystery of reality which no thought can ever define."^ This is the
"mystery of creation", arising from the question "how a law can be set in
reality so that, from being a thought, it becomes a thing," Bowne answers
that "We do not pretend to know how being is made»"^ It is interesting to
note that Berkeley also had pondered over the same problem; when Hylas
argues that creation would seem to imply "a sort of change" "to befall the
1-Fraser, I,273 2-Ibid»424 3-Bo,M»r,39 4-Ibld.41
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Deity", Phllonous answers, "Pray consider what you are doing, is it not
evident that this objection concludes equally against a creation in any
sense; nay, against every other act of the i>eity, discoverable by the
light of nature? None of which can we conceive otherwise than as per-
formed in time, and having a beginning,"
Both Bowne and Berkeley analyse the meaning of identity, and while
Bowne is more explicit in his terminology and treatment of the problem^,
yet the solution reached is essentially the same as that offered by Berke-
ley.^ Phenomenal identity reduces to logical identity; and logical identity
presupposes a thinking subject for whom the identity exists; metaphysical
identity is found only in the conscious mind itself. The identity of a
thing is not in any substance of the thing, but in its constant law of
4
action. But the conception of law must give way to a higher identity;
for a law implies a law-giver, or an agent whose uniform mode of action
may be called a law; hence, it is said that absolute sameness is impossible
on the impersonal plano.^ Neither change nor identity can be affirmed,
except it be from the viewpoint of an abiding intelligence, which fixes
the changing stream of experience with permanent meanings, and which recog-
nizes the permanent laws of action which govern phenomena.
°
The discovery of such laws and relationships of phenomena is sufficient
for natural science; but metaphysics, which seeks to know ultimate reality,
must go behind the phenomena and the laws, to the constitutive principle
which explains them both.^ The clue to such a principle is found in exper-
ience itself. "In personality, or in the self-conscious spirit, we find
the only union of change and permanence, or of identity and diversity. The
soul knows itself to be the same, and distinguishes Itself from its states
as their permanent subject*"^ "Consciousness, then, does not simply re-
veal permanence in change; it is the only basis of permanence in change."^
1-Fraser ,1.475 2-Bo.i4*r,45 S-Fraser ,i«468 4-flo«ii.r,54 5-ibid.55
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(Hence), "we must say, only the personal truly Is. All else is flow and
process,"^ Thus, the analysis of Change and identity points to the same
conclusion as the analysis of Being - "the absolute person, not the ab-
solute being, is the basal fact of existence,"^ This solution of para-
doxes by appeal to personality shows the influence of Lotze, but it is
also quite in accord with the conclusion of Berkeley, who closes his dis-
cussion of the same problem with the words: "so you may suppose an ex-
ternal archtype on my principles; - external « 1, mean . to your own mind ;
though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends
all things; but then, this serves all the ends of identity."^
The category of Causality is next examined with reference to its
ontological meaning. Since all natural science depends upon the assumption
of causality, it is essential that this category should have its objective
validity firmly established; otherwise, science itself must appear to rest
upon uncertainty. The impossibility of establishing such objectivity on
the basis of pure empiricism had been clearly demonstrated by Hume. But
neither Berkeley nor Bowne accepted the scepticism of Hume as final. Bowne
notes that any system whatever, which exists for thought, must necessarily
be an intelligible system, intelligibility requires uniformity; "a real
system must be a system of law, so that definite antecedents shall have
the same definite consequents."^ Experience shows that the world of nat-
ure is in fact such a uniform and orderly system, thus assuring its know-
ability, ihis knowability, Bowne considers "one of the greatest wonders
of existence.**^ Berkeley also speaks of the "consistent uniform working"
of phenomena, and of "the settled laws of nature"^, giving us "a sort of
foresight, which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of
life."' \¥e may compare this recognition of the pragmatic value of natural
science with the words of Bowne, "We see how things and events hang together
in an order of law With this knowledge we get a basis for practical ex-
l-Bo.M.r.65 2-lbid.66 3- Eraser ,1.468 4-Bo.ii.r.71 5-ibid.71
6-i.^raser,i.274 7-Xtid.273
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pectation and a means of controlling phenomena to some extent,"^ "Our
valuable practical knowledge must very largely consist in a knovrledge of
these laws,"^
We have already noted that both Bowne and Berkeley recognize the
fact of phenomenal causality. But Berkeley denies to the phenomenal
order of antecedence and sequence the name of causation. He tells us
"the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect ,
but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified , Berkeley reaches
this conclusion not only because of the inability to apprehend any causal
tie through sense experience, but also because of the "great absurdities"
attendant upon the assumption of "corporeal causes."^ He is aware of the
infinite regress into which we are led through seeking causal explanations
on the plane of the senses.^ Hence he describes the phenomenal causality
as a mere sequence of sign and thing signified. Berkeley denies that
there is any necessary connection between phenomenal cause and effect^;
the connection Is of the same arbitrary character as that found between
spoken words and their logical meanings; this connection is established
by the arbitrary flat of the A»elty« iieverthe le ss , the connection la
uniform, and hence it indicates the more certainly the rational character
and the goodness of irod who gives the signs.^ it is th^^s that the propos-
itions of science are found to rest upon faith in God; "for all deductions
of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of iiature always
operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take
for principles, which we cannot evidently know,"^ niince there is "no other
agent or efficient cause than splrlt''-^^, we may explain the causal phenom-
ena of nature only by reference to a supreme spirit. Just as the active
self is the cause of its own Ideas, so the immanent Spirit of tod must be
looked upon as the cause of phenomenal change,H i'he world is therefore
I- Bo,isi.r.258 2-j.bid,247 3-j?^raser ,1,294 4-ibld.295 5-i?raser ,ix .155
6-lbid.l70 7-Fraser,i,274 8-ibld.274 9-ibid,317 10-lbld,314
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CrOd's act, not merely God's concept. ihua the search for true causality
should ultimately bring the "natural philosopher- to accept that Active
Principle" of religion and metaphysics, 'that supreme and wise Spirit
'in whom we live, and move, and have our being. '"^
Bowne reaches the same conclusion by a slightly different chain of
reasoning. onlike Berkeley, he affirms that the antecedence and sequence
of events in phenomenal causality must conform to a necessary order of
connection; "otherwise, anything might be followed by everything or by
2
nothing*" the category of necessity, however, as Bowne points out in
his Theory of Thought and Knowledge . is a "doubtful category"; and in
the Metaphysics
.
he further declares that "the only clear conception we
have of necessity is of rational necessity"^, so that the necessary con-
nection of phenomenal cause and effect proves to be nothing more than
the demand for intelligibility in a rational order. Berkeley also ac-
cepted this principle; so that we conclude that what looked like a dif-
ference between the two thinkers is after all only a difference of phrase-
ology.
Bowne admits that we have no proper experience of interaction^;
hence, we conclude that interaction is a thought problem rather than a
datum of sense experience.^ He criticises the proposition that only like
can affect like, asking why there shoiild be any interaction at all. The
difficiilty in the problem is not that things are assumed to act across
empty space, but that they are assumed to act across individuality." How
is such interaction possible? Not by the transmission of an impersonal
7
"force", for "force" apart from agency is a bare abstraction - the Berke-
leian argument being used to refute this popular fallacy. The solution
offered is the suggestion that "The interaction of the many is possible
only through the unity of an all-embracing one, which either co-ordinates
1-Fraser ,1.295 2-B0«i4.r.71 3-lbid.409 4-Ibid,73 5-Ibid.74 6-Ibid.77
7-lbid,78
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and mediates their interaction, or of which they are in some sense phases
or modifications,"^ t'his raises the paradox of the one-and-the-many
,
which constitutes a new phase of the causal problem.
The clue to the solution of this phase of the problem has already
been indicated in the recognition of the conscious self - "The mind must
comprise the many conceptions in the unity of one consciousness, must
distinguish, compare and relate them, and thus unite them into one system-
atic whole. If the real system were founded and maintained by a supreme
thinker, we should have the necessary bond, and one analogous to the bond
which we have in the case of the conceptual system."^ This reasoning is
identical with that of Berkeley, who, in the airi
s
.
frequently use the
term "The One" (To bv) as a synonym for Grod. In the application of this
principle, however, Bowne departs from Berkeley. Bowne gives a two-fold
application, which is pluralistic in relation to finite spirits, and
monistic in relation to sense objects. "We may regard the many Individuals
as ontologically distinct from the one and from one another, and as brought
into interaction only through the mediation of the basal one which posits
and co-ordinates thera according to the plan of the whole. — This view
reduces to a universal occasionalism, so far as the interaction of the
finite is concerned. The one incessantly adjusts and co-ordinates the
relations of the many."^ in the case of sense objects, "the relation of
the one to the many is that the many have no proper existence or thinghood
in themselves, and are only modes or phenomena of the one, which alone
truly is*""^
The second conception accords with Berkeley's teaching, but the doc-
trine of "universal occasionalism" as an account of the action of finite
spirits, Berkeley specifically denies; - "that there are certain unknov/n
Ideas in the mind of (iod - this, if anything, is all 1 conceive to be meant
by occasion with regard to God. "5 "While Berkeley holds that the reality
l-Bo.M«r.81 2-lbid.72 3-Ibid.82 4-lbid.82 S-Fraser ,1,299
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of thlnf?s depends on their being referred directly to God, he maintains,
against Jialebranche , that actions owe their reality only ultimately to
God, and proximately to finite selves. 'We move our legs ourselves
Berkeley was much concerned with the problem of causality as touching
finite spirits, as is shown "by his repeated references in the Commonplace
Book^, but while he willingly referred all existence to God, he seemed to
feel that the demands of finite freedom required that the finite will
should share with the Divine Will the power of action* Hence, he declares,
"I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the
motions in bodies. It is true 1 have denied there are any other agents
besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking
rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers,
ultimately Indeed derived from God, but Immediately under the direction
of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt
of their actions."^ Had Berkeley reduced his thought of freedom to con-
sistency with his dictum that the only conceivable causal power Is personal
volition,^ he would doubtless have come to a conclusion Identical with
that of flowne* As it is, however, he maintains a difference, though the
difference is not great. Both Bowne and Berkeley agree that the only true
causality is to be found in personal will, and that the efficient causal-
ity underlying the world of nature belongs ultimately to the will of God»
The analysis of the category of Causality leads logically to the
inquiry concerning the World Ground, which conception Bowne next considers.
Here again, Bowne' s agreement with Berkeley is clearly apparent. We are
told that the infinite must be a unitary and indivisible agent.^ Finite
spirits, being dex^endent upon the World Ground for their being, are
creatures of the Supreme Agent, yet with a freedom which guarantees moral
responaiibillty.^ Just how this dependence and independence are to be recon-
1-G. A. Johnston
,
Development of Berkeley's Ph. 70 2-Fraser , !• 69 3- Ibid. 340
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oiled in concrete life, we do not know; "we only know that we cannot inter-
pret life without admitting toth, and that to deny either lands us in con-
tradiction and nonsense."^ Thinea are modes of God's activity, and in the
last analysis, all impersonal things vanish into phenomena, but finite
persons are God's creatures, and share trod's nature as active, thinking
being*^ 'fhe spirit, whether finite or infinite, is **not a resting thought,
but a thinker and a doer."^ We may compare with this statement the as-
sertion of Berkeley that a spirit is "the only substance or support where-
in unthinking beings or ideas can exist, ""^ and the definition of spirit
as "that which thinks, wills, and perceives."^
Bowne does not immediately pass from the fact of the intelligibility
of nature to the conclusion that the author of nature is an intelligence,
as does Berkeley in the doctrine of "idea"; instead, Bowne shows the Im-
possibility of affirming such intelligibility upon impersonal grounds;
"Critical thought can find no rational security for uniformity and con-
tinuity in anything but rational purpose."^ We are driven to the person-
alistio conclusion not by any a-priori conceptual scheme, but by the
logic of experience, "The attempt to define reality itself fails until
intelligence is introduced as its constitutive condition."''' Bowne holds
with Berkeley that there can be but one fundamental reality; neither
space nor time can be affirmed as ultimately real, without denying the
ultimate reality of God»® Berkeley had said, "Matter once allowed, I defy
any man to prove that God is not matter."® Like Berkeley^^, Bowne rejects
"the atheistic attempt to refer the world to mechanical necessity"^
,
because of the difficulties attendant upon such an assumption, both logical
and practical. i'hus by a process of logical elimination of other alter-
natives, Bowne comes at last to the Berkeleian conclusion. "The world
depends unpicturably upon God, as our thoughts depend unpicturably upon
I- Bo,M,r.l02 2-lbid. 98-99 3-lbid,103 4-Fraser , 1. 334 5-lbid.335
6-Bo.24»r.l07 7-lbid.lll B-ibid^lll 9-Fraser ,1,32 10-ibid,376
II- Bo.jn.r,112
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the mind, and uod is in the world as the mind is in its thoughts, not
as a pervading aura or spatial presence, but as that active subject by
which all things exist.
The personality of (»od does not mean the anthropomorphism of Ood»
"Self-knowledge and self-control" are the essential marks of personality;
and Bowne agrees with Berkeley^ that while finite personality may be
fragmentary and intermittent, perfect and complete personality is possible
only to the iJelty, Thus the two philosophers stand together in the account
of causality and creation. Both hold to a personalistic , theistic meta-
physics. Berkeley reaches his conclusion by the epistemological argument
from the "idea" to its source in "Mind". Bowne argues from the impli-
cation of all of the major problems of thought, -"^Crod is that with which
all our inquiry must end."3
The argument from the cosmological categories of Space, Time and
iiature, has already been anticipated in considering the relationship be-
tween Bowne and Berkeley in the development of the categories of thought,
Bowne and Berkeley are agreed that Space cannot be ultimately real, be-
cause it possesses no causal activity^; it is a form of experience; and
apart from such experience, it is a bare abstraction.^ Both Bowne and
Berkeley 'suggest that a real infinite space would impose limits upon God,
implying two Infinite and ultimate realities, which notion must be reject-
ed because of its logical difficulties.^ Both agree that the objective
ground of space and the spatial experience is (jrod.'' When the subjectivity
of space is affirmed, it is not to be supposed that a solipsistic view
is conceded; rather, the subjectivity merely declares that all spatial
experience is dependent upon mind, and all space-objects are likewise
Qdependent. ipace and natural objects are "real", but not apart from an
infinite jsiind.^ i-he conclusion reached is that the space-order is mind-
l-Bo,M.r.ll9 2-i?'raser,l,29tpar.580 );alsop.478 S-Bo.M.r. 118-119
4-lbid.l29 5-Ibid,127 6-lbid, 133-4 7-lbid,140 8-lbid,142 9-ibid,143
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dependent; and space itself must be defined as ••ultimately a principle of
intuition, and secondarily, a mode of appearance ."^ This is all that is
meant by affirming the ideality of Space; and in this affirmation, Bowne
and Berkeley are in accord*
Both Bowne and Berkeley criticise the doctrine of phenomenalism as
taught by Kant, Bowne explicitly, and Berkeley by anticipation of the
doctrine. As Berkeley had objected to the dualism of Locke, so Bowne
objects to the dualism of Kant* Space and Time are not "the mental speo-
taoles through which the mind looks"
,
implying that a world of things-
in- themselve s is somehow masked behind the world of phenomena* The ideal-
ity of nature does not mean that we are 'in a world of illusions", but
that we are »»in a world of mind#"^ In the recognition that the World-
Ground is a 2ilind, we find the guarantee of the objectivity of the cate-
gories, so that "the apparent world becomes the only world there is, and
is just as real as it proves itself to be.""^ This metaphysical monism,
ideali stically interpreted, is proclaimed by both Berkeley and Bowne with
equal emphasis.^ Says Berkeley, "I take not away substance* I onely
reject the philosophic sense iw°^ in effect is no sense) of the word sub-
stance***^ And again, "I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being
of those things which i actually perceive by sense.""'' While Bowne de-
clares, "The laws of space are as binding upon us as ever But when we
abstract them from things and set them up as realities by themselves, we
are 'lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties.'"®
What has been said of Space applies essentially to Time. Says Bowne,
•*the notion of time as a separate ontological existence shows itself on
every hand as a congeries of contradictions, and must be given up.»*^ He
quotes the language of Berkeley in this connection, feeling "lost and
embrangled" and "miserably bantered*"!^ Berkeley had said, ''Time is the
train of ideas succeeding each other. "H Bowne expresses a similar con-
I- Bo.M,r.l53 2-lbid.l38 3-lbid.l45 4-lbid.l45 5- Fraser , 1 . 25 & 266-lbid.20 7-Ib.306 8-Bo, M.r. 154 9-lb.l74 10-See Fraser. 1,313
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ception in words almost identical, "time is only the subjective appear-
ance of change. Since time possesses no causal activity, it cannot be
regarded as ultimately real; it has no other reality than as the form of
changei,^ as change is nothing except with reference to an abiding in-
telligence, 80 time also implies an intelligence, and "the temporal Judg-
ments will vary with the powers of the one judging, "3 the same thought
is expressed by Berkeley as followss "'Tis a perfection we may imagine
in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the ut-
most clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point. Both
Berkeley and Bowne agree that God is timeless. ^ The conclusion reached
is that "Both time and change must be referred to intelligence as their
source"^; that the temporal form of experience is a characteristic of
our finitude, though the conscious- self is also time- transcending, in
the ability to "grasp all of its elements in an indivisible act"; and
that God, who comprehends all reality immediately, is therefore timeless.
This conclusion is more comprehensive than anything which Berkeley wrote,
yet it accords essentially with his speculations; hence, we may say that
here we find the Berkeleian doctrine supplemented by that of Kant, but
with complete acceptance of the Berkeleian teaching as far as it goes.
Thus the study of cosmology, through examination of the categories
of space and time brings Bowne to give an account of "Nature", which, in
all essential points, is identical with the account given by Berkeley,
since
.
"thought can never recognize anything which is not rooted in thought",'''
we may regard nature as wholly phenomenal, meaning by this statement that
nature considered by itself lacks the power of causality^, and has no extra-
mental reality*^ "The only definition of nature which criticism can allow
is the sum-total and system of phenomena which are subject to law. --
This nature is throughout effect, and contains no causation and no necessity
l-flo,M»r.l78 2-lb.l83 3-Ib,188 4-ib.l89; also Fraser,i.53 5-Bo«M,r.l89
<i Fraser,l,64 6-Bo*M.r.l93 7-Ib,244 8-lb.260 9-ib.244
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in it."^ Beside this statement of Bowne's, we may put the statement of
Berkeley, "Nothing can he plainer than that the motions, changes, decays
and dissolutions which we hourly see "befal natural bodies (and which is
what we mean uy the course of nature ) cannot possitly affect an active,
simple, uncompounded substance" (which is what we mean by Spirit),^ Bowne
declares that the only view of nature which can abide is the view which
regards nature as an expression of "that Living Will which not only work-
eth hitherto, but worketh still and worketh forevermore ."^ The discussion
ends with a section entitled "Nature as Idea." The section reads like a
page from Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge". No comment is need-
ed other than the citing of two quotations: "A thought world is the only
knowable world; and a thought world is the only real world, — The ration-
al ideas and relations and system in what we call things are the only
thing with which we can deal; and they are nothing in abstraction from a
mind which constitutes them and maintains them."^
The final phase of the metaphysical inquiry concerns the nature of
consciousness, or the doctrine of the self, A few words should be said
concerning Berkeley's view, before we proceed to examine the teachings of
Bowne. Berkeley commonly speaks of the self as "mind" or "spirit"; some-
times he says "will" and sometimes "soul"; but in his general philosophical
writings, the term "person" is never used. We find this interesting entry
in the Commonplace Book, "The concrete of the will & understanding I must
call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit
defining of person, or making much mention of it,"^ The reason for such
a view seems to have been an element of uncertainty which Berkeley at this
early period felt in his own mind concerning the ultimate metaphysical
account of personality. Probably also, he wised to avoid theological
controversy such as might have been aroused by use of the term "person",
l-Bo.ja,r,262 2-.Fraser,I.337 3-Bo.M,r,285 4-Ibid,294 5- Fraser , 1 ,41
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In the Principles and Xiialocues, he writes with perfect assurance con-
oerning the substantial chara,cter of the mind, as a central unity over
and above the train of ideas or volitions. Besides ideas, "there is aome-
thing which knows or perceives them; and exercises divers operations
about thera."'^ "jL myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking,
active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas.
He always assumes that the intuition of personal identity is universal;
and if we did not have his notes in the Commonplace Book, it might appear
that he dealt with the conception of the self dogmatically, having never
appreciated its difficulties. A study of the Commonplace Book, however,
discloses the fact that before he attained to such an attitude of assur-
ance, "he had already passed through a scepticism as absolute as that
which Hume afterward reached,"^ We find such entries as these: "The very
existence of ideas constitutes the Soul. Consult, ransack y^ under-
standing. W"** find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts?
W* mean you by the word mind? — Mind is a congeries of perceptions.
Take away perceptions, and you take away the mind, jeut the perceptions
and you put the mind."^ Hume himself could not have asked for scepticism
more complete.
How Berkeley worked his way out of this scepticism appears from
later entries in the Commonplace Book. "Substance of a spirit is that
it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble
y"^ may be made of the word 'it') to act, cause, will, operate."^ **I must
include understanding de will in the word Spirit - by which 1 mean all that
is active. I must not say that the understanding differs not from the
particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions. The Spirit, the
Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.**^ The question of personal
identity perplexed him. "Wherein consists identity of persons?" he asks,
1-Fraser ,l»258 2-lbid.450 3-G. A. Johnston, Uevelopment of Berkeley* s Ph«198
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and in answer, he writes, "Not in actual oonsciousnesa; for then I*m not
the same person 1 was this day twelvemonth hut while I think of w* 1 then
did,"^ He inclines to seek identity in the conative rather than the coe-
nitive element of consciousness. He makes this entry in the Commonplace
Book, "Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Wlll?"^ And
at a later date, he writes, "The spirit - the active thine - that w°^ is
soul i God - is the Will alone."^ Thus, from the very first, he refused
to "believe that the esse of spirits is merely perc ipere , for the attitude
of percipere is not active in sense-perception except when volition is
included in the percept ion,"^ And throughout his argument, Berkeley con-
sistently holds that activity is the essence of spirit. "While I exist
or have any idea," he asserts, •*! am eternally, constantly willing; my
acquiescing in the present state is willing."^ It thus appears that the
metaphysics of personality, as held by Berkeley, includes two elements,
cognition and volition; and since volition is the active phase of exper-
ience, it seems that the will is the primary attribute of selfhood, the
understanding secondary.
Vrhat then is the willY Berkeley had intended to develop this part
of his doctrine in a second "book, appended to the principles. In his
journal, he notes, "Volition or V7ill, w°^ is not imaginable, regard must
not be had to its existence at least in the first book."^ Fraser sug-
gests that this"aecond Part of the principles" may have been written
afterward and lost in Berkeley's travels.^ At any rate, Berkeley's meta-
physics of the self never appeared in any connected discourse, and we
must piece the doctrine together from the various writings. One of the
clearest statements is that which appears in the Principles, "A spirit is
one simple, undivided, active being - as it perceives ideas it is called
the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them
it is called the will."^
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An examination of Bowne ' a doctrine shows that Bowne also went
through a process of development in this Important phase of his thinkine*
He left no "Commonplace Book" through which we might trace the evolution
of doctrines during his early maturity, "but in his first edition of the
ifietaphysic s
,
published when the author was "but thirty-five years of age,
we find abundant evidence that Bowne had grappled with the problem of
scepticism as well as Berkeley. Jioreover, there are noticeable differ-
ences between the doctrine of the self as set forth in the early Meta-
physics and the sane doctrine as it appears in Bowne • s maturer writing
of the Metaphysics some sixteen years later. The early view makes fre-
quent use of the term "soul"; and Bowne insists that the soul is •'sub-
stantial,"^ The soul is characterised by the power of action, and Berke-
ley's proposition that "conscious action" is the only form of action
which may be conceived as ultimate, is specifically cited and accepted.^
Bowne*' s assertion that "there is some one element which I call myself,
and which is the substantial subject of my mental life"^, has a marked
Berkeleian flavor. In opposing the associat ionali st ic psychology, Bowne
insists, as Berkeley had done, that the self is something other than the
stream of thoughts or feelings, and concludes, "We must return to the
notion of a self which really thinks and feels. "^ That the "unity of
self** is immediately given in consciousness is suggested, and not denied.^
Bowne' s later doctrine is an advance beyond this early reasoning,
yet there is no essential departure from the Berkeleian teaching. The
conception of "substance" gives place to the notion of "identity**; and
the term **soul" is used less frequently, the term "self" being preferred
in its stead. It is argued that "only consciousness can raise continuity
to identity"^; and that "a phenomenon as such cannot exist apart from con-
sciousness."''' This reasoning is quite similar to Berkeley's utterance
that "Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All
1-Bowne, Metaphysics (1882)361 2- lb. 109 3-Ib.364 4- lb. 362 5- lb. 368
6-Bo.lI.r.342 7»ib.311

116
other things are not so much existences as manners of existence of
persons. "1 Says Bowne in parallel statement, "Only spirit fills out the
notion of being; and the only being of which we have any proper exper-
ience is our selves • Recognizing that the only true metaphysical real-
ity which we find is in the self, the qiiestion arises. What is the self?
Bowne answers after the manner of Berkeley, "The reality of the soul
consists in its ability to act", but "How the soul can act, there is no
telling. "3 Pursuing the point, Bowne tells us that the self must be a
mind plus its idental states, a subject-object complex, "The subject of
consciousness is not the soul, considered as a blank substance or blank
subject, but the conscious soul; and the thing which is identical is
neither consciousness in abstraction from the soul, nor the soul in ab-
straction from consciousness, but the conscious soul."^ Nowhere in this
reasoning is mention made of the "will"; so it might seem that Bowne
differs from Berkeley in emphasizing the cognitive rather than the con-
ative function of consciousness. The difference, however, tends to dis-
appear when we remember that in Bowne' s view all cognition is active and
constitutive, and that the criterion of being, for Bowne, as for Berkeley,
is action. Heal identity is found only in "the self- ident ify ing action
of intelligence. There is no other real identity,
iiotwithstanding this mutual dependence of minds and their ideas,
which is affirmed by both Berkeley and Bowne, it seems that both of the
men allow a kind of separation. Both of them suggest that mind is active,
while ideas are passive and inert. The question might be raised. How, if
we grant the mutual and necessary dependence of the mind and its ideas,
either the one or the other could be characterised independently except
by resorting to that rejected practice of abstraction? The question need
not be pressed, but it should be remembered that both Berkeley and Bowne
el^ve ground for it#
1-fraser,1.59 2-Bo.M,r.302 3-lb,339 4-Ib.340 5-lb.341
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Considering the experience of sensation, Bowne makes the distinction
which Berkeley failed to make, namely, the distinction between the intel-
lectual apprehension of sense objects and the psychological event of
sense stimulation and psychic reaction. We have already seen how Berke-
ley's failure to make this distinction made him the target of later criti-
cism, "By sensation," Bowne tells us, "we may mean the logical contents,
and we may mean the psychological activity involved. Sensations in the
former sense have only logical existence."^ in the latter sense, sensations
represent the concrete exp eriences of life in their particularity, and
form the subject matter of psychology. Both factors are present in every
valid sense-experience, and neither is anything but an abstraction apart
from the other. Sensation in the latter sense "furnishes the raw material"
sensation in the former sense "gives it form and interpretation. ffhere is
2
no possibility of either of these passing into the other." Here, we come
again upon the epi stemological dualism, which we considered in an earlier
section, in this clear recognition of the elements of sensation, with the
mutually dependent factors of form and content, universality and particu-
larity, logical meaning and existential concretene as , Bowne is following
the lead not of Berkeley but of Kant. Bowne declares that "where the
sensations are regarded as affections of a mental subject, we cannot work
the doctrine without appealing to some higher principle."^ In this state-
ment, Bowne indicates his departure from Berkeley, for the rejected doc-
trine was Berkeley's account of sensation} and the "higher principle" to
which Bowne appeals, is the constitutive function of consciousness as
taught by Kant.
5?he difference which here emerges between Bowne and Berkeley is
apparent in like manner in Bowne 's account of memory. Berkeley had made
memory merely ohe phase of volitional activity of the mind; by direct act
of will, the mind summons up or creates a memory idea, which differs from
l-Bo.Jil.r.38 6 2-Bowne, Introd. to psychological aheory,174 3-Bo .M. r . 38 6
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an immediate sense idea only as an image differs from an object; this
image-idea is not indeed numerically identical with the thing-idea, "but
the former may represent the latter as a sign represents the thing signi-
fied. Just how this identity can be established, or Just what it in-
volves, Berkeley does not tell. l"he real problem of memory, or repro-
duction of "identical ideas" is apparently not realized. Here again,
Bowne follows Kant in appealing to the constitutive function of conscious-
ness. The same idea, as psychic event, cannot be recalled, for ideas are
but fleeting states of consciousness; but logical meanings may be re-
instated, for logical meanings are permanent. It is the function of con-
sciousness as constitutive activity to effect the reproduction of ideas
by ideas of reproduction. This cryptic language means that the mind it-
self, as a time-transcending and self- ident ify ing agency, sets forth a
new concept which the mind recognizes as identical with a former concept,
and this gives the experience of memory. tfhis constitutive act of mind
Is not an act of volition, but the normal working of consciousness, and
the power to synthesize, relate, and identify different ideas is essential
to any rational consciousness. "If there were not an abiding subject
throughout the entire process, in the unity of whose consciousness these
various factors are related to the subject and to one another in their
various temporal and logical relations, there would be no consciousness
whatever. -- And this obvious fact is all that is meant by the transcend-
ental unity of apperception."^ Thus the problem of memory, like the
problem of sense perception, is solved by Kantian principles, not Berkeleian.
The power of the conscious self over its own body, and the apparent
action of the body in relation to the mind, presents a problem of causal-
ity to which Bowne gives special attention. We have already seen that
Berkeley, in contemplating this relationship, affirmed a measure of finite
causality not altogether consistent with his doctrine of Will; this finite
1-Bowne, Kant and apencer, 21
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efficiency is defended in the interest of freedom. Bowne , hov/ever,
leaving- all efficient causality in the power of Crod
,
frankly faces the
problem of interaction of mind and body. She problem arises from the
obvious fact that mind and body are of different natures, yet experience
shows that they are causally related. How is it possible for elements
of such different natures to be related one to another? Bowne* s answer
is an appeal to theism. it is not essential, says he, that the interacting
members should be alike, but only that they should both stand related to
the same fundamental reality, both belonging to the same unified system.
The mind and the body are able to interact because uod is the ultimate
ground of both. Here again, Bowne evinces some slight difference from
Berkeley, though the difference is of minor importance. the same ideal-
istic conception of reality, the same theistic background, and the same
declaration of finite freedom, governed them both.
The problem of interaction of mind and body leads logically to the
problem of freedom; for the latter problem involves an extension of human
efficient causality to the entire order of nature. i>oes spirit dominate
nature, or is nature dominated by spirit? And again, is the finite spirit
self-determining in its actions? Here, Bowne and Berkeley agree. In re-
lation to nature, the finite self is partially free, and partially deter-
mined, 'i'he self is free in the exercise of volition, bait is determined
in being subject to physical conditions. In the personal life, we are
limited by circumstances, but in the attitude of will, we are absolutely
free. Berkeley declares, "Actions leading to heaven are in my power if
I will them; therefore i will will them."^ Bowne likewise affirms our
freedom in "the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes,
ideals, and to work for their realization."^ Berkeley recognizes that it
is only in respect to man's freedom that man is morally responsible. Says
li9
» "We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of
1-J?'raser,i,69 2-Bo.j4.r.405
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our own doing; natural abllltys are not consequences of our volitions.
Bowne also holds that the "power of self-direction within certain limits
— is implicit in the assumption of responsibility on which society is
built. "2
As finite spirits are free, so uod is free. in fact, the possibility
of our freedom depends upon G-od's freedom. "Freedom everywhere presupposes
a basis of fixity or uniformity to give it any meaning. An absolute free-
dom, unconditioned by any law whatever, is simply our old friend pure be-
ing, and cancels itself."^ Berkeley also recognized that our freedom de-
pends upon the uniformity and regularity of the natural order, and he also
regarded this natural uniformity as a nark of trod's freedom. Both the
natural world and the moral world are free. "the sharp distinction which
we find in Kant between the necessity of the natural world and the freedom .
of the moral realm has no counterpart in Berkeley. For Berkeley mechanical
necessity is non-existent, because nature, as we have seen, consists of
the free actions of (jod.**^ In this divergence, Bowne takes his stand with
Berkeley, not with Xant« As Berkeley had ruled out mechanical necessity
by referring all causality to Will, which in its very nature is free -
l**an unfree will is a contradiction of terms" ) - so Bowne also sustains
freedom by positing a Free Intelligence as the World Ground, and elimin-
ates mechanical necessity by reducing all "necessity" to "rational neces-
sity."^ Thus both philosophers explain phenomenal causality by a doctrine
of final causality; and the universe is denied an impersonal mechanistic
character, in favor of a rational purposive order, obedient to the Will
of God,
The relationship between the personalist ic metaphysics of Bowne and
the spiritualistic idealism of Berkeley may be summed up briefly* Both
of the philosophers approach the metaphysical inquiry from the side .of
epi stemological implication, both are influenced by religious interests,
l-Fraser ,1,39 2-Bo.ja,r.406 3-lb,411 4- Johnston ,Dev .B» s Ph. 306 5-Ib.305;
Fraaor,i.34 (Berkeley says, "Folly to inquire what determines the will.")
o-Bo ,M. r .40y
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and both presuppose the reality and value of the spiritual order. Both
accept the principle of causal activity as the essential attribute of
real being, and both find such abiding reality only in persons. They
agree in viewing the sense order as phenomenal, and in the per sonal i st ic
account of identity, causality and creation; they agree in the theistic
conception of World CJround, the ideality of space, time and nature, and
in the spiritualistic metaphysics of personality; they agree concerning
the unity, identity, self-consciousness and self-direction of the spirit;
and they agree finally in describing the world as an expression of the
will and rational purpose of an immanent personal God. The differences
are chiefly those which we met in examination of the epi stemological doc-
trines. Bowne differs from Berkeley, but does not directly oppose him,
in deriving the spiritualistic metaphysics from the ontological meaning
of the categories; the lines of reasoning are distinct, but the results
are the same. Bowne differs from Berkeley in the account of finite free.-
dom and efficiency in relation to the Divine Agency, but here again, the
difference is slight, and there is no actual opposition. The one essential
disagreement which does appear is in the doctrine of minds and their
ideas; Bowne rejects the Berkeleian theory of passive, receptive cog-
nition, holding to the constitutive character of consciousness as taught
by Kant; this factor we have already seen in the doctrines of epistemo-
logy. Concerning the metaphysics, we may say that in all of the basic
principles and doctrines, Bowne agrees with Berkeley, differing only in
methodology and in the Kantian account of consciousness, carried over
from epi stemo logy
.
Having traced the Berkeleian relationship through Bowne* s theory of
knowledge and theory of reality, the greater part of our present investi-
gation has been accomplished, for these two phases of philosophy were
paramount for both men. Other philosophical writings there were, but
the doctrines already described remained central and dominant throughout.
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This is not to say that we find the same measures of agreement and dis-
agreement in the balance of the writings of the two men which we have
found thus far; but the specific elements of identity and difference
continue the same through all the writings, and these elements lie at
the heart of the respective philosophical systems of both. That our
analysis may be comprehensive, however, it is essential that we give
some attention to the rest of Bowne*3 writings, in order to determine
more clearly the extent of the agreement with Berkeley. We may proceed
to examine the principles of Sthlcs.
iii. The Principles of Ethics.
\ The direct influence of the Berkeleian teachings upon the ethics of
Bowne was manifestly slight. In his Introductory chapter on the "Prin-
ciples of Ethics'*, Bowne specifically repudiates the teachings of the
"English moralists", declaring that they have "generally confused the
question of origin with that of validity, and have produced not a little
misunderstanding and waste of effort."^ The "prevalence of the error in
question in Bnglish ethics" is attributed to the sensat ionalist ic psy-
chology of the empirical school.^ "A false psychology started false
issues, and these were met by irrelevant logic. The blind led the blind
with the usual result."^ After this outspoken condemnation of the Eng-
lish school, it is not to be expected that Bowne should have borrowed
largely from Berkeley, nor did he do so. His chief dependence seems
clearly to be upon Kant and Schle iermacher , to both of whom Bowne makes
frequent reference. We may find, however, that there was some measure
of indirect influence which Berkeley exercised over the ethical specu-
lations of Bowne, an influence which was perhaps unrecognized by Bowne
himself. If there was such influence, it should appear from a comparison
of the ethical views of the two men.
Both Bowne and Berkeley attached great weight to ethical consider-
1-Bowne, Principles of Sthics,4 2-Ib.5 3-Ib.l2
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atlons. The personaliat Ic doctrines of metaphyslca could not fail to
throw the ethical interest into the foreground of attention; and in ad-
dition, both Bowne and Berkeley were Impelled by their personal vocation
as churchmen and educators to emphasize the ethical claims of life. In
the writings of the two men, however, Bowne surpasses Berkeley in the
systematic treatment which he gives to the subject of ethics. Berkeley's
doctrine can be learned only by searching through his metaphysical dis-
cussions, his sermons, his essays and his diary* Bowne envisaged the
whole ethical problem, and gave a connected exposition of his doctrine*
Berkeley's ethical assumptions were unquestionably hedonistic. The
chief end of man, as he believed, is happiness, The indications of this
fact are numerous. "The things promised by our Saviour are life and im-
mortality; that is, happiness, large as our desires."^ "It is natural
for us to regard things as they are fitted to augment or impair our own
happiness; and accordingly we denominate them good or evil,"^ But this
happiness is by no means the base gratification of the senses, for "as
the nobler faculties of the human soul begin to display themselves, they
discover to us goods far more excellent than those which affect the
senses,"^ True happiness is inseparable from religion, since "there is
a sovereign omniscient Spirit, who alone can make us forever happy, "^
Yet, while admitting that "there is a restless endeavor in the mind of
man after Happiness", Berkeley cannot limit the ethical motive to mere
self-interest; "it is natural for men not only to have an eye each to his
own happiness, but also to endeavor to promote that of others in the same
rank of being. And so Berkeley's hedonism becomes qualitative and al-
truistic. As to the basis for this altruism, Berkeley feels that it is
best explained by "resolving it into the immediate operation of uod,"^
The hope of immortality is itself conditioned by this aim; "It is in ray
power to be happy a thousand years hence. ""^ Altruism is logically justi-
l-Fraser,IV.90 a-Ib,104 3-lb.l05 4-lb.l05 5-lb,176 6-lb.l88 7-Ib.ie4

126
fied. It seems, only because it is a way to find the hi£:he8t happiness,
because in the happiness of all, one finds the only perfect happiness for
his individual self* "The good of the whole is inseparable from that of
its parts. Yet pervading all of this hedonism, there is a strong tend-
ency to perfectionism, based upon the religious interpretation of life.
Berkeley finds it hard to understand, why, when the "light of the Crospel
Is held forth to guide every man through piety and virtue into everlasting
happiness", men should "scramble for a little dirt within sight of heaveni'^
"We should make life and imaortality our principal business,"^ Religion
alone teaches the true goal of right endeavor; "How little must the amuse-
ments of sense, and the ordinary occupations of mortal men, seem to one
who is engaged in so noble a pursuit as the assimilation of himself to
the Deity, which is the proper employment of every Christian,"^
Bowne differs from this point of view in his initial assumption. He
felt the theoretical difficulties of the problem much more keenly than
did Berkeley. He found truth in both intuitionism and utilitarianism.
He felt obligated to preserve the formalism of Kant and the objectivism
of Schleierraacher . Hence, he sought to reconcile both aspects of the
ethical principle, by uniting the "goods ethics" with the "duty ethics"
in a single system of pure perfectionism. As in the case of Berkeley,
the deepest meaning of life is found only in religion. "The training
and development of souls as the children of G^od, then, is God's essential
purpose in the creation of men; and we must understand our human life
from this point of view."^
JSthics depends upon metaphysics, as is evident when one considers
the ethical consequences which arise from the recognition of personality
as the fundamental reality. I'his means that the only true ends are per-
sons,- and the key to ethical value is found in the sacredness of person-
ality. "The individual may never be regarded as fuel for warming society.
1-J?'raser,iv.l89 2-lb.89 3-Ib.91 4-ib.l72 5-Bowne, Studies in Christ-
ianity, 219
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In a moral syatem, the good he produces he must in some way share. ''^
Yet although ethics is dependent upon metaphysics, the ethical life is
not guaranteed "by metaphysical speculation; the perfect life is found
only when sound metaphysical assumptions are conjoined with the ethical
will to do right, "There is absolutely no crime or baseness whatever
for which a pettifogging intellect could not say something when suborned
by a wicked heart.
Bowne ' s criticism of hedonism rests chiefly upon the proposition that
happiness is a secondary consideration; happiness is a relative conception,
which must wait upon a rational ideal for its meaning. Hedonism "over-
looks the significance of self-consciousness for both pleasure and desire.
for the developed man, most objects derive their value from their re-
lation to self-feeling and self-esteem. The thing does not please us
on its own account, but because it fits into some ideal of ourselves."^
In affirming a qualitative gradation of pleasures, the hedonist intro-
duces a new principle, namely, the rational ideal, in the light of which
the scale of pleasures gets its meaning and validity; and this ideal sup-
plants subjective happiness as the governing principle of the ethical life.
But if the qualitative hedonism of Berkeley is unacceptable to Bowne
as the final account of right living, neither is the Kantian doctrine of
formal good will accepted as a complete statement of ethics. Bowne'
s
personalism leads him to say "that the center of gravity of the good lies
within the person himself; and that within the person the central element
of the good is the righteous will. This is the highest, the beat, the
only sacred thing. Berkeley also had recognized the ethical quality of
the wlll^; but Bowne goes farther. Along with the good will must go some
measure of objective value content. The categorical imperative is empty
without reference to an end.^ "The good will is not sufficient unto it-
self, it needs a field for development and realization; and this field*
l-Bowne,i:'rin.of Ethics, 199 id-.ib.94 3-.lb.6i2-63 4-ib.72 5-Fraser 1.4546-Bowne ,x»rin.of iithi0B,29 *
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is found, not created by the good will. ffhis field consists in the
potentialities of our nature, but these potentialities in turn depend
for their realization in any high degree upon the existence of a devel-
oped social order and also upon the co-working of the physical world it-
self. Learning, science, wealth, and a good degree of mastery of cosmic
forces are necessary to secure for nan anything approaching an ideal
existence even upon the earth."^
Accordingly, the conditions of the perfect life are "both subjective
and objective. "For life has two poles. It demands for its perfection
both outward fortune and happiness and inward worth and peace. a con-
ditioned life like ours cannot reach an ideal form, unless it be in har-
mony both with its objective environment and with its subjective ideals."^
Bowne's system is therefore a synthesis of "subjective ethics" and "ob-
jective ethics**; **in neither field (alone) can we reach a completed sys-
tem;"^ and *'for the final harmony of the two, we must fall back on the
conviction that the world is essentially rational and moral, and will
finally be manifest as such.*'^ Here we have disclosed both the differ-
ence and the agreement of Bowne and Berkeley as touching the ethics. In
Bowne*s synthesis of hedonism and formalism, he parts company with the
Berkeleian ethics; but in seeking a ground for this synthesis, Bowne
definitely comes back to the Berkeleian metaphysics.
But although Berkeley did not attempt any such reconciliation of
conflicting views, he did admit an ethical freedom and an ethical duty,
which tended to balance his hedonism. Says Berkeley, "77e need only open
our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things with a more full and
clear view than we do any of our fellow creatures.**^ ^BvlX what truth is
there which glares so strongly on the mind that, by an aversion of thought,
a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it?**^ Recognizing
that natural laws are but modes of expression of the Divine Will, we are
1-Bowne, principles of Ethics, 73 2-Ib.304 3-lb,204 4-Ib,2055-Fraser ,1.541 6-Xb.546

1^29
obligated to seek to know God*s will and conform thereto, since this
a^one , "and not any prospect of temporal advantage, is the, sole rule
whereby every nan who acts up to the principle of reason, must govern
and square his 'action. Berkeley and Bowne are in strict accord In this
recognition of the ethical imperative in the rational life, and in the
moral responsibility inherent in the freedom of the will* Throughout the
Oomraonplace Book, Berkeley reiterates the principle. The following state-
ment from Bowne seems closely parallel to the reasoning of Berkeley: "As
the study of the world of physical changes leads to the assumption of the
law of causation, so the study of the world of moral action leads to the
assumption of freedom, and the law and condition of the sarae,"^
The ethical ideal is described by Berkeley in a fine passage of the
Alciphron, which closes with the words of the Psalmist, "Very excellent
things are spoken of thee, thou City of God," The conception Includes
both individual and social good, the two elements supplementing each other
in mutual dependence. Speaking in the person of Crito, Berkeley says, "In
a system of spirits, subordinate to the will, and under the direction of
the Father of spirits, governing them by laws, and conducting them by
methods suitable to wise and good ends, there will be great beauty, --
When a man is conscious that his will is inwardly conformed to the Divine
Will, producing order and harmony in the universe, and conducting the
whole by the justest methods to the best end, this gives a beautiful
idea»"*' That Bowne also had such an Ideal is apparent from his doctrine
of "The Good"! "The ideal good is conscious life in the full development
of all its normal possibilities; and the actual good is greater or less
as this ideal is more or less approximated. For man the attainment of
thi^ good Involves the perfection of individual life and of social relations.
For man the good is perfectly realized only In and through the co-working
of the community; indeed, the good exists mainly in the social form. Hence,
1-Fraser ,iV. 105 ;d-Bowne ,Frin.iSthiC8 ,164 3- Fraser
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virtue itself largely takes on the form of workin£: for the common good."^
in the conception of the ethical ideal, iowne and Berkeley unquestionably
stand very close together.
Ihe passages just quoted indicate also the agreement of the two men
in the theory of value. Both agree in the recognition of the intellectual
moral, social, aesthetic, and religious values. Both interpret the xmi-
formity and intelligibility of nature as marks of value, pointing toward
an Author of nature, whose attributes are wisdom and goodness. Both in-
terpret the order of nature as a teleological system, manifesting the
plans and purposes of Crod, And both agree that the ethical vocation of
man is the realizing of value - not merely the values of intellect and
character, but all of the values designed for fulfilment in the infinite
will of (jOd« ao far, Berkeley was a perfectionist* Bowne confirms his
acceptance of such a system of values in an important sentence, "Life
certainly has other than moral interests as these are understood by an
other-worldly religiosity; but nothing can outrank a morality whose aim
2is the attainment of the largest and fullest life»"
Berkeley recognizes both the need of religion as a basis for ethical
motivation, and the ethical problem created by introducing the conception
of an omnipotent (rOd, The question of (rod's omnipotence and its relation
to finite freedom has already received attention in an earlier section.
Neither Berkeley nor Bowne would admit that man's freedom is denied by
trOd's omnipotence, and both saw that such finite freedom may be preserved
by referring moral action not to ontological causality, but to an at-
titude of the will.'' Both saw that the free Will of uod is legislative
over the moral realm and the nat;^ral world alike* But Bowne saw, as
Berkeley probably did not see, the implication of the moral law with
reference to the obligation of (iod. Says Bowne, "We have come to see
that (xod is the most deeply obligated being in existence, and moral prin-
1-Bowne, Principles of 3thics,69 2-Ib,74-.75 3-Fraser ,I*454
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works of love and all that love implies,"^ Yet that relie:ion is some-
thln£j over and above ethical obligation, Bowne is positive, "Religion
has to do with the relation of man to CrOd, and would exist if there were
no sin in the world or in the heart. Indeed, it is only in the sinless
life that the ideal of religion can be perfectly realized; for only there
can we find the filial spirit perfectly realized and perfectly expressed,"
The two philosophers were agreed in this recognition that religion not
only guarantees the validity of the ethical endeavor, but also furnishes
the true ethical ideal*
Neither Bowne nor Berkeley gave much attention to the problem of
evil, yet so far as they did touch upon the problem, they were essentially
in agreement, Natural evil is sufficiently explained by the universality
of law. Berkeley suggests that "the very blemishes and defects of nature
are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety,
and augment the beauty of the rest of the creat ion#**'5 He also suggests
that the judgment of evil may be a mark of our finite understanding, and
that "if we enlarge our view, we shall be forced to acknowledge that
those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be
evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole
system of beings."^ Bowne puts the matter on a slightly different basis;
the justification of natural evil and human suffering is in the fact that
these are conditions of religious value. Life has a higher meaning than
the enjoyment of x-'l^asure; the finer qualities of the personal life are
love and self« sacrifice , and these come to their fulfilment "in the face
of the world's misery and pain and sorrow."^ The great lesson of the in-
carnation and atonement was simply this - redemption through suffering
and sacrifice. Strictly speaking, there is no theoretical solution for
1-Bowne, Studies in Ghri st iani ty ,9 5 2-lb»266 3-Fraser , 1.344 4-Ib«345
5-Bowne, Studies in Chri st ianity ,97
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the problem of evil, for the only solution is in action. Bvil is not so
much a theoretical problem as a concrete task; and Bowne ' s final word is,
"Worlc out your own salvation with fear and trembling.'*^ "We are in a
personal world, a moral world, where character is being wrought out, and
a kingdom of righteousness is being set up."^ This is the same answer
which Berkeley gives to the problem of moral evil - it is a consequence
of human freedom, and human freedom is essential to moral character; char-
acter is achieved only as the finite spirit faces the evil, and overcomes
it with good. Bowne applies the one answer to natural evil and to moral
evil alike. The conception of God and the religious meaning of life offers
the only satisfactory answer - "God works his will in history not apart
from men, but through men and in partnership with them»"
In the program of practical ethics, there was very little difference
between the two men# Both were fairly consistent in the deduction of such
a program from experience and from the primary metaphysical assumption of
the sacredness of personality, Bowne tells us, "The rights to life, proper-
ty, freedom, reputation, and those arising from contract are the elementary
rights in the community. Beyond these, rights have to be left to the
insight and faithfulness of the moral person and to the control of public
opinion,"^ The ethics of society are to be guided according to the ethics
of the individual and the same primary assumption of personality as an
end« Berkeley is dominated throughout his life by an unbroken faith in
his fellowmen, in the Indians of Uorth America^, in the men of England^,
and even in the men of slothful Ireland'''* for all of whom he spent him-
self in personal service. Bowne likewise sustained his word with his
deed, though in less extensive measure than Berkeley.
Concluding our survey of the ethics of the two men, we find that
while Bowne did not borrow directly from Berkeley, he did found his
1-Bowne, The Immanence of God, 153 2-Ib.l52 3- lb, 65 4-Bowne, Principles
of athics,299 5-Fraser,lV.358 6-Ib,360 7-lb.447
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ethical system and the synthesis of opposing views upon the Berkeleian
personalist ic metaphysics; and in the greater part of his ethical doc-
trine, he agreed with Berkeley. The most notable differences are ohserved
in the ethical motive, Berkeley holding a hedonistic doctrine with per-
fectionist tendency, Bowne holding to pure perfectionism; a difference in
Bowne's conscious acceptance of subjective ethics and objective ethics
united in the personali st ic synthesis (Berkeley also allowed these two
elements, but he failed to give them definite reconciliation); and fin-
ally, a difference in the place given to religion, Bowne making it serve
as the practical answer to theoretical problems, whereas Berkeley inclined
to hold the theory complete in itself. This portion of our inquiry serves
to confirm our primary hypothesis of Bowne's relationship to Berkeley,
since we find that even in the philosophical discipline of Ethics, wherein
Bowne disclaims the Berkeleian kinship, a close logical connection is none
the less apparent. We may proceed to consider somewhat more closely the
relationship of the two men in the philosophy of religion.
iv* The Philosophy of Keligion.
Although the philosophy of religion had not been differentiated as
an independent philosophical discipline in Berkeley's day, the essential
elements of religion as a branch of philosophy nevertheless occupied a
central place in the Berkeleian system. It has been well said that "Hany o
of the features of the philosophy of religion were anticipated by Berkeley*
Thus he insists that the study of religion must not merely describe the
contents of sacred writings, and recapitulate the dogmas of theology,
but should also exercise its interpretative and critical functions on
the actual facts of religious experience; and in the strongest terms he
emphasizes that its conclusions must be judged at the bar of human reason,
and that its solutions must satisfy human needs and aspirations."-^ Bowne
also felt that it belongs to the province of philosophy to criticise and
l-G. A. Johnston, The Development of Berkeley's Philo sophy ,321
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evaluate the assumptions and doctrines of religion. We noted, in con-
sidering Bowne's "biography, that he went so far in his critical treat-
ment of religious doctrine that he aroused the resentment of certain
conservative persons among his ecclesiastical brethren and precipitated
a trial for heresy. Notwithstanding this apparent liberalism, however,
Bowne was more conservative in his attitude toward religious conceptions
than Berkeley. This is not to say that Berkeley's personal "beliefs were
more advanced than Bowne's; the contrary seems to have been the case;
Berkeley's sermons indicate that he accepted the traditional eschatology
of the established Ohurch of his day; but in his conception of the re-
lationship between philosophy and religion, Berkeley went farther than
Bowne . Bowne conceived a sort of extra- rat ional province wherein are to
be found "the great catholic beliefs of mankind"; these primal instincts
are not dependent upon rational criticism but are rather the intuitions
with which speculation must begin; within this province, according to
Bowne, no doubts may be raised without endangering the whole structure of
civilization and morality. Berkeley, on the other hand, was ready to
cast even his most cherished beliefs into the crucible of rational examin-'
ation; and his purpose was to accept nothing which could not stand this
test. His Commonplace Book tells us that he had been given to such criti-
cal practice since early childhood.^
in spite of this difference, however, it may fairly be said of both
men that the philosophical inquiry was dominated throughout by religious
interests. xJeither the speculations of Berkeley nor the writings of Bowne
are free from partisanship. Both men accepted the cardinal doctrines of
orthodox Christianity as a thesis to be established, or at least to be
safeguarded, throughout the range of philosophic argument. Berkeley's
opposition to infidelity and free- thinking , and Bowne's corresponding op-
position to naturalism and agnosticism, show how both men proved themselves
l->'raser ,1,79
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champions of the faith.
Both Berkeley and Bowne find the key to value in the nature of per-
sonality. jNOt only laay it be said that persons are the only true ends;
they are the only trwe realities; and whatever is valuable to persons is
for that very reason valuable to the universe. Law and order and uniform-
ity are values because they signify rationality. "The imperfection of
the physical world in itself is its perfection, considered as an instru-
ment for the upbuilding of men."-^ "There is no law of life which is in
itself evil. Whether the laws bring bane or blessing depends on man him-
self. The chief ills under which man suffers are the results of his
own doing. Human sin it is which changes the law into a curse, and
2
even as it is, the law works more good than harm." And the central law
of man's being is the law of self- fulfilment , the obligation to be a com-
plete person. Bowne had a clearer conception of this principle than
Berkeley, as we observed in the survey of the ethics, but Berkeley's
philosophical system also gave place to such a view. Berkeley declares,
"We should make life and immortality our principal business. — When God
dispatches his well beloved son on* this momentous message, shall we remain
stupid and inattentive; and must it be said to our reproach that life and
immortality are pearls before swiney"^ The theory of value does not mean
anthropomorphism, but personalism; it is not as men, but as rational spir-
itual agents, that we find in ourselves the key to value. Personality,
indeed, as we find it in men, is fragmentary and incomplete, but we may
conceive it as perfect in the being of God, It is because we share God's
nature as persons that we find value in ourselves, and this value is in-
creased only as we grow in likeness to God#
The objectivity of value is guaranteed by the same considerations.
Berkeley, indeed, believed that he could offer a cogent demonstration of
the being of God by pointing out the rational character of the physical
1-Bowne, Theism, 276 2-Ib. 276-277 3-Fraser ,IV.91-9S
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world; such a world could only "be the work of the infinite Mind and Will,
But in Berkeley's areuments, he recognized that the theistic doctrine
represents a aighty faith rather than an axiomatic certainty. His attack
upon the "infidel liatheraat ic ian" was intended to prove that science and
mathematics, no less than religion, are grounded upon faith* The deeper
justification for the theistic belief is found in the fact that it answers
the fundamental needs of life and satisfies the demand for rational con-
sistency. "When life and immortality are at stake, we should play our
part with fear and trembling, though "twere an hundred to one but we are
cheated in the end,"^ Bowne likewise recognizes that the theistic doc-
trine is a postulate of faith rather than a demonstration. Of the onto-
logical proof, Berkeley had said, "Absurd to argue the existence of God
from his idea."^ Bowne likewise rejected the "proof" of Crod, but he goes
on to add, "so far from concluding that theistic faith is baseless, 1 hare
sought to show that essentially the same postulate underlies our entire
mental life»"^ The argument "mainly belongs" to "the field of life and
action. Logic has only a regulative function with respect to the great
beliefs by which men and nations live. Theism is the fundamental postulate
of our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without assumption,
but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests."^
As thus stated, the proposition sounds dogmatic; and it must be ad-
mitted that a certain measure of dogmatism was characteristic of both
Berkeley and Bowne, though Berkeley inclined to correct this weakness in
later life. There is, however, a logical ground for the theistic faith.
It rests primarily upon the Berkeleian assumption that the total universe,
existential and valuational, is a single rational unity. "The sharp dis-
tinction which we find in Kant between the necessity of the natural world
and the freedom of the moral realm has no counterpart in Berkeley,"^ The
same infinite Spirit is the author and sovereign Lord of the world of
l-Fraser ,1V.93 2- Fraser ,1,44 3-Bowne, Thei8m,iv. 4-lb.iv.
5-G, A. Johnston, The Development of h^riiQl^y* a Jehilo sophy ,306
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power and the world of meaning, the world of fact and the world of value;
for there Is tut one world - the world of persons, of whom Crod is Father.
And herein lies the guarantee of value; it is sustained as the physical
order is sustained, "bj^ the mind and will of God. "Shall every other
passion he rightly placed by nature, and shall the appetite of Immortality,
natural to all mankind, be alone misplaced, or designed to be frustrated?**
Berkeley asks.^ And as if in answer, Bowne replies, "All that is normal
to man and demanded by his life has its place in the divine purpose.
To think otherwise is atheism."^ Neither Berkeley nor Bowne make any
serious attempt to prove the being of God, but both insist that the real-
ity of God is the necessary postulate underlying all experience. Values
are objective because God is real.
Berkeley observes, however, that the "being of God is a point in
itself of small consequence, the great point being the sense in which
the word God is to be taken."'' Both Bowne and Berkeley draw their con-
ception of God from the analogy of the finite spirit. Says Berkeley, "All
the notion I have of God is obtained "hy reflecting upon my own soul,
heightening its powers and removing its imperfections,"^ Again, he tells
us, "if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and con-
catenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty and
perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller
parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence
of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and
pleasure, and the instincts of natural inclinations, appetites, and
passions of animals; - I say if we consider all these things, and at the
same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Sternal,
Infinitely Wise, Good, and ferfect, we shall clearly perceive that they
belong to the aforesaid spirit, 'who works all in all* and 'by whom all
things consist."*^ From this utterance, it seems clear that Berkeley's
l-Fraser ,IV, 144 2-Bowne,The Immanence of God, 146 3- Fraser , II . 178
4-Fra8er ,i .448 b-lb,240
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primary conception of God was a logical inference, based upon observation
and introspection.
While Bowne agreed in his analogical mode of reasoning, he supple-
mented this inferential procedure, in a way rather foreign to Berkeley,
"by the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and by the inner
witness of religious experience. Bowne was far from setting apart a dis-
joined section of life as alone religious, yet he admitted an element of
mysticism which we do not find in Berkeley. From the witness of Christ,
Bowne drew the conception of God as Father - a conception which he empha-
sized - and the interpretation of life as a filial relationship to God,
From the witness of inner experience, he drew the conception of God as
a spiritual presence, immanent not only in the works of nature, but also
in the conscience and works of men. From this three-fold conception of
God in nature, God in history, and God in the moral and spiritual con-
sciousness, Bowne builds up his doctrine of the "Divine Immanence", and
from it, he gets his definition of religion. "Religion conceived as a
specialty, as a matter of prayers and rites and ceremonies, is a minor
matter, and one of no great importance; but religion conceived as a
principle which knows no distinction of secular and religious, but per-
vades all life, and perpetually offers unto God in living sacrifice as
its continual spiritual worship, the daily round with all its interests
and activities, sanctified by the filial spirit - this is the ideal of
humanity, Berkeley acknowledged the immanence of God in the universe,
but he failed to make the religious use of this conception which Bowne
made*
This difference of emphasis upon the inwardness of religion, which
distinguishes the view of Bowne from that of Berkeley, enters also into
the specific doctrines of religion as conceived by the two men. Thus,
the revelation of God for Berkeley is not primarily the revelation in
1-Bowne
, immanence of God, 145
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Christ, but the revelation in nature. Though he accepted the Christian
doctrines, he appears to have had the Old Testament thought of an august
majestic sovereign, rather than the Christian conception of a loving
Father. For Bowne , on the other hand, the Christian revelation is "prim-
arily and fundamentally, a revelation of the righteousness and grace of
Uod. it tells us how God feels toward us; what he has made us for; what
he has done and is doing for us; how we are to think of life and its
meaning, of death and destiny, of our mutual human relations also, and
the spirit in which we are to live,"-^ The Bible is inspired, only be-
cause, and in so far as, it conveys this revelation to us. Prayer for
Berkeley is an address to the Deity; for Bowne, it is a communion be-
tween the child of God and the Heavenly Father. "Religion is not all on
one side, as if we prayed into the empty air with not even an echo in
response."^ In this possibility of mutual relationship of the finite
and the Infinite Spirit is the "real foundation for the demand for a
self-evidencing inner life, in which the soul shall become aware of divine
help and know that it is not alone, because the Father is with it."*"^
Berkeley's sermon on "The Mission of Christ" sets forth the formal doc-
trine of salvation without much appreciation of the inner meaning of
regeneration; yet he did recognize the personal responsibility in the
effort for salvation. Says he, "If we will be saved, we must do some-
thing on our parts also, and, without relying altogether on the suffer-
ings and merits of Christ, work out our ov;n salvation with fear and
trembling***'^ For Bowne, the whole meaning of salvation is encompassed
in the true filial relationship to God. "God's aim is to bring men to
the recognition of his presence and purpose in their lives, and to a
filial acceptance of that purpose in all their conduct*"^ "Without
doubt the Holy Spirit must assist us in our efforts. The weak will must
1-Bowne, Studies in Christianity ,6 2-Ib.239 3-Ib.238 4-Fraser , iV.201
5-Bowne, Studies in Christ ianity, 225
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strengthened, the dull conscience rauat be enlightened, the wayward af-
fections must be fixed -- but its effect for us, and the only intel-
ligible meaning we can ascribe to it, must consist in the turning of heart
and will toward uod in the set purpose to please and to serve him,"^ Bowne
emphasized an element v/hich Berkeley failed to grasp; even in Berkeley* s
sermon on the text, "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples,
if ye have love one to another", he seems to have emphasized the letter
and missed the spirit of the commandment.
Bowne and Berkeley agreed in the metaphysical account of the
Incarnation. Here, Bowne appears not to have reckoned with his familiar
principle of Divine Immanence; for Christ is portrayed as the pre-existent
second member of the Trinity, who voluntarily "became subject to the con-
ditions, laws, and limitations of human life, and thus became in the
truest sense of the word a man."^ "The Son leaves the glory which he
had with the >'ather and enters into the human lot and becomes obedient
unto death that he may reveal the father and reconcile men to God. There
is great mystery here -"^ Berkeley's language is almost identical: "The
Lamb of God, the internal Son of the Father, clothed himself with flesh
and blood that he may tread the winepress of the wrath of God, and offer
himself a ransom for us."^
Similarly the two men agreed in the account of miracles. Miracles
mean not the breaking of God's law, but the applying of God's law to
special needs. The thing which serves as a distinguishing mark of the
divine purpose is the value manifest in the consequences of the event.
Thus, the virgin birth, the resurrection, the conversion of jeaul, and
other events, apparently supernatural, are no more abnormal than any
other natural events, save in respect to their religious significance.
The thing which Bowne repeatedly emphasizes, (and in this respect, he
agreed with Berkeley) is the divineness of the natural and the natural-
l-£owne. Studies in Chr i st ianity ,229- 230 2-Ib.91 3-ib.97 4-l!'ra8er , i V. 200
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ness of the divine. (iod is working in and through all of the universe,
and save for the freedom of the finite will in the power of self-
direction, all power belongs to ttod*
The meaning of religion seems to have been different in the respect-
ive views of the two men. *'or iserkeley, it was primarily adoration; for
Bowne , it was primarily a filial fellowship with trod. Berkeley describes
the working of (iod in nature, quotes copiously from the Bible concerning
the attributes of Deity, and then asks, "Can the mind of a philosopher
rise to a more just and magnificent idea of the Deity than is here set
forth?"-^ The suggestion is that of intellectual contemplation. Bowne,
on the other hand, assures us, "It is only in the sinless life that the
ideal of religion can be perfectly realized; for only there can we find
the filial spirit perfectly realized and perfectly expressed."*^ "If we
are God*s children, there must be some way of direct c ommimicat ion with
our Father."^ The central thought here is that of spiritual fellowship.
Both men recognized the pragmatic value of religion, and both realized
its ethical significance, but Bowne added to these conceptions the inner
element of mystical fellowship with God, which is not found in the
logical expositions of Berkeley.
Briefly stated, the examination of Bowne* s philosophy of religion
as set forth in his various religious writings has confirmed the hypothe-
sis of Bowne' s relationship to Berkeley. The doctrinal identity is
chiefly to be noted in the theory of value and the basis for value ob-
jectivity. Bowne and Berkeley agreed in the personalistic account of
value and in the theistic ground of value objectivity. They both admitted
the critical function of philosophy in relation to religion, yet both
approached philosophy with a certain religious partisanship. While
Berkeley was more conservative than Bowne in his theology, Bowne allowed
an extra- rat ional element in his religious thought which was foreign to
1-J?'raser ,17. 182 2-Bowne, Studies in Ohri st iani ty ,266 3-ib,274

142
Berkeley. In the formal account of specific doctrines, and in the con-
ception of God as the immanent and perfect Lord of the universe, the two
men agreed, but Bowne differed from Berkeley in emphasizing the subjective
significance of religion, the kindred relationship of Uod and man, and
the element of mystical fellowship. The agreements are far greater than
the differences, and the cardinal principle of theistic personalisra holds
the central place. We may conclude that the Berkeleian idealism was the
dominant factor in Bowne* s philosophy of religion, though the details of
religious conception in Bowne' s view were somewhat modified from the
specific views of Berkeley,
V. The Critical Exposition of Kant.
We come now to a particularly interesting phase of our investigation,
namely, Bowne* s criticism of Kant, as set forth in the book, "Kant and
Spencer, a Critical Exposition." This portion of the study assumes
special importance by reason of the relationship which both Berkeley and
Bowne sustained toward Kant. Y/e have already seen how Berkeley anticipat-
ed certain elements of the Kantian doctrine; and we have noted Bowne*
s
statement that in his own system, he has combined the Kantian principles
with those of Berkeley. We may now inquire hovr far Berkeley would agree
with Bowne in Bowne* s acceptance and criticism of Kant.
in general, it may be stated that Bowne accepted Kant's a-priorism,
his principle of criticism, and his pragmatism, while rejecting Kant's
agnosticism, his subjectivism, his dualism and his mechanism. This gen-
eral statement needs considerable explanation in order that the Berke-
leian kinship may be clearly defined. Bowne ' s treatise is indeed a
"critical exposition". He begins by accepting the Kantian proposition
that we need to inquire how experience is possible. Bowne agrees with
Kant in rejecting the sensat ionalistic psychology of Hume, and the empir-
ical conception of the mind as purely passive in sense experience. In
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this respect, Bowne sides with Kant agiainst Berkeley. The mind is
active in consciousness; to have shown this, Bowne declares, was "Kant's
most valuable contribution to speculative thought."-'- The activity of
the mind is found in the universalizing function of consciousness, in
the constitutive act whereby the mind creates its ideals, and in the act
of judgment, wherein particular ideas are assimilated in an idea system,
so as to become articulate items of knowledge. Such active consciousness
is possible through the unity of consciousness (which Bowne feels is but
another name for Kant's transcendental unity of apperception^), and also
through the principles of thought known as categories. Bowne agrees
with Kant that the subjective states of consciousness are valid only as
they have objective reference to a reality beyond themselves. He agrees
that the sense order is phenomenal. He accepts the doctrine of the cate-
gories, but he feels that Kant's tabulation of the categories is arti-
ficial and includes certain conceptions which are not true categories.
He accepts the Kantian doctrine of transcendental freedom, but feels
that the account of phenomenal causality is inadequate. He commends
leant for the logical refutation of theistic proofs, and for the co-
incidental refutation of atheistic proofs. He allows the Kantian claim
that (rOd, freedom and immortality, are postulates of the practical reason.
Just how these doctrines square with the doctrines of Berkeley has been
sufficiently shown in the foregoing pages, for the sane propositions have
appeared in the outlines of Bowne' s own philosophy. It is not primarily
in this positive attitude toward Kant, but rather in Bowne* s critical
attitude that the Berkeleian kinship is most apparent,
Jf'rom the viewpoint of our present study, the most significant fact
revealed in the examination of Bowne ' s treatment of Kant is this - Bowne
uses the Berkeleian philosophy as the basis for his criticism of Kant.
The errors of Kant are to be corrected by a theistic idealism such as
1-Bowne, Kant a Spencer (hereafter abbreviated '''i^,vx o.-')160 £-Ib.74
I
Berkeley advanced. Only once in the treatise is the name of Berkeley
mentioned, and then only to sugcest that "Kant and ±ierkeley, after all,
seemed to differ not so much in the idealistic outcome as in their doc-
trine of knowledge"'^ - an important admission - yet throughout the work,
the principles of Berkeley are constantly "broiight forward to correct
and supplement the deficiencies of iCant»
Bowne criticises Xant's aenosticism. That which is unknov/ahle is
unaff irmable , and serves no useful purpose if it could be affirmed, "If
we can tell what things must be for intelligence, we can cheerfully fore-
go knowing what they are apart from any relation to intelligence."
Berkeley had said virtually the same thing. The objects of sense per-
ception are indeed phenomenal, but this does not mean that they are
"masks of reality."^ "Phenomena will have finally to be defined as
4
objects or phases that exist only for intelligence." This was Berke-
ley's definition exactly. There are no "thinge-in~themselves" which
"continually elude us". "All the objects of perception - immediately
take on the character of objectivity; that is, of independence of the
knowing and in our own case of the knower. They are things to be per-
ceived, or they are facts of the inner life, and the function of thought
is not to make the facts but to report them."^ There is a slight dif-
ference here from the doctrine of Berkeley, yet the language is very
suggestive of the Berkeleian dictum, and the repudiation of an unknowable
substratum of thing- in- themselves was certainly anticipated by Berkeley.
The chief attack which Bowne makes upon Kant is in the matter of
Kant*s subjectivity. If the categories are merely subjective, as Kant
holds, and if through the categories, the mind builds the world of
nature for itself, what guarantee is there that any reality exists out-
side the subject? Kant "has a world of things in themselves of whose
existence he appears to have no doubt, but which he thinks we can never
1-Bowne, K.& 3.107 2-Ib.ll3 3-Ib.ll3 4-Ib,113 5-1^.114-115
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know; and then he proceeds to deal with these things in such a fashion
as to make them utterly empty, without any contents whatever. And this
is true not merely of the world of things, but also and equally of the
world of persons*"-^ If we take Kant*s doctrine of the a-priori char-
acter of the categories "in strict literalness, the result is to shut us
up to solipsistic negation and nihilism."^ Bowne's own solution of
this difficulty is not to affirm an objective order of unknowable entities
as the underlying ground of phenomena, but to affirm the objectivity of
the categories of thought. The categories are not merely laws of thought,
but also laws of things; and the objectivity of things must be guaranteed
by a cosmic intelligence whose thought categories become cosmic laws.
"Now the only way to secure this result is a way which Kant never
took, but one which a disciple of Kant must take if he is not to fall
into the Kantian agnosticism and scepticism. First, we must define phe-
nomena not as appearances or illusions or masks of any kind, but as
something existing only for and through intelligence. Then we must pass
behind these phenomena to the intelligence through and for which they
exist. In our own case, the phenomena of the outer sense are the world
of external perceptions. As phenomenal, they exist only through and
for intelligence. We apprehend them through our own intelligence, but
they do not depend upon our intelligence for their existence; and since
they must depend upon intelligence for existence, it only remains that
we affirm a backlying Intelligence as their cause and presupposition."'^
The whole argument is virtually identical with the Berkeleian idealism.
The world is "idea", Berkeley said; not merely mental conception, but
mental expression; and since things "do not exist in my mind, or that
of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all,
or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit.""^ This interpre-
tation, to be sure, is based not upon Berkeley's earliest conception of
1-Bowne, K.& 3.46 2-Ib.81 3-.Ib.124 4- Fraser ,1,260-261
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ease 1 g perclpi . but upon his later recognition of the function of the
Will. Berkeley had seen, long before iiowne , that if the subjectivity of
consciousness and the ideality of the world Is to be maintained, the only
escape from solipsism lies in the assumption of a Supreme Mind as the
World Groundo
Bowne develops the criticism by a further contention. Kant's error,
says Bowne, lay in his failure to see the double meaning of "subjective*'.
"We may mean subjective to some individual, Or we may mean by sub-
jective something that exists only in and for intelligence, not something
apart from mind and independent of all consciousness. "Now these dis-
tinctions escaped iCant, In general, he viewed space as a phase of human
subjectivity only, and declined to say anything of what might lie beyond*
The limitations of the sub j ec t Ivl st Ic account of knowledge can be escaped
only as we pass beyond the plane of the finite to include the Infinite,
only as we pass beyond humanism to theism. "The only reality Is God and
his progressively unfolding plan and purpose and work, and the world of
finite spirits. In this case also, we should have a relativity, but not
an Illusion, a validity of knowledge within the sphere which finds its
ground and warrant in the plan and purpose of the Creator."^ Bowne uses
an Illustration In his argument which is distinctly Berkelelan - the
notion of a reader of a manuscript. Inferring an Intelligence as the
author of the manuscript. "Plainly we should have to say that our Inter-
pretation is not merely conditioned by our own mental nature, but also
by the nature of the manuscript Itself, and probably we should find no
resting-place for the meaning In the manuscript. We posit the mind
behind the manuscript, of whose thought the manuscript Is the expression.
The Berkelelan character of this thelstlc, per sonall st ic argument which
Bowne advances as the corrective of Kant's subjectivism, needs no further
comment than the citing of these representative quotations*
l-Bowne,A.db 3.121 ii-Ib.l22 3-Ib.l46 4-Ib.23
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Bowne further criticises Kant for hia "incomraensuratle dualism" of
thought and thing. "On the one hand, are things utterly unrelated to
thought, and on the other, is thought utterly unrelated to things.
This produces only the most inconsistent of skepticisms."^ Berkeley had
also attacked such an irrational dualism, and had offered the same solution
which Bowne offers, namely, spiritualistic monism. Bowne also charges
that Kant has committed the fallacy of "abstraction" in setting up the
categories as principles, without seeking their ontological meaning. We
have pointed out earlier how far Berkeley agreed with Bowne in the argu«
ment of the per sonal i st ic implication of the categories. We need only
mention in addition that the "abstraction" argument brought against Kant
is another item suggesting the system of Berkeley. Finally, Bowne attacks
Kant for retaining a scheme of mechanical necessity in his account of
nature. Necessity itself becomes intelligible only as it is traced to a
rational ground, and phenomenal causality must be accounted for ultimately
in terms of free causal agency. Here again, the Berkeleian reasoning had
anticipated that of Bowne.
The result of this examination of Bowne* s criticism of Kant con-
tributes very materially toward answering the initial question of our
treatise. It shows that the chief elements of Bowne*s theistic person-
alism logically point toward Berkeley rather than Kant. It shows that
Bowne agreed with Kant in the general principles of eplstemology but cor-
rected the Kantian defects with Berkeleian principles. It shows Bowne
making Important criticisms of Kant with arguments which Berkeley had
clearly anticipated. And most important of all, it shows, in the meta-
physical view of reality, that the Berkeleian Idealism holds the central
and dominant place, while the Kantian view is accepted only as a corrective
of the Berkeleian doctrine.
1-Bowne, K. & 3. 137-138
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vi. aumnar;' of the Berkeleian elements
in the philosophy of Bowne.
The analytical part of our investigation has been accomplished. We
have traced the Berkeleian relationship through the various divisions of
Bowne' 3 reasoning, and we may state in summary the results found. In the
analysis of the epi stemology , we found that, although Bowne professed to
reject the Berkeleian teaching, he agreed with Berkeley in numerous im-
portant phases of the doctrine. He agreed in acceptance of the unity and
identity of the self, the recognition of fallacies, the activity of the
mind, the intelligibility of reality, the coherence and pragmatic criter-
ion of truth, the acknowledgment of formative categories of thought, the
spiritualistic imi'.licat ions of epi steraology , the knowled£,e of self and
of other selves, and the knowledge of trOd. Bowne disagreed in his empha-
sis on the interaction of objects, the constitutive function of conscious-
ness, the detailed account of the categories, the universality of ideas,
the complete acceptance of epi atemological dualism and the provision for
objective reference.
In the analysis of the metaphysics, we found that Bowne agreed v/ith
Berkeley in the epi stemological approach to t?ie problem, in the causal
criterion of reality, the i^henomenali ty of the sense order, the person-
alistic solution of identity and causality, the theistic World uround,
the spiritualistic conception of personality and the immanence of bOd in
the world. Bowne disagreed with Berkeley only in certain methods of de-
duction and in the doctrine of minds in relation to ideas, this latter
difference being carried over from the epi st emology . In the ethical
writings, v;e found that while Bowne did not look to Berkeley for his
ethical theory, he gave the Berkeleian metaphysics a central place in his
system, and he agreed with Berkeley in the general trend of his ethical
teaching. Bowne differed in the acceptance of pure perfectionism where
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Berkeley had accepted perfection! at ic hedonism; Bowne differed in the
conscious synthesis of siil)jective and objective ethics and in the prac-
tical function assigned to religion. in practical ethics, the two men
agreed. In the philosophy of religion, fiowne used the Berkeleian ideal-
ism as the basis of valixe and value objectivity. He agreed with Berkeley
in his general theology, but differed in his emphasis upon the mystical,
subjective and practical aspects of religion. Finally, in Bowne's treat-
ment of Kant, we found that while he accepted the general Kantian epistemo-
logy as against the epistemology of Berkeley, he opposed the Kantian meta-
physics because of its agnosticism, subjectivism, dualism and mechanism;
and the Berkeleian theistic idealism is made to serve as the basis for
this criticism.
With these general specifications and distinctions before us, we
seen justified in affirming that the Berkeleian principles permeate
Bowne's entire system of philosophy, and that even in those aspects of
thought in which Bowne disclaimed the relationship, the Berkeleian factor
is present in noticeable degree and serves as a regulative influence. In
the epistemology, Bowne accepts the critical a-priorism of Kant, but still
holds with Berkeley in the idealistic implications of knowledge. In
ethics, Bowne synthesizes Kant and schleiermacher , but theistic idealism
and the claims of religion, as held by Berkeley, determine the direction
of the ethical teaching. In religion, it is the Berkeleian spiritualism
which gives the basis of value; while in metaphysics, the Berkeleian con-
ception is accepted almost in toto. In the light of these observations,
and also in the light of Bowne' a treatment of Kant, it appears that the
central and dominant factor in Bowne* s "Kantianized Berkeleiani sm** is the
Berkeleian conception, while the influence of Kant is corrective rather
than basic,
Bowne' 3 agreement with Berkeley, and also the points of difference,
Oan be understood more readily by reference to the following tabulation:-

Bowne *
1.
Z.
3.
4.
6.
o •
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12o
13.
14.
15,
16.
17.
16,
19o
20.
21.
22 «
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 .
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
2 6.
27.
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Doctrinal Tatle
s 2PISTEM0L0GY -
Importance of epi stemoloey agreed with Berkeley
iJmpirical approach to protlen agreed
Unity and identity of self agreed
interaction of objects Difference (Kantian)
Fallacy of language agreed
Fallacy of abstraction agreed
Mind active in perception Disagreed (Kantian)
Constitutive function of mind partly agreed
Universalizing aspect of thought Uifference (Kantian)
Coherence Criterion of truth agreed
i^ragnatic test of truth agreed
Knowability of object agreed
Subjectivity of consciousness agreed
Rejection of things in themselves agreed
Ideality of sense order agreed
Recognition of categories of thought agreed
Tabulation of categories partly agreed
Meaning of "Ideas" Disagreed (cf . £ * s notions)
objective ref. of mental states partly agreed
Jiipist. dualism re. sense objects Disagreed (Kantian)
apist. dualism re. other selves agreed
Intuitive knowledge of self agreed
Inferential knowl. of other selves agreed
nature a language agreed
nature governed by categories Difference (Green & Lotze)
Knowledge of (jod agreed
Epist. problem solved by metaphysics agreed
METAPHYSICS
Importance of metaphysics agreed
I'ractical and religious interest agreed
Only active being is ontological agreed
i-'er sonali at ic solution of "Identity" agreed
Only persons are truly causal — agreed
Phenomenal causality of sense order --agreed
(Bowne* s invariable sequence)
(Berkeley's sign & thing signified)
One- and-many
,
per sonali st ic solution agreed
Relation betw. God & finite spirit s-partly agreed (difference slight)
Relation betw. God & nature agreed
(Doctrine of divine immanence)
The i Stic World Ground agreed
Mystery of Creation agreed
natural law, mode of divine action agreed
Intelligible universe 6c Supreme Hind agreed
Personality of Supreme Agent agreed
Theistic implic, of tho*t problems--part ly agreed
Value aspect of natural uniformity agreed
(Uniform nature implies goodness of God}
Ideality of Space agreed
Ideality of Time agreed
Mind-dependent character of isature agreed
Doctrine of Self ; agreed
Activity of mind; inertness of ideas agreed
Sensation <Se memory; mind active partly agreed (Kantian influence)
Subject-object account of consciousness --agreed
Mind-body interact ionJ theistitf solution --partly agreed
Freedom of finite spirits of God a moral necessity agreed
rheiiomenal causality subordinate to final causality agreed
Universe ^ uurpoaive or a ox-
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1. Importance of ethical cons-iderat ions agreed
2. iSthical motive - Perfectionism Difference
(Berkeley's perfect ioni st ic hedonism)
3. Personal! at ic tasis for ethical doctrine --agreed
4. Buty ethics dc goods ethics toth allov/ed agreed
5» Duty ethics & goods ethics synthesized Difference
6, Per sonali st ic ground for this synthesis ---agreed
7, Inadequacy of sense hedonism agreed
8, Importance of ideal for qualitative hedonism Difference
9, iSthical quality of good will agreed
10, Social character of ethical obligation agreed
11, iaub j , <3c obj, conditions of perfect life--- agreed
12, freedom oe moral responsibility ' agreed
13, iithical social ideal, "the city of uod»' agreed
14, Jthical individual ideal, p erf ect life --partly agreed
15, t/ocation of man to realize Value agreed
16, Religious basis for ethical life agreed
17, j:ithical expression of religious life ---— agreed
18, Instrumental value of suffering agreed
19, liJvil due to freedom in v/orld of law agreed
20, iSvil solved in action, not speculation slight difference
21, Practical ethical program agreed
RELIGION
1, Religious partisanship in philosophy agreed
2. Per sonalist ic basis for religion agreed
3» Personality the key to Value agreed
4o Per sonal i st ic theistic basis of value ob jectivity--agreed
5. Rejection of ontological proof of (rOd agreed
6. Theism a faith, not a demonstration --partly agreed - slight- difference
Iwote Berkeley's avowed demonstration from Mature)
7o Personali st ic conception of (iod agreed
8, Immanence of God in nature --agreed
in history slight difference
in individual life-- -slight difference
9, Divine revelation agreed
10, prayer - oommunion with uod slight difference
11, salvation, a voluntary harmony with uod -—--agreed
12, incarnation, i^re- exi stent aon in human form--agreed
13, Miracles, special divine action for special value-- agreed
14, Religion, a personal fellov/ship with uod Difference
15, xhe mystical aspect of religion -Difference
BOWi\S'a CHI'I'lClaM UF KAliU
1, Accepts Kant's inquiry, How is experience possible— Difference
2, Accepts criticism of Hume's sensationalism Berkeley agreed
3, Accepts Kant's a-priorism partly agreed
4, Accepts Unity of Apperception agreed
5, Accepts epistemological dualism partly agreed
6, Accepts objective reference partly agreed
7, Accepts phenomenality of sense order -agreed
8, Accepts doctrine of categories partly agreed
9, Accepts Transcendental Freedom agreed
lOo Accepts refutation of theistic proofs dc di sproof s--partly agreed
llo Accepts pragmatism (postulates of pract. reason )-- agreed
12» Opposes Kant's agnosticism agreed
13. Opposes subjectivity of conditions of knowledge agreed
(not merely finite mind which makes nature)
14. Advances theistic metaphysics to correct #13 agreed
15. Opposes things- in-themselves agreed
16. Oriticises solipsistic interpret, of " sub j ec t ive"- agreed
17. Opposes metaphysical dualism agreed
18. criticises failure to seek ont. meaning of categories --partly agreed
19. opposes mechanical necessity in nature agreed

152
Before offering our final conclusions, it v/ould seem proper to
make some appreciative estimate and otjective criticism of Berkeley and
of Bowne
,
noting their respective contributions to philosophy. The fore-
going investigation has furnished us with the significant facts pertain-
ing to both.
J}« Appreciative Jilstimate and Oritioism of Berkeley and of Bowne.
Of the two men, Berkeley is unquestionably the more constructive and
creative thinker. His greatest contribution to philosophy, in the judg-
ment of the present writer, was his clear demonstration of the subjectivity
of consciousness and the ideality of the natural world. This doctrine was
qualified by the additional contention that, notwithstanding the subjectiv-
ity of consciousness, valid knowledge is possible. in support of this
contention, he adduces the important principle that rational consistency,
and not a fancied correspondence between thought and thing, is the test
of truth. He made definite contribution also in his theory of vision,
showing the function of conception and judgment in the process of sense
perception - as ureen puts it, we must see with the mind rather than
with the eye - a principle of vast importance to psychology. He also
served philosophy in asserting that abstractions are not existent ials
,
a point of great historic importance in relation to the long drawn battle
between nominalism and realism. Finally., he earned an immortal place in
the history of personalisra by showing the idealistic implications of
epistemology - more definitely, by shov/ing that the key to metaphysics
is to be found in the conscious personal life.
Along with these excellencies, there were certain weaknesses in
Berkeley's reasoning, which were exposed by his successors. The anthro-
pological aspect of Berkeley's early conception of nature was opposed by
the system of Lotze, and criticised by Bowne; things have more to do than
simply to appear to finite consciousness. Again, Berkeley erred in his

failure to provide for the otijective reference of ideas, a failine; which
particularly^ aroused the Scottish realists. The latter were right in
asserting: that what we actually regard as the ohject of valid thinking
is something other than our own mental states. This objectivity must "be
provided for by a more rational process than merely enlarging the meaning
of the term "idea". Berkeley's attempt to solve the problem in this
fashion led to ambiguity and inconsistency, not to speak of endless mis-
understandings. Berkeley's failure to see the true function of the uni-
versal in relation to particulars, was another weakness, which gave occas-
ion for the sceptical conclusion of Hume, who followed Berkeley's empir-
ical assumptions without allowing for his a-prioristic admissions.- The
need of synthesizing the universals of thought and the particulars of
sensation in the unity of experience was clearly pointed out by Kant.
Berkeley also erred, as Kant contended, in his failure to seek the
meaning of experience before accepting its data. This omission led to
Berkeley's assertion of the passivity of the mind in perception, and his
failure to recognize the constitutive nature of consciousness. There is
much truth in J. Ho Srdmann* s contention that Berkeley made the finite
mind in sense perception identical with Locke's tabula rasa . Berkeley
was open to criticism also in his account of "ideas" as disjunctive,
failing to envisage nature as an organic system of relationships. This
weakness was pointed out by T. H. Green, and forms the object of Bowne's
attack in his doctrine of the interaction of the physical order. Berke-
ley's willingness to determine philosophical questions by considerations
of theological or religious interest, was also a weakness, which exposed
him to the attack of John Stuart isJill. Berkeley's qualitative hedonism
was also open to criticism, and is sufficiently refuted in Bowne*s criti-
cism of the ethics of Mill, Finally, there was a logical weakness in
Berkeley's doctrine of the passivity of "ideas"; Berkeley himself con-
tendsd that ideas are nothing apart from mind, yet he constantly referred
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to them as passive and inert, as if they could be detached from mind in
the account of knowledge and reality. It should "be recognized, as cer-
tain of Berkeley's critics have pointed out, that mind apart from its
ideas or the ideas apart from mind is equally abstract and unreal. In
separating these two aspects of consciousness, Berkeley left his doctrine
open to his own valid criticism of the fallacy of abstraction.
Bowne's philosophical system shared the excellencies of Berkeley's
doctrine, but lacked the originality of the latter. Bowne's strength
was not that of creative philosophical genius, but rather the intellect-
ual power of a systeraatizer and expositor of doctrine. His power of ex-
position, as it is found in the careful setting forth of the per sonali s t ic
idealism, is exceptional; and quite as valuable is his interpretation of
religious doctrine according to the idealistic principle. His ability as
a critic, which was the first matter that brought him into prominence, is
likewise noteworthy. His criticism of naturalism and agnosticism still
stands, and in the judgment of the present writer, it will continue to
stand, as a valid refutation of positivism, mechanism, and scepticism,
such as the nineteenth century produced, Bowne has shown how all of these
views depend upon a partial recognition of the data of experience, and
hence,,in their cone lusions, can give only a fragmentary account of life.
In the opinion of the writer, Bowne has made two notable contributions
to philosophy. his first service is that of philosophical synthesis. In
a comprehensive and generally coherent system, Bowne has succeeded in com-
his day. In this respect, he was indeed preceded by Lotze, and undoubtedly
owed much to his teacher, but Bowne accomplished a far more complete syn-
thesis than Lotze. In his system, he united the elements of empiricism
and transcendentalism, realism and idealism, pragmatism and rationalism,
science and religion, the teachings of Berkeley and the teachings of Kant.
In a day when many philosophers were saying, "Either -- or it was
factors of thought in the philosophical schools of
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good to find one who could say, "Both and Bowne faced the
challenge of alternatives, and v/rought out a philosophy of syntheses,
To have accomplished this was a distinct advance in constructive thought.
What was possibly an even greater service was the contribution
which Bowne made to philosophy through his use of the conception of
personality as a methodological principle. In living personality, Bowne
found the solution for the paradoxes of thought - change and identity,
freedom and determinism, the one and the many, the universal and the
particular, subject and object. Personality is the key to reality and
to value, "Personality is the ultimate principle; it cannot be ex-
plained by anything else, but everything else can be explained by it.
Thus 'per sonali sm' becomes the distinctive name for Bowne • s contribution
to metaphysics, and as a summary account of the curve of metaphysical
speculation since Kant," says Professor Hocking^ "there is no more powerful
and convincing chapter in American metaphysical writing than that of Bowne
on *The failure of impersonali sm. • Here again, Bowne followed Lotze;
and before Lotze, the principle had been taught by Berkeley; but Bowne
gives to the conception an emphasis and a prominence sustained by logical
support, which had never before been given. The elevation of personality
into the central place of philosophical method marked Bowne* s originality.
It was not without truth that Bowne was able to say, "I am a Personalist,
the first of the clan,"
As in the case of Berkeley, there were certain weaknesses in Bowne'
s
philosophy and mode of presentation. There is noticeable a tendency to
dogmatism, such as characterized Berkeley in early life, but somewhat
more marked in the case of Bowne. Berkeley inclined to correct this
tendency in his later years, but Bowne seems not to have softened. Close-
ly akin to this tendency was the scathing use which Bowne made of sarcasm.
He seems not to have exercised Berkeley's youthful admonition to himself
1-V/. E.Hocking in Methodist Keview,CV,#3
,p . 374
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"to rein in y® satirical nature."^ As Professor Palmer otserved, when
Bowne was giving public utterance to his convictions, **he drove that
message home with pungent insistence and a superb scorn of all who were
disposed to other views,"^ Bowne felt himself to he a disciple of no one,
having thought out independently, as he said, the outlines of his system;
this fact, coupled with his peculiar view of the freedom of truth as a
universal human property, may account for the fact that he rarely made
reference to other thinkers, save by way of criticism. If he was indebted
to other thinkers for any essential elements of his system, he was appar-
ently unconscious of the dependence, for he makes few acknov/ledgment s
,
even to those with whom he agreed. His references to Berkeley are the
more significant in consequence.
The acceptance of a certain extra- rat ional province of thought marks
Bowne' s concession to the claims of intuition. This concession seems to
have been linked up with another trait which Bowne shared in common with
Berkeley, namely, his religious partisanship. Hocking has rightly pointed
out in his "The Cleaning of God in Human iixperience" , that religious mysti-
cism is a valid element of experience, and that for the sake of acquiring
this element, there must be an occasion for the admission of new and un-
rationalized experience when intellectual anarchy has its day, but that
such elements can receive the final sanction of intelligence only as they
are ultimately rationalized. Life is indeed deeper than logic, but life
is not illogical, nor is the spirit a thing apart from intelligence. The
pragmatic element in both Berkeley and Bowne needs to be qualified by
this rationalistic interpretation of life. Finally, Bowne like Berkeley
inclines to regard ideas as inert. The same criticism made of Berkeley
may be made of Bowne - the inertness of ideas is a possible view only
through the fallacy of abstraction.
With this objective estimate of the two men, our study is complete.
'•Ve are now able to state concisely our final conclusions.
1-J!raser,i.s;d ii-ij<.G
. Wilm, studies in philosophy ix 'x'heo logy ,14

IIJ. COi^lCLUSlONS
This research was undertaken to determine the relations "between
Berkeley and Bowne. .Ve were encouraged to make the investigation not
only because certain obvious similarities in the doctrines of the two
men at once suggest a logical relationship, but also because Bowne him-
self affirmed in a degree the Berkeleian character of his system. In
the case of a maturely developed thinker like Bowne, it was hardly to
be expected that we coiild trace the actual genesis of his beliefs, nor
have we attempted to do so; but the hope of evaluating and correlating
logically and historically the elements of his developed thought was
deemed sufficient justification for our study,
A survey of the literature on Berkeley made at the beginning of
our inquiry disclosed two facts bearing upon the subject of investi-
gation: first, the modern interest in Berkeley has been far-reaching,
tending to substantiate the assertion of xlill, JSorris, Haldane and others,
that no thinker in modern time has escaped the Berkeleian influence;
second, the interest in Berkeley was particularly notable during the
years when Bowne was passing through the formative period of his life
as a college student; the volume of writings upon Berkeley which ap-
peared at that time and also during the later years of Bowne' s maturity,
rendered it easy for Bowne to find access to the Berkeleian thought and
influence, and makes exceedingly probable the hypothesis of Bowne*
s
early and continued acquaintance with Berkeley.* The survey of liter-
ature on Bowne showed that at least four different writers (Dick, 7/ilm,
McConnell and Brightman) have affirmed Bowne' s doctrinal relationship
to Berkeley, although none has attempted to prove the relationship.
A study of the biographical data pertaining to Berkeley and Bowne
Note - Bowne owned a set of Berkeley's writings of the 1871 Fraser
edition. Unfortunately for the purposes of this research, however,
the volumes contain no markings of any kind other than Bov/ne's book-
plate, iiven the date of purchase is not entered. These books at
present are owned by Urew Theological Seminary.
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showed numerous parallel traits of character, kindred inclinations,
aims, conceptions and similarity of intellectual environment, which
would suggest that Berkeley and Bowne might easily have followed the
same general trend of philosophic thought. This suggestion was "borne
out by the observation of numerous doctrinal similarities v/hich are
at once apparent to the casual student of their respective systems.
Bowne' 3 Berkeleian kinship was further substantiated by the witness
of Bowne himself; he called his metaphysical system "Kantianized Berke-
leianism**, and admitted that "a strong smack of Berkeley's philosophy"
appears in his doctrine. This testimony was borne out by Bowne'
s
direct references to Berkeley through the course of the philosophical
writings; such references indicated, in the main, a favorable attitude,
and were of more than ordinary significance, because of the infrequency
with which Bowne mentioned other writers, or made acknowledgment to his
predecessors. Moreover, Bowne' s use of characteristic Berkeleian ex-
pressions and phrases indicated not only Bowne ' s familiarity with Berke-
ley's writings, but also a fondness for the Berkeleian modes of utterance.
A review of the relations between Berkeley and various eminent
thinkers who followed him, showed three things of importance: first, it
revealed the potency of the Berkeleian influence upon the ensuing trend
of thought; second, it showed the critical elements which tended to cor-
rect the Berkeleian doctrine and so make the doctrine itself more reason-
ably acceptable; and third, it indicated some of the channels through
which the Berkeleian Influence may have been mediated to Bowne, all of
the thinkers in question being men to whom Bowne gave considerable at-
tention, iiiore specifically, we found that Hume showed the inadequacy
of a purely empirical theory of knowledge; Kant showed the task which
the mind itself performs in consciousness, the function of categories,
and the objective reference of thought in a dualistic world of knowledge;
the Scottish Realists showed the importance of primary postulates, rooted
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in life, and the need of providing for objectivity of knowledge; Mil
emphasized Berkeley's positive teachings, renewed the stress on prag-
matic considerations, and at the same time, "by the deficiencies of his
own ethical doctrine, showed the inadequacy of hedonism; Green showed
the need of affirming objective relationships, and of viewing the world
as an organic unity, grounded in mind; Lotze showed the importance of
personality as a synthesis of the antitheses of thought. All of these
criticisms, we recognized as corrections, but not rejections, of the
basic metaphysical principle of Berkeley, which reduces all reality to
Hind and the activities of Hind, We found that Bowne's doctrine agreed
with the Berkeleian idealism as modified by these contributions and
criticisms*
Tracing the Berkeleian likeness through the detailed doctrines of
Bowne, we found that the Berkeleian element holds a central place in
Bowne's entire philosophical system. The extent of Bowne's agreement
with Berkeley and also the extent of his difference was indicated in
tabular outline. In summary of the analysis, v;e found that while Bowne
professed to reject the epistemology of Berkeley in favor of the doc-
trine of Kant, he differed from Berkeley only in the clearer recognition
of the a-prioristic and constitutive character of consciousness and in
the universal affirmation of epistemological dualism; even in these re-
spects, there is a large measure of agreement, inasmuch as Berkeley went
far toward anticipating the Kantian epistemology. In the metaphysics,
Bowne accepted the total idealistic system of Berkeley, differing only
in a few minor details and in certain methods of reasoning; the Berkeleian
metaphysics holds a central place in all of Bowne's argument. In ethics,
Bowne avowedly paid no attention to Berkeley, yet aside from Bowne's
synthetic treatment of intuitioniam and utilitarianism, and also his
clear acceptance of perfectionism, the two men stand very close together,

the personali St Ic account of value and the ethical ideal being paramount
for both; moreover, it is the Berkeleian conception of personality which
serves as the basis for £owne*s synthesis of opposine ethical principles.
In religion, there is essential identity of doctrine, the one noticeable
difference being Bowne's emphasis on the mystical aspect of religious
experience; Berkeley's theistic personalism gives the key to value and
furnishes the guarantee of value objectivity. In Bowne's criticism of
Kant, it is the Berkeleian doctrine which is used to correct the errors
of Xant; there is a large measure of agreement with Berkeley in the
positive elements of the criticism, while the negative criticism clearly
rests upon the Berkeleian foundation of theistic personalism, and accords
with the Berkeleian reasoning in nearly all of the specific arguments.
In the light of this analysis, it seems clear that Berkeleian principles
furnished the framework of Bowne's philosophical system, together with
a considerable part of the detail. Even in those sections, chiefly
epi stemological , wherein Kant may be thought to have influenced Bowne's
reasoning, the Kantian teachings had largely been anticipated by Berkeley.
Hence, we may say of Bowne's philosophy that the Berkeleian cast of
thought was basic, while the Kantian influence was corrective and
regulatory.
The question may fairly be raised whether the Berkeleian character
of Bowne's thought is indicative of actual dependence upon Berkeley, or
u -<' •
whether the similarity was merely a logical co-incidence touching two
independent thinkers. a'o this question, we can give no positive answer.
It seems that Bowne was not consciously dependent upon Berkeley or upon
any one else, for he declared himself to be a disciple of no one; and
he is reported to have said privately that he worked out the essentials
of his system independently in his youth. It is only fair to accept
Bowne's statement of the matter, recognizing that whatever Berkeleian
influence reached him may have come indirectly and may have been uncon-
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aoiously assimilated. The more oredit is due Bowne in view of this
fact, for he worked out an idealistic system which, in its comprehensive-
ness and logical coherence, was undoubtedly superior to the system of
Berkeley. Nevertheless, it should "be remembered that the Berkeleian
teachings formed an important part of Bowne' s thought inheritance, and
he could have responded only to those elements of his early instruction
which he found acceptable. Logically and historically, therefore,
Berkeley was Bowne* s philosophical ancestor, though Bowne undoubtedly
did much indep^endent work.
The question whether Bowne* s kinship to Berkeley should take pre-
cedence over his relation to Lotze, is another question which cannot
be answered arbitrarily. The identities between Bowne and Lotze are
indeed very many; and Bowne himself in his first edition of the Meta-
physics admitted that "the conclusions reached are essentially those of
lotze." (Pref.vii) The following considerations have weight in con-
fronting this question: first, Bowne nowhere in his writings refers to
Lotze, except in this early edition of the Metaphysics, whereas he makes
frequent references to Berkeley, and commonly with approval; again, much
of Bowne* s language and argument has a marked Berkeleian flavor; Bowne
himself, at the close of his later edition of the Metaphysics, pub-
lished in mature life, calls his system »*Kant ianized Berkeleiani sm"
.
Since Eraser's first edition of Berkeley's works appeared in 1871, and
this together with Fraser' s earlier writings of 1862 and 1864 attracted
wide attention in the world of scholarship, it seems highly probable
that Bowne became acquainted with Berkeley's philosophy before he
came into contact with Lotze, whom he did not meet until 1874. Finally,
it should be noted that while our comparison of Berkeley and Lotze re-
vealed numerous doctrinal identities, there was this important distinction
- Berkeley taught the doctrines first. In the light of these facts,
it seems proper to give prior recognition to Berkeley. iJevertheless
,
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it must "be admitted that we have no certain proof of the genesis or
source of Bowne ' s idealistic doctrines.* It suffices that their
Berkeleian character is unmistakable.
Our olDjective appreciation and criticism of Berkeley and of Bowne
showed similar excellencies and a few similar weaknesses, so that here
again, the affirmation of Berkeleian kinship was sustained. It was,
however, a kinship only, and not in any strict sense an identity. We
found that Berkeley was more creative and original in his conceptions,
while Bowne * s strength lay in his power as a systematizer and expositor
of doctrine. Berkeley gave the first clear and cogent account of the
modern idealistic conception of knowledge and of reality, so that he
may rightly be called the father of personal idealism. Bowne accomplished
a logical reconciliation between Berkeley and his critics, wrought out
a complete and unified system upon the idealistic foundation, and exalted
personality to the central place in philosophical method, so that he may
rightly be called the first "Per sonali st** . Thus the two men stand as
landmarks in the development of personal idealism, sustaining close and
vital relation to each other, yet each contributing in essential manner
to the course of philosophy. Berkeley introduced the current of personal
idealism; Bowne helped to clarify and widen the stream.
We may summarize our final conclusion as follows:- Attracted to
Berkeley by community of personal interest, by intellectual sympathy,
and by the Christian outlook, Bowne early became acquainted v;ith Berke-
ley, whose personal idealism met Bowne^s favor. Influenced to some ex-
tent by Berkeley himself and by other eminent thinkers whom Berkeley had
stimulated, and influenced even more by the Berkeleian principles which
formed an important part of the intellectual environment, Bowne developed
a system which admitted all of the outstanding and constructive elements
of Berkeley's philosophy and tended to correct the more serious defects
*Kote
- Professor iinudson is authority for the statement that Bowne had
worked out the main outline of his philosophy while in college before he
knew anything about LOtzo.
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of that earlier system. 'I'he Berkeleian principles furnished the frame-
work and much of the content for Bowne's philosophy, while the influence
of Kant was chiefly corrective and disciplinary. The personal idealism,
as taught by Berkeley, gave Bowne the essentials of his metaphysics and
much of the detail for his epi stemology , the key to ethical and religious
value, and the basis for the criticism of Kant. Bowne accepted the
epi stemological principles of Kant, the per sonali st ic synthetic principle
of Lotze, the objectivity of relations as taught by Green, and the prag-
matic emphasis as held by Mill. Bowne* s chief contribution to philosophy
was his synthesis and exposition of doctrines and his setting forth of
personality as a fundamental methodological principle. But through all
the reasoning, the Berkeleian Weltanschauung is predominant, while the
chief modifying influence is that of Kant. Accordingly, it seems fair
to accept Bowne' 3 personalistic philosophy under the designation which
he himself applied, "Kant ianized Berkeleianism" . The Personalism of
Bowne is the modern development of Berkeleian Idealism.
tr
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